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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF CLACKAMAS

WEST LINN-WILSONVILLE SCHOOL
DISTRICT 3JT, a political subdivision of the
State of Oregon,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CITY OF WEST LINN, OREGON, a
municipal entity,

Defendant.

Case No. 22CV06982

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant the City of West Linn (the “City”) submits the following reply to *Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Response”)* and in further support of *Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”)*. This *Reply* is supported by the ongoing records and files herein, together with the supporting declaration of Christopher K. Dolan (“*Dolan Dec.*”), the declaration of Rory Bialostosky (“*Bialostosky Dec.*”), and the supplemental declaration of Edward Trompke (“*Trompke Supp. Dec.*”) filed herewith.

Introduction

“(C)heat” and “swindle” and “biased” and “surreptitiously” and “collusion” and “secret instruction” and even “Machiavellian.” These are all buzz words employed by the District to color the City’s role in securing a joint appraisal. They are nothing more than an appeal to emotion and certainly false characterizations made all the more egregious by the duplicity with which the District has operated. There are no genuine issues of material fact in the record in dispute and the City is entitled to summary judgment on the District’s claims.

///

1 **Analysis**

2 **1. Reply to the District’s Statement of Material Facts**

3 **a. Letter of Intent**

4 The District clearly misstates the scope and purpose of the of the parties’ August 16,
5 2021, Letter of Intent (“LOI”).

6 The District points out that “the LOI did not include any term suggesting the Chapter XI
7 designation would be used to affect the appraisal.” *Response*, P. 5, Ll. 15-16. Related to that
8 claim, the District argues that “(t)he PSA contained a revised version of the appraisal process
9 outlined in the LOI(,)” including a “term * * *(that) was not a deal point in the LOI,” and that
10 “raises a substantial issue of whether this *surreptitiously inserted term* was actually intended by
11 the parties.” *Response*, P. 10, L. 23 to P. 11, Ll. 22. (Emphasis added.)

12 The terms of the LOI are, respectfully, largely irrelevant. That is because the LOI
13 provided only a preliminary framework for the parties’ January 10, 2022, *Real Estate Purchase*
14 *and Sale Agreement* (“PSA”). That cannot be disputed because the LOI expressly stated: “This
15 Letter of Intent *is intended to be for preliminary discussion purposes and not be binding with*
16 *respect to the sale of the Property.*” *J. Williams Dec.*, ¶2, Ex. 1. (Emphasis added.) Moreover,
17 the District’s charge of a “surreptitiously inserted term,” is baseless. (In other words, it does not
18 create a *genuine* issue of material fact.) On this point, the LOI expressly stated: “The
19 Agreement shall include, *but shall not be limited to*, the following terms and conditions(.)” *Id.*
20 That is, the LOI expressly contemplated, and the parties were put on actual notice, that there
21 would be additional terms.

22 Here, the purposed offending term was not hidden from the District’s review. It was
23 included on the first page of the PSA and in the same font and font size as all of the other terms
24 and conditions. It was not kept secret. Moreover, the PSA was “reviewed by the District’s legal
25 counsel, Miller Nash, LLP and found to be acceptable to the District.” *Bialostosky Dec.*, ¶6,
26 Ex. 1.

1 Finally, within its recitation of facts pertaining to the LOI, the District argues: “The
2 parties’ contemporaneous communications were clear that the District wanted to sell the property
3 for \$6,500,000.” *Response*, P. 5, Ll. 18-20. What the Districted “wanted” is also irrelevant
4 (and frankly, self-serving). If the District wanted to sell the property for \$6.5 million, it could
5 have insisted that that term be included in the non-binding LOI, which it signed, and it absolutely
6 should have required that it be included in the binding PSA, which it signed. It did neither.
7 Instead, the District agreed, and thus intended, that the value of Oppenlander would be
8 determined by the appraisal process expressed in the PSA. *See Ryan v. Western Pac. Ins. Co.*,
9 242 Or 84, 90 (1965) (“We have a policy of interpreting the intent of the parties to a contract
10 according to the language of the contract.”) This fact cannot be in dispute: the District stated in
11 its January 10, 2022, proposed District Resolution 2021-08:

12 **FURTHER RESOLVED**, by the authority vested in it under
13 Oregon law and Board Policy DID, the Board does hereby approve
14 the sale of the Property according to the terms and conditions
15 specified in the Agreement, ***including without limitation at a price
determined using the Fair Market Value as further defined and
described in the Agreement.***(.)

16 *Bialostosky Dec.*, ¶7, Ex. 2.

17 The District knowingly assumed the risk that the appraised value would be less than \$6.5
18 million just as the City equally assumed the risk that the appraised value would be more than
19 \$6.5 million. This too cannot be in dispute. At its January 10, 2022, public meeting, the
20 District’s Board Chair admitted:

21 I’m thinking about the risk that both parties take in doing this. ***It’s***
22 ***not without its risks.*** But definitely I think both parties are being
23 responsive to what we heard from the public about the desire to try
and keep this land.

24 *Bialostosky Dec.*, ¶5. (Emphasis added.)

25 The District’s allegation of surreptitious (that is “secret”) behavior is baseless.

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1 **b. Prior Dealings**

2 The District claims that “(b)ased on prior dealings, the District believed the inclusion of
3 Chapter XI language would not reduce the purchase price.” *Response*, P. 5, Ll. 22-23. This was
4 not, however, a term of the PSA, and indeed, it is directly contrary to terms of the PSA, assented
5 to by both parties, which expressly and unambiguously allowed the joint appraiser to consider
6 “all limitations on the permitted use of the Property made as a condition of (the) sale.” *J.*
7 *Williams Dec.*, ¶4, Ex. 2. The purported prior dealings are extrinsic evidence which may not be
8 used to add, subtract, or vary the terms of a contract (let alone a fully integrated contract). *See*
9 *Hyland v. Oregon Agr. Co.*, 111 Or 212, 217 (1924) [(“E)vidence extrinsic to the writing itself, is
10 inadmissible for the purpose of adding to, subtracting from, altering, varying, or contradicting
11 the terms of the written contract or to control its legal operation or effect(.)]”]

12 **c. Purported Instructions to Joint Appraiser**

13 **i. Mr. Trompke was duty bound to zealously represent the City.**

14 In October of 2019, when attorney Edward Trompke was in preliminary discussions with
15 Sam Romanaggi, Mr. Trompke had a duty to zealously represent only his client—the City, and at
16 that time the PSA had not been executed in any event.

17 Subsequent to execution of the LOI, Mr. Trompke repeatedly reached out to the District
18 to determine if the parties would consent to a joint appraiser—including Mr. Romanaggi. That
19 undeniable fact is already in the record. On December 2, 2021, with the appraisal deadline fast
20 approaching, Mr. Trompke reached out (again) to the District’s attorney, James Walker, and
21 advised:

22 We need to get the PSA signed, ***and the appraisal started.*** The
23 city will hare [*sic.*] an appraiser, in that ***the District has been***
24 ***unable to respond*** to our ***requests*** for names ***and consent to one***
the city selected.

25 *Trompke Dec.*, ¶2, Ex. 1, P. 3. (Emphasis added.) Thus, prior to entering into the PSA, (1) the
26 District was not cooperating with the selection of a joint appraiser, and (2) the District had

1 already been made aware that the City had already selected Mr. Romanaggi (whether as the
2 City’s sole appraiser or, if the District was inclined, a proposed joint appraiser).

3 Note that this e-mail communication was sent at 8:42 P.M. on December 2, 2021. *Id.*
4 Mr. Trompke does not mention Sam Romanaggi by name. *Id.* Just over an hour later, Mr.
5 Walker, on behalf of the District, agreed to “using Romanaggi Valuation Services (RVS) for the
6 appraisal.” *Id.* at P. 2. Thus, it is clear Mr. Walker was aware of Mr. Trompke’s selection of Mr.
7 Romanaggi before December 2, 2021. At that time (and at no time thereafter) did Mr. Walker
8 make any inquiry of Mr. Trompke as to the contents of Mr. Trompke’s conversations with Mr.
9 Romanaggi. *Trompke Supp. Dec.*, ¶4. Had Mr. Walker asked Mr. Trompke about such
10 discussions, Mr. Trompke would advise him of any non-work product discussions. *Id.* Of
11 course, the District could have then decided not to proceed with Mr. Romanaggi, but the parties
12 will never know because the District did not ask and Mr. Trompke was still duty bound to his
13 client—only.

14 The October discussions with Mr. Romanaggi occurred prior to any agreement on who, if
15 at all, the joint appraiser would be, Mr. Trompke was duty bound to secure the best deal for only
16 his client. Indeed, Mr. Trompke would have violated that duty if he advocated for a higher
17 price—all for the benefit of the District. Any argument that Mr. Trompke’s October discussions
18 with Mr. Romanaggi was inappropriate—when there was *no agreement* in place on the selection
19 of a joint appraiser—simply fails to account for Mr. Trompke’s duty to zealously represent his
20 client in that moment and under those circumstances.

21 **ii. Mr. Trompke did not “instruct” Mr. Romanaggi.**

22 The District argues that Mr. Trompke instructed Mr. Romanaggi to appraise Oppenlander
23 at a low value. What Mr. Trompke stated, however, was not an instruction, but a simple truism:
24 “(t)he [C]ity wants lower value.” Well of course it did—it was the buyer! And what was the
25 result of this self-servingly described “secret instruction”? Mr. Romanaggi addressed that at his
26 deposition, under oath and under penalty of perjury:

1 Q. Okay. And in the last sentence, Mr. Trompke tells you,
2 quote, the city wants lower value to get voters to approve a
bond to buy it, end quote. Did I read that properly?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What did you take Mr. Trompke's email to you to mean?

5 A. That he needs me to do an appraisal. He needs somebody to
6 do an appraisal. I don't know if he's talking to other ones --
other people too.

7 Q Okay. What about the statement that the city wants lower
8 value? *Did that impact your appraisal of the property?*

9 A. No.

10 *Zahniser Dec.*, ¶3, Ex. 2. (Emphasis added.)¹

11 The District points to former Mayor Walters and Councilor Jones's concerns related to
12 Mr. Trompke's statements to Mr. Romanaggi. Those concerns do not render Mr. Trompke's
13 dealings with Mr. Romanaggi inappropriate. For instance, as the District points out, former
14 Mayor Walters indicates that "the city council (did not direct) city staff to *ask* for a low – lower
15 value to get voters to approve the bond." *Zahniser Dec.*, ¶2, Ex. 1. Mr. Trompke, as indicated
16 above, did not "ask" for a lower value. In any event, Mr. Romanaggi did not allow that to
17 influence his appraisal. Thus, Councilor Jones's concern over a biased appraisal also did not
18 come to fruition.

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24 ¹ Mr. Romanaggi was obligated to testify truthfully. It is presumed that "(t)he law has been
25 obeyed." OEC 311. Unless or until the District tenders admissible evidence that Mr. Romanaggi
26 perjured himself, then it is presumed he testified truthfully, and the only evidence before this
court is that Mr. Romanaggi was, in fact, *not* influenced by Mr. Trompke's innocuous statement.

1 **iii. The District Took Steps to Influence Mr. Romanaggi.**

2 The *only* statement the District takes exception to is Mr. Trompke’s statement that the
3 City wants “lower value.”² But, can there be any genuine doubt that the District wanted to keep
4 the value of the Property high? Even if the District had done nothing, that would still be true.
5 Here, however, the District was proactive in attempting to influence Mr. Romanaggi. This fact is
6 also already in the record. On December 2, 2021, when the District agreed to Mr. Romanaggi
7 serving as the joint appraiser, Mr. Walker informed Mr. Trompke: “The District would also like
8 to submit to the appraiser purchase offers submitted to the District in June 2021.” *Trompke*
9 *Dec.*, ¶2, Ex. 1. Mr. Trompke did not object. *Trompke Supp. Dec.*, ¶3. In fact, the District did
10 provide Mr. Romanaggi with all of the materials the District considered important. Mr.
11 McGough reported to the Board:

12 The District and City agreed on a mutual appraiser. That appraisal
13 is in progress. The District has provided the appraiser all of the
14 information, historical information that they need to make that
appraisal.

15 *Bialostosky Dec.*, ¶4.

16 **iv. There is no evidence that the Romanaggi appraisal was biased**
17 **or flawed.**

18 The District suggests that Mr. Romanaggi’s appraisal is flawed because the District has
19 several offers to purchase the property in the millions of dollars. First and foremost, the Court
20 should refuse to admit Mr. McGough’s testimony on this point. *See Defendant’s Motion to*
21 *Strike Inadmissible Evidence (“Motion to Strike”)*, Pp. 2-3. Even if the Court were to allow this
22

23 ² The District argues that it was “unaware of the *extensive* communications between Mr.
24 Trompke and Mr. Romanaggi.” *Response*, P. 10, Ll. 9-10. (Emphasis added.) There is no
25 evidence that the communications between Mr. Trompke and Mr. Romanaggi were extensive. In
26 fact, the District immediately confirms thereafter that the only communication between Mr.
Trompke and Mr. Romanaggi that it calls into question is that “the City desired low value.” *Id.*
at Ll. 11. Hyperbole is not a defense to summary judgment.

1 evidence, the District’s evidence seeks an apples to oranges comparison.

2 Mr. McGough testified that these offers were submitted by “residential developers.”
3 *McGough Dec.*, ¶8. It can reasonably be concluded that these offers were made with the
4 understanding that the residential developers would then proceed with actual development of the
5 property. There is no evidence that these offers would still be in the millions of dollars (let alone
6 that any offer would be made at all) if these prospective purchasers (who are developers) would
7 only be allowed to develop the property if it could convince the voting residents of West Linn to
8 change West Linn’s Chapter XI designation—the very condition under which the District agreed
9 to sell Oppenlander to the City. This is another example of the District’s duplicity: It demands
10 that the City pay a developer’s price yet under the condition that the Property not be developed.

11 The District then complains that Mr. Romanaggi “had no experience appraising property
12 subject to a Chapter XI designation.” *Response*, P. 12, Ll. 6-7. If this was a genuine concern to
13 the District, it should have inquired about Mr. Romanaggi’s qualifications prior to selecting him
14 as the joint appraiser. The District should not be allowed to place the consequences of *its* failure
15 to do *its* own due diligence on the City’s shoulders.

16 More baffling is the fact that this appears to be a belated argument by the District, having
17 previously conceded: “The School District did not object to Romanaggi’s *qualifications* to
18 perform the appraisal to determine fair market value.” *Complaint*, ¶23. (Emphasis added.)
19 There is no *genuine* issue of material fact in dispute.

20 Regardless, the District’s argument misses the fundamental point: The parties agreed that
21 Oppenlander would not be developed, and Mr. Romanaggi’s appraisal was based on the fact that
22 Oppenlander would be preserved as park or open space as intended. *Romanaggi Dec.*, 4. On
23 that point, Mr. Romanaggi *is* experienced:

24 Q. Okay. Is it safe to say that you don’t have any experience,
25 other than the Oppenlander project that brings us here,
26 you’ve never appraised a piece of property that was subject
to a Chapter XI designation?

- 1 A. Well, isn't Chapter XI specific to City of West Linn?
- 2 Q. Correct.
- 3 A. And I just told you that I haven't done work for West Linn
4 in the past.
- 5 Q. Correct.
- 6 A. Okay.
- 7 Q. So you have no experience appraising property that
8 is subject to a Chapter 11 designation, correct?
- 9 A. Correct.
- 10 Q. What is your prior experience appraising parks for
11 any municipality?
- 12 A. Appraising a park. I've done a number of appraisals where
13 it's either for a park or open space. ***Probably at least ten
14 times.***

15 *Dolan Dec.*, ¶2, Ex. 1, Pp. 15-16.

16 Alternatively, the District suggests that it is the “non-permanent nature of the
17 designation,” that is the missing element of Mr. Romanaggi’s valuation. Again, however, that is
18 not true. Mr. Romanaggi testified:

- 19 Q. Okay. The land use that’s allowed is park or open space.
20 My question now becomes, in your mind, in this appraisal,
21 do you assume that that land use that is allowed as park or
22 open space is a permanent encumbrance on title?
- 23 A. Well, that’s a bit of an interesting term, permanent, because
24 again it’s kind of like land use laws or zoning laws or tax
25 laws, they’re permanent until they change. Now, the
26 likelihood of them changing is unlikely. But we basically
do it based upon how most perceived invest -- investors or
buyer would look at a property, you know. So as of right
now that’s what it is, and it’s unlikely it would change.

27 *Dolan Dec.*, ¶2, Ex. 1, P. 58.

28 In point of fact, a zone change would only require a vote of the West Linn Council.
29 Here, the Chapter XI designation makes it even harder as it would require approval by West

1 Linn's voters.

2 The District has offered no expert opinion on the validity of Mr. Romanaggi's appraisal.
3 Nor has the District identified any failure on Mr. Romanaggi to comply with the Uniform
4 Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. Moreover, for reasons unknown, the District chose
5 not to offer into evidence the appraisal its represents that it has, nor any subsequent appraisal.
6 Notwithstanding all of this, the District seeks to establish that the valuation is flawed by pointing
7 out the process employed by Mr. Romanaggi. Primarily, the District takes exception to the
8 comparables used by Mr. Romanaggi (without identifying any comparables he should have
9 used). Mr. Romanaggi explained the basis for his comparables at his deposition:

10

Q. Let's talk about your comparables.

11

A. Okay.

12

* * *

13

Q. Comparable 1. A sale that occurred in September 2017.
An 11.6 acre vacant parcel located on an island in the
Clackamas River. It's accessible only by boat, or possibly
wading in low water times. It is non-buildable, other than a
yurt is possible, and there are no utilities. That's your first
comparable.

14

15

16

17

A. Uh-huh.

18

Q. To 11 flat acres in West Linn that has unfettered street
access, utilities, water, electric, sewer. Your first comparable
is an island in the middle of the Clackamas River. Do you
find that an accurate comparable?

19

20

21

A. What do you mean by an accurate comparable?

22

Q. How is an island in the middle of the Clackamas River at
all comparable to Oppenlander Field?

23

24

A. As we wrote here, it brackets the lower range of value.
Everything is comparable to either superior or inferior or
similar. So this, being at \$2500 an acre, and we concluded

25

26

1 at 12 -- what was it? \$12,000 an acre, it's inferior. That's
2 how it compares.

3 Q. Okay. The next comparable. 2016 sale. Six acre parcel.
4 Nearly all of the property has slopes with greater than 25
5 percent or else floodplains, wetlands along Abernethy
6 Creek, and the development of the site would be extremely
7 difficult or impossible. So you -- this is Comparable No. 2.
8 You compared this, an impossible land to develop, to ten
9 acres of flat land in West Linn that has utilities and street
10 access.

11 A. Well, the utilities don't matter. It's non-developable. That's
12 the whole point.

13 Q. And why is it non-developable?

14 A. Pardon?

15 Q. Why is it non-developable?

16 A. We've discussed this already.

17 Q. Because of the Chapter 11 designation?

18 A. Because of the Chapter 11 designation and the hypothetical
19 condition.

20 Q. But if I remove the Chapter 11 designation, then it is
21 developable.

22 A. If you remove the chap -- the chap -- then you have a
23 different appraisal report -- assignment.

24 Q. But my question is, did you take into account the
25 removability of the designation when valuing the property?

26 A. No, because we have a hypothetical condition.

Q. And hypothetical conditions are set in stone? They can't be
-- they take into account the flexibility of the condition
being removed?

///

1 A. We have a concept called speculation. Nobody knows
2 what's going to happen to anything far into the future. So
3 we're looking at today's marketplace, and what you have,
4 and maybe even the holding period of an asset. You know,
5 we factor those kind of things. But as a hypothetical
6 condition, they're just saying what's the property -- what's
7 the value of this property as park, open space, non-
8 developable land. So if we look at comparable sales, you
9 know, we want to find properties that are non-developable.
10 Now, typically you don't have a situation like you have in this
11 potential transaction that was appraised. So trying to find
12 willing buyer, willing seller, market transactions of non-
13 developable land, it's -- simply put, it's difficult.

14 Q. You know that --

15 A. If we had better comparables, then we would use those.

16 Q. So Comparable 3.

17 A. Okay.

18 * * *

19 Q. Comparable 3 has no legal access or utilities, can only be
20 accessed from the river. There's a fire pit and a camping
21 platform. And factors development of this comparable would be
22 -- the above factors development of this comparable would be
23 extremely difficult. And so this is another comparable, in
24 your mind, that you used to value the ten acres known as
25 Oppenlander Fields.

26 A. Right.

Q. Okay. Comparable 4. The site consists of a steep ravine and
it's considered non-buildable. The development of this
comparable would be extremely difficult, and the highest and
best use is considered to be recreation. And you considered
this steep ravine, non-buildable site to be a comparable to
Oppenlander Field.

A. It was comparable in respects to whether it was inferior or
superior to its subject, and in this case whether its topography
was inferior or superior to its subject. If in this case it's

1 inferior, then you would hazard the guess that you might pay
2 more for a piece of flat land than you would for a piece of land
3 that's sloped, all things being equal.

4 Q. Comparable 5. Roughly rectangular shaped. It's
5 pasture/hay land, almost entirely in wetlands in a
6 floodplain. Development of this comparable would be more
7 challenging. And it's been purchased for conservation
8 purposes. And you compared that to Oppenlander Field.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Comparable 6 is in wetland.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Comparable would be more challenging. And the City of
13 Portland purchased the property for wetland enhancement.
14 And yet at the end you say, on balance, this sale is
15 considered similar to the value of the subject, and its sale
16 price of \$12,658 per acre is considered to bracket the close
17 to immediate upper range of the value. Why is this wetland
18 that the city purchased for wetland enhancement establishing
19 the -- in close proximity to the airport establishing an upper
20 range of value for Oppenlander?

21 A. Well, did you read the analysis portion?

22 Q. Oh, I read your narrative.

23 A. Okay. Well, the wetlands require an upward adjustment,
24 and some noise nuisance, downward adjustment for its
25 smaller size, then on balance. We conclude that it was
26 immediate upper range. So, yeah, adjustments going both
directions in that case.

Q. Okay. A wetland in proximity to the airport is comparable -
- is considered the upper range comparable to Oppenlander.
In fact, according to your analysis, this wetland in the
shadow of PDX airport is on a per acre basis more valuable
than Oppenlander, because Oppenlander you only valued at
120,000. It's ten acres.

1 A. Right.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. So we're not talking about the -- in this case it's part of the
4 smaller acreage, and also when you have open space is --
5 part of it is just having a view amenity, which is a value as
6 well, if you're looking at open space.
7 Q. Another comparable, Comparable 7.
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. You say the property slopes steeply, a 20 percent slope. It's
10 recorded as a protected open space by a homeowners
11 association and is not developable. And you use this as a
12 comparable, correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In fact, it's 13,000 per acre. In fact, according to your own
15 analysis, this comparable of un-developable, steeply sloped
16 land is more valuable on a per acre basis than Oppenlander
17 because this is 13,000 per acre. Yeah? Is that your
18 testimony?
19 A. Yes.

17 *Dolan Dec.*, ¶2, Ex. 1, Pp. 66-69, 71-75.

18 The District has offered no credible evidence that the process and comparables used by
19 Mr. Romanaggi was defective. The District argues:

20 Critically, the City's own representatives concede the so-called
21 comparables Mr. Romanaggi used were incomparable to
22 Oppenlander field.

23 *Response*, P. 13, Ll. 18-19. The District provided no evidence that the City's representatives
24 were qualified to address the comparables used by Mr. Romanaggi. Consider, for instances,
25 former Mayor Walters deposition testimony on cross-examination:

26 ///

1 Q. * * * I'd like to ask you, first of all, are you a licensed
2 appraiser yourself.

3 A. No.

4 Q. Have you ever done any appraisal work?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Are you familiar with the Uniform Standards of
7 Professional Appraisal Practice?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Okay. For the Oppenlander matter, did you yourself
10 happen to pull and analyze any other comparables that were
11 not in Mr. Romanaggi's report?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Are you familiar with the criteria that Mr. Romanaggi used
14 to select his comparables?

15 A. No.

16 *Dolan Dec.*, ¶3, Ex. 2, P. 185.

17 The District quotes Councilor Relyea who testified that he was “surprised” and “felt that
18 was a low value.” *Response*, P. 13, Ll. 23-24. But that testimony was in response to Mr.
19 Romanaggi's finding that the value of Oppenlander was \$120,000. *See Zahniser Dec.*, ¶6, Ex. 5,
20 P. 60. The District has offered no evidence into the record that that Mr. Relyea conceded
21 anything. The same holds true with the District's reference to Councilor Jones's deposition
22 testimony: he was referring only to Mr. Romanaggi's conclusion, not the comparables. *See*
23 *Zahniser Dec.*, ¶5, Ex. 4, P. 59.

24 In any event, the undisputed fact is that neither the former Mayor nor any of the council
25 members quoted by the District are in a position to provide an opinion as to the actual value of
26 Oppenlander (or at the very least, there has been no effort to qualify them to do so). Under
Oregon law, a witness offering testimony as to the value of property must be “an expert witness

1 or as one having special knowledge of the value of the property,” *State by and through Highway*
2 *Commission v. Assemble of God, Pentecostal, of Albany*, 230 Or 167, 177 (1962), or be an owner
3 of the property. *Id.* at 178.

4 **2. Reply to Legal Analysis**

5 **a. There was no collusion between the City and Mr. Romanaggi**

6 As shown above, Mr. Trompke did not collude with Mr. Romanaggi via “secret”
7 communications or otherwise. The fact that the District suggests that there was collusion and
8 that there were secret communications does not raise a *genuine* issue of material fact because
9 those arguments are inconsistent with the evidence in this summary judgment record:

- 10 • Mr. Trompke’s communications with Mr. Romanaggi occurred between
11 the execution of the LOI and PSA;
- 12 • The LOI was not a contract and it was expressly non-binding;
- 13 • The fact that Mr. Trompke was in preliminary communications with Mr.
14 Romanaggi was not a secret, and that was made known to the District, *see*
Trompke Supp. Dec., ¶4;
- 15 • Both the LOI and the PSA provided for a scenario where each party would
16 retain their own appraiser, and Mr. Trompke’s October communications
17 with Mr. Romanaggi were entered into under this scenario;
- 18 • Mr. Trompke had a duty to zealously represent the City when he was
19 seeking a City-only appraiser and the communications with Mr.
20 Romanaggi would have been protected work product not subject to
21 disclosure;
- 22 • Mr. Trompke did not instruct Mr. Romanaggi to issue a low value
23 appraisal, rather he only stated the obvious—the purchaser was looking
24 for a low value;
- 25 • Mr. Romanaggi, in any event, did not allow that statement to influence his
26 appraisal;
- The District was not only provided the opportunity to submit to Mr.
Romanaggi whatever materials it wanted to (without objection or
opposition), it, in fact, did so, including, apparently, offers to purchase the

1 property in the millions of dollars—all certainly in an effort to persuade
2 Mr. Romanaggi; and

- 3 • The District was never precluded from speaking with Mr. Romanaggi.

4 **b. The District *is* attempting to rewrite the contract**

5 The District is correct that prior dealings may constitute “circumstances underlying a
6 contract,” but the evidence of prior dealings offered by the District is offered to contradict an
7 express and unambiguous term of the PSA: the parties were allowed to select a joint appraiser
8 “to conduct an appraisal of fair market value of the Property, taking into consideration all factors
9 as such appraiser, in its professional discretion deems relevant, including * * * all limitations on
10 the permitted use of the Property made as conditions of the sale.” *J. Williams Dec.*, ¶4, Ex. 2.
11 The only relevant purpose of the prior course of dealings is to strip the joint appraiser of this
12 contractually provided discretion to consider the Chapter XI designation. Clearly, the District is
13 attempting to impermissibly rewrite the PSA. The District is not entitled to the declaratory relief
14 it seeks based on this scheme.

15 **c. There is no evidence of fraud**

16 The purported nexus of District’s proposed evidence of prior dealings to Mr. Trompke’s
17 communications with Mr. Romanaggi are patently absurd. the District argues:

18 Moreover, because Mr. Trompke’s communications with Mr.
19 Romanaggi predated the District’s signing of the PSA, extrinsic
20 evidence of the District’s understanding of the engagement is
critical to showing that the District would not have otherwise
executed the contract.

21 *Response*, P. 20, Ll. 8-11.

22 That argument make no sense. Had Mr. Trompke breached his duty of confidentiality to
23 the City and disclosed his protected communications with Mr. Romanaggi, the District could
24 have simply chose not to accept him as the joint appraiser. There is no evidence that the District
25 would have scuttled the entire deal.

26 ///

1 **d. There are no “vagaries” in the PSA**

2 As indicated above, the undisputable evidence establishes that the District executed the
3 PSA knowing full well that the appraiser had be given express instructions in the PSA
4 concerning the Chapter XI designation. It does not matter who “inserted” the clause—it was
5 agreed upon by both parties. There is not ambiguity.

6 The appraiser was also allowed to consider all encumbrances on title. The District argues
7 that there were not encumbrances on title, and therefore, apparently, this creates an ambiguity. It
8 does not. It refers only to a harmless mistake—it had no effect on the appraisal and there is no
9 evidence that it did. In any event, none of the parol evidence offered by the District assists the
10 Court in explaining the non-ambiguity.

11 The District then argues (with absolutely no evidence to support it) that “* * * Mr.
12 Romanaggi created a ‘hypothetical condition’ (presumably per Mr. Trompke’s instruction since
13 it is not stated in the PSA) that, at the time of the appraisal, Oppenlander Park *was already*
14 *designated under Chapter XI.” Response, P. 21, Ll. 22-24. (Emphasis in the original.)* The
15 District’s argument that the post-sale requirement to designate Oppenlander is not a “condition
16 of sale,” is a tortuous interpretation at best. The City agreed to designate the Oppenlander as
17 open space under Chapter XI—if it had not agreed to do so, there is no dispute that the sale
18 would not have happened. Whether the action to so designate took place before the closing of
19 escrow or after does not change the fact that it was a condition of the sale.

20 **e. There is no evidence of breach of contract**

21 The District raises two arguments: The first is that “the City breached the Joint Appraiser
22 clause by how it hired and interacted with Mr. Romanaggi synonymous with its good faith and
23 fair dealing argument(.)” *Response, P 22, n. 2.* As established above, there was no breach of the
24 Joint Appraiser clause. The District position is derived simply out of seller’s remorse. Likewise,
25 as pertaining to the District’s second argument, it is clear the District waived the deadline for the
26 appraisal. Nothing in any of the District’s proffered parol evidence addresses that point.

1 **f. There is no evidence of breach of the implied duty of good faith and**
2 **fair dealing**

3 The District has done a thorough job of twisting the facts. As argued above, Mr.
4 Trompke was acting on behalf of his client at the time he was in contact with Mr. Romanaggi as
5 expressly contemplated by the PSA which allowed the parties to secure their own appraisals.
6 The District has offered not a shred of evidence (nor is there any) that there was any
7 inappropriate collusion. In fact, it appears that the District failed to conduct its own due
8 diligence and now simply wants to lay blame on the City's attorney for not bailing it out.

9 **Conclusion**

10 The District states:

11 * * * (T)he City moves for summary judgment arguing (1) that
12 there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the appraisal
13 process followed the strictures of the Purchase and Sale
14 Agreement; (2) that District's reading of the PSA requires
15 evidence prohibited by the parol evidence rule; (3) that the District
 waived its objections to the timeliness of the appraisal; and (4) that
 the District's good faith and fair dealing claims do not raise
 genuine issues of fact.

16 *Response*, P. 2, Ll. 6-11.

17 The District is correct. The District, however, is wrong when it then adds: "All of these
18 arguments are unavailing." *Response*, P. 2, L. 12.

19 The appraisal process was strictly adhered to. The discussions between Mr. Romanaggi
20 and Mr. Trompke predated the PSA and once the parties agreed to retain Mr. Romanaggi, Mr.
21 Trompke stopped interacting with Mr. Romanaggi as the City's appraiser. Up until the parties
22 agreed to use Mr. Romanaggi as a joint appraiser, Mr. Trompke had a duty to secure an appraisal
23 and to protect his confidential communications. There is no evidence in the record that
24 contradicts this, and thus there is no evidence that the City breached its implied duty of good
25 faith and fair dealing. The District simply has seller's remorse. Even if the communications
26 were somehow improper (although there is not evidence of this), the only evidence in the record

1 of Mr. Romanaggi’s testimony that his valuation was not affected by the communication. There
2 was no harm to the District.

3 To the extent the District wishes to introduce parol evidence (e.g. the LOI) and prior
4 dealings that expressly contradict the parties’ unambiguous and fully integrated contract, that
5 evidence must be disallowed. Even if it is allowed, it cannot override the express and
6 unambiguous terms of the PSA.

7 The District executed the PSA after the deadline for the appraisal. None of the evidence
8 tendered by the District (admissible or otherwise) changes the fact that the District understood
9 and implicitly agreed that the deadline was not a material term. In other words, the District
10 waived this condition. Even if the City had colluded with Mr. Romanaggi (and that clearly did
11 not happen), that purported collusion would have no effect on the timeliness of the report.
12 Indeed, that delay in getting the report out was a result of the District’s belated agreement to
13 retain Mr. Romanaggi.

14 The City has established that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and it
15 is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

16 DATED this 30th day of December, 2022.

17 JORDAN RAMIS PC
18 Attorneys for Defendant the City of West Linn

19
20 By: s/ Christopher K. Dolan
21 Edward H. Trompke, OSB #843653
22 ed.trompke@jordanramis.com
23 Christopher K. Dolan, OSB #922821
24 chris.dolan@jordanramis.com

25 Trial Attorney: Christopher K. Dolan, OSB #922821
26

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I hereby certify that on the date shown below, I served a true and correct copy of the
3 foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

4 JUDGMENT on:

5 Jacob A. Zahniser, OSB #085210
6 Erica A. Clausen, OSB #170902
7 Miller Nash LLP
8 111 SW 5th Ave Ste 3400
9 Portland OR 97204
10 Phone 503 205-2352
11 jacob.zahniser@millernash.com
erica.clausen@millernash.com
12 cc: Laura.Doll@MillerNash.com
13 cc: Cindy.Switzler@MillerNash.com

14 *Of Attorneys for Plaintiff West Linn-Wilsonville*
15 *School District 3JT*

16 ***EMAIL SERVICE AGREEMENT**

- 17 by first class mail, postage prepaid.
- 18 by overnight mail.
- 19 by hand delivery.
- 20 by facsimile transmission.
- 21 by facsimile transmission and first class mail, postage prepaid.
- 22 by electronic transmission.
- 23 by electronic transmission and first class mail, postage prepaid.

24 DATED: December 30, 2022.

25 *s/ Christopher K. Dolan*

 Edward H. Trompke, OSB #843653
ed.trompke@jordanramis.com
 Christopher K. Dolan, OSB #922821
chris.dolan@jordanramis.com
 Attorneys for Defendant the City of West Linn