

Memorandum

Date: January 9, 2014
To: West Linn City Council
From: Zach Pelz, Associate Planner
Subject: AP-12-02 and AP-12-03 Remand – New testimony and staff recommendation to reject certain items

The notice for the January 13, 2014, City Council hearing regarding the LUBA remand of AP-12-02 and AP-12-03 was mailed to all persons with standing on Friday, December 20, 2013, and was posted on the City of West Linn's project website on Monday, December 23, 2013.

This packet includes all information and correspondence received, regarding the LUBA remand of AP-12-02 and AP-12-03, between December 17, 2013, and 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2014. The hearing notice for January 13, 2014, stated the proceeding was:

[A] limited hearing based solely on the issues identified in LUBA's Order as follows:

- A. Provide a meaningful opportunity for rebuttal of the Mayor's ex parte disclosures regarding neighborhood associations opposition, by having the Mayor provide additional information regarding the ex parte contacts. After the Mayor responds to certain requests for additional information in the record, the City must provide a reasonable opportunity for participants to rebut the substance of the disclosure.
- B. Conduct the proceeding required by CDC 99.180(B) and adopt appropriate findings.
- C. Adopt findings that either address the Wilkerson Report, or explain why no further consideration of the Wilkerson Report and economic impacts is necessary.

Only one of these matters, Issue A, requires that the City open the evidentiary record and consider additional public testimony. As such, all written and oral testimony, including argument and evidence, must be directed specifically to the substance of the Mayor's responses to the questions as required by LUBA in its decision.

Emphasis in original.

Staff has reviewed all testimony submitted regarding the LUBA remand and believes three items, included on pages 1 through 8 of the attached packet are responsive to Issue A. In staff's opinion, the remaining public testimony, pages 9 through 231, does not respond to Issue A. Therefore, staff recommends excluding pages 9 through 231 from the public record for these decisions.

Pelz, Zach

From: Scott Gerber <jumpin@cmn.net>
Sent: Sunday, January 05, 2014 6:09 PM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: LUBA remand of AP-12-02 and AP-12-03

Hi Zach

Would you please deliver the comments below for the record and confirm receipt

Thanks

Scott Gerber

LUBA Remand of AP-12-02 and AP-12-03

To the West Linn City Council:

I would like to address the subject of the Mayor's ex parte disclosures and the manner in which the city is choosing to handle the remand from LUBA.

The city has chosen to offer statements from the mayor that respond to certain questions that were brought forth at the time. Of course, the city has decided in its ultimate wisdom which questions the mayor should answer and which he should not as per its interpretation of LUBA's ruling. I would suggest that the city's interpretation is incorrect and that there are other proposed questions that should be answered to comply with the ruling. However, rather than following the city's limited line of thought, I would rather address what I believe to be much more pertinent aspects.

To begin with, what is the problem that the city and the mayor have with transparency? Why is there and has there been such effort taken to only provide as little information as they can possibly get away with? What is it that the mayor is so obsessed with hiding? At its core, this is a relatively simple matter that Mayor Kovash could have dealt with at the time by just revealing everything that was said and done and who it involved. Instead, he obscures the facts and remains insistent on doling out the minimum amount of information he thinks he can get away with.

This brings me to the crux of this entire affair, and that is one of honesty and integrity in our elected officials. This whole mess began with the mayor failing to admit to ex parte communications. When asked, he declared he had had none. The fact that he used these same communications later in the hearing to rebut statements from Councilor Jones makes it very clear that these contacts did not just "slip his mind". Afterwards, the mayor **KNOWINGLY AND WILLINGLY REFUSED to comply with the public process when asked to come forward with further information.**

Herein lie the larger issues of the LUBA remand. The fact is that Mayor Kovash's actions were so blatantly discordant with the public process that he tainted the proceedings beyond

repair! It is absurd that the city and this council can support such a transgression against honesty and transparency and simply sweep it under the rug by having the mayor answer a few chosen questions. Is everyone involved here so blind with the intent of pushing this project through that basic integrity is willingly tossed aside?

I am not making this up. You councilors all witnessed the same behavior that I did. It is not a matter of interpretation. The mayor's actions, if not dishonest, most certainly exhibited a conscious disdain for and dismissal of the public process. Because of this and the impact that his actions had upon the final decision, the only correct course of action is for you to remand to the Planning Commission's ruling and begin the process anew without the mayor's participation. Given that that is unlikely to happen, the very least acceptable course of action on your part would be to recuse Mayor Kovash from any further participation in these proceedings.

Finally, I would also suggest that because his actions are primarily what are under review here, Mayor Kovash should absolutely step down from presiding over these hearings.

Respectfully

Scott Gerber

2740 Warwick

West Linn

Sent from my iPad

Pelz, Zach

From: Mollusky, Kathy
Sent: Thursday, January 09, 2014 9:18 AM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: FW: :Please add this to the record for the remand hearing
Attachments: LUBA Remand comments for Jan 13 2014.odt

Kathy Mollusky, City Recorder
Administration, #1430

West Linn Sustainability Please consider the impact on the environment before printing a paper copy of this email.

Public Records Law Disclosure This e-mail is subject to the State Retention Schedule and may be made available to the public.

From: teric518@comcast.net [mailto:teric518@comcast.net]
Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 4:59 PM
To: Mollusky, Kathy
Subject: :Please add this to the record for the remand hearing

Kathy , please submit these comments for me, thank you, Teri Cummings

January 7, 2014

Teri Cummings
2190 Valley Ct,
West Linn, OR 97068

Please submit the following comments to record of Agenda bill 2014-01-13-0, LUBA remand

Mayor Kovash, and Councilors Carson, Jones and Tan,

I am writing to raise questions and comment on the remand hearing scheduled to address errors cited by LUBA that occurred in the process of approving Lake Oswego and Tigard's application which among other things, condemns codes written to preserve a residential neighborhood in West Linn for the sake of constructing a water treatment plant large enough to serve the two cities' prospective 100,000 customers. While property values fall, the hazards and inconveniences will continue to rise for residents and businesses located nearby. West Linn's long standing, mutually beneficial IGA with LO for emergency water supply has been traded for an IGA that only supplies "up to" 4MGD when available and ends in 2041. Our children have yet to know what that uncertainty will cost. A change in the use of Mary S Young Park, never brought to a vote of the citizens, was sold for a pittance along with our city's land use codes, all sold off cheap for the sake of satisfying Lake Oswego and Tigard's thirst for new water revenue.

Mayor Kovash, although you should have known better with a decade of experience chairing public meetings, you injected ex-parte comments into the midst of deliberations going in a direction you opposed and therefore additional time became available so that you and your fellow Councilors could craft a decision apparently behind closed doors.

After having already personally invested so much of my own personal time and money in hopes of helping you reach a better understanding and respect for Oregon Public Meetings Law just eight months earlier for your abuse of an Executive session, I decided this time to file an ethics complaint after seeing a such a crucial decision handled so improperly, yet again you have disappointed me. You have spent countless tax dollars to avoid taking responsibility for your improper and unethical actions. The laws set a minimum standard but after all our city has suffered because of what you have done, I hope you will take the high road and step down from the hearing. Please show some respect for the people of West Linn by remanding this to the Planning Commission.

Having a complete record available in a timely manner before a decision is important, both to those potentially affected by the decision and for decision makers too, because everyone hopes for the best, most well-informed decision possible.

After reading the staff report and way that this hearing has been set up, I am quite surprised that pertinent information related to this case still isn't adequately disclosed. One might think after having spent untold time and tax dollars to defend the errors that triggered this LUBA appeal, extra effort to answer all questions and show information would be employed. Unfortunately, the scope of discussion has been needlessly narrowed down while again providing only partial information. This only furthers the perception of a potentially unfair and biased hearing.

Unless I have missed something, the 48 page staff report produced for this remanded hearing does not have an attachment or link to the actual LUBA appeal that was filed. I have never seen it because although I signed in and testified January 28, 2012, I have never been noticed or given information about the consequent LUBA appeal or LUBA decision. Therefore, my ability to speak according to

the LUBA record is profoundly limited to the footnotes in the staff report about the LUBA decision. I believe the city, in good faith, should make this pertinent information readily available to the public. Merely stating that records might be available somewhere else on the city website fails to serve the true purpose of freedom of information law.

Therefore, I request the LUBA file be added to the staff report posted online and a continuance to allow time for review and comment.

Considering the extensive amount of effort and expense your fellow citizens were forced to invest, in order to address multiple errors on your part, I really had hoped to see you answer all the questions regardless of whether the minimum standards of the law require it or not, if nothing else, or the sake of regaining public trust.

LUBA requires that you provide citizens with a meaningful opportunity to rebut information that Mayor Kovash failed to disclose at and before the January 28, 2012 hearing. But I see Megan Thornton, the assistant attorney hired by the City Manager has advised Mayor Kovash to only answer three out of ten questions posed by citizens in the LUBA appeal.

First, I question whether it is appropriate for Council to rely on legal advice supplied by an attorney hired by the City Manager regarding this matter. West Linn voters recently approved City Charter amendment measure 3-429, which determined that City Council hires a city attorney to represent the city in legal matters. Appointed and removed by the Council, the city attorney reports directly to the City Council, not the City Manager, as is the case with Ms Thornton.

I believe the distribution of powers in the city were originally designated in this manner in order to provide reasonable opportunities to check and balance important matters like this where bias or conflict of interest might become an issue. Cost is a problem, I'm sure. It would be fascinating to know how much it has already cost to defend these unfortunate errors already. But you have no choice, the City Charter requires you, the Council to hire an attorney to represent and advise you in this critical decision. I urge you to immediately seek out the most knowledgeable and non-conflicted attorney our money can buy.

The various accounts provided by Mayor Kovash about his ex parte contacts so far simply do not add up nor do they make sense. It is disappointing to see such vague, nonspecific answers given to so few questions. Surely Mayor Kovash has had sufficient time by now, after this LUBA appeal and so forth, to obtain his phone records and pin down the specific dates and times of his phone calls. After all, it's not as if the phone numbers of the persons involved, NHA presidents, are unknown. Specificity is particularly important because the hearings commenced mid-January, but even so, Mayor Kovash, who has presided over hearings for almost a decade, each time reciting rules for disclosure of ex parte contact, he of all people had to have known that to call those people while the application was in process, was wrong. Not disclosing his ex parte communications when hearings commenced was wrong. And then, to bring his ex-parte contact out in the midst of deliberation, thereby opening the opportunity to discuss the matter further behind closed doors, January 28, 2012, was without exception, the worst thing I have ever seen Mayor Kovash do. And in allowing Mayor Kovash's improper actions to go unaddressed, meanwhile, engaging in ex-parte discussions as well between meetings as it appears, Councilors Jones, Carson and Tan have yet again demonstrated a pronounced unwillingness to uphold public meetings law. The indelible impression of bias and improper behavior on the part of these Councilors has stained all possible trust in their ability to conduct a fair hearing. The fact that the entire proceedings have become such an embarrassment and liability to West Linn citizens is sufficient reason to demand that Mayor Kovash and Councilors Carson, Jones and Tan all recuse themselves from

this hearing. Please, for the sake of preserving the trust of West Linn citizens, remanded this hearing to the Planning Commission and in good faith, please also provide the most knowledgeable, non-conflicted and credible attorney our money can buy.

After all this, I just hope that the people of West Linn who invested so much effort and expense to seek justice and the truth, will finally get the kind of transparency and fair consideration that all parties involved in a decision should be able to expect.

With sincere gratitude for your time and effort in considering my opinions,
Teri Cummings

Pelz, Zach

From: ericjones2009@aol.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 4:45 PM
To: Pelz, Zach; Ericjones2009@aol.com
Subject: LUBA Remand Comments for CC LOT Land Use Approvals

Zach,

Please include the following comments into the official record and confirm receipt of this email and that my request has been taken place. Having participated in the planning commission and city council hearings processes, I have standing in this matter for the record.

Thank you,

Jay Eric Jones

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1. The mayor should recuse himself from participation (in public or behind the scenes) or voting regarding the LUBA remand of the LOT water plant expansion and accompanying water transmission lines city council decisions from last year (AP-12-02 and AP-12-03). Since it largely due to his ex parte communications in January 2013 that the matter was returned to the city for reconsideration by LUBA and due to his disregard for his own warnings at the beginning of each meeting to avoid ex parte contacts, the mayor should not participate in further consideration of these land use decisions. I personally do not believe the mayor when he says the contacts were not a land use decision problem and/or not deliberately designed to disrupt a vote that was about to go against his obvious bias toward the project. His disregard during the entire hearings process for citizens' input/suggestions, testimony, and concerns is obviously to anyone viewing the record by the manner in which he conducts himself. There is no reason to believe that the mayor's consideration of this matter at this time would be any less biased. I call upon the mayor to recuse himself and on the council to call for this action.
 2. It is equally clear that LUBA's remand regarding the Wilkerson Report holds merit. The projects, particularly the pipeline, will adversely affect local businesses and the West Linn economy. ANY major construction zone includes construction equipment, reduced speed limits, lane closures and restrictions, and driveway/entryway closures and restrictions - even when construction is not actually occurring. Traffic *will* be disrupted. It appears to me that the council chose to "cherry pick" arguments, facts, and study sections that allowed them to support the appeals last year. It is not a time to allow projects that do not directly benefit (in perpetuity) West Linn businesses and have a great potential to damage the local business economy in the next three years to move forward.
 3. The city council has a unique opportunity here to undo a major decision (one the mayor said is most likely the most important and far reaching decision this council will ever make) that unacceptably burdens West Linn citizens and businesses for nearly three years (and beyond) and offers little to no direct and perpetual community benefits. It does not meet the CDC nor the comp plan nor the Highway 43 planning document. The construction by LOT is underway in its early stages. It has, as anyone paying attention has seen, not gone well! Roads have been damaged and are in need of repair, a child was almost hit by a dump truck, fences have been placed on public ROWS for weeks, trucks have routinely exceeded the posted construction speed limits and made unwieldy turns on narrow residential streets, and traffic on Highway 43 has already been delayed by the voluminous number of double bed dump trucks. I know the latter two personally from having sat behind a number of the trucks on the highway and having witnessed the fast speeds and unsafe maneuvers a number of them have made. The construction is just beginning and the most disruptive work is yet to come. Conditions of approval have been already ignored by LOT. Examples include that the backup warning devices on heavy equipment that were not deactivated until neighbors complained, a long delayed telephone hotline, and a water supply from the intertie that is not perpetual as Councilor Jones demanded.
 4. A note on the project's progress: LOT *chose* to proceed while the appeals and lawsuits were underway at their OWN peril. West Linn's government has no obligation to accept or promote the projects because of time and money LOT has already spent. These projects do not belong in a quiet West Linn residential neighborhood! How will the council react

when someone is killed or seriously hurt and/or property is seriously damaged as a result of them? I believe that this *will* occur if these projects proceed. Then it will be too late. But it is not too late now. Please reconsider approval of these CUP appeals in the LUBA remand and place West Linn's citizens and safety first!! Please follow your planning commission's unanimous recommendations to reject both projects and reverse your 2013 decisions.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Jay Eric Jones

1-7-14


This is in regards to the meeting for Jan. 13th. 2014.

First off we would have to disagree that LUBA's finding were minor. What the Kovash did was nothing short of criminal. That was his way of convincing others to accept it. This decision should start over with Kovash recusing himself and a unbiased decision made based on the facts. Deep down we don't believe this will happen, based on the bias we've seen from the beginning. When Kovash pirated his phone calls and messages in, the number of neighborhood associations that weighed in against LOT's plans still outweighed the pirated exparte. The counsels members absolutely slapped the planning commission in the face. To completely go against their decision, that was made based on facts and not bias. You all have ignored the city development code, so one would have to wonder why we have them. The responsibility of the city counsel is the citizens of West Linn not Lake Oswego or Tigard. Regardless of the outcome on LOT, the intertie takes both parties to agree, and cannot be broken. LOT would have been required to hook back up if the new main had gone through, instead of having an end date for this agreement. The city counsel should represent the citizens of West Linn instead of selling them out to the highest bidder. Considering exparte forward is the right thing to do, since Kovash dirtied up the water.

Carl and Linda Edwards

3680 Mapleton Dr.

1



Pelz, Zach

From: Steve Hopkins <sfhopkins9@aol.com>
Sent: Friday, January 03, 2014 11:37 AM
To: Pelz, Zach
Cc: Frank, Thomas
Subject: LO/T treatment plant expansion

Dear Zach,

We won't be in town for the city's disposition of LUBA's remand on aspects of the city's handling of the water treatment plant expansion in our neighborhood but want to weigh in one last time before this approval travesty is consummated. We were...

... active partners in presenting the neighborhood's concerns to the city planning commission,
... pleased with their rational rejection of the applications,
...outraged at being stifled in an attempt to address the city council on the issue in an open comments section of a council meeting.

Why bother attending council meetings?
...incensed at the council's violation of their own "ex parte" policy,
...incredulous that the council would reject the planning commission's reasoned decision. Why serve on a commission?
...amazed that the council would ignore residents' interests in accepting the \$5 million bribe which we understand hasn't been

paid yet,
...amused by the suggestion that the \$5 million bribe "changed everything and justified rejecting the planning commission's

findings". It certainly didn't "change everything" in our neighborhood.
...irritated that LOT's agents assumed that they could do whatever they damned please throughout the ramp-up. For example, one

actually asked our 95-year-old neighbor whether they could store their pipes in her yard in preparation for their installation...in

exchange for putting gravel on her driveway. Who are these people?

...dismayed that those who aren't directly impacted by this three-to-four year "inconvenience" publicly dismissed our concerns as

being "overblown and the whining of a few disgruntled activists". Meanwhile, huge, heavily-loaded trucks roll by our house every

few minutes, the street is being torn up for the first of two pipe installations, 200 trees have been cut down, we're faced with the

probability that many more will be sacrificed along with street-side landscaping and plantings, and the promise of two+ more

years of this "inconvenience", and the likelihood of declining property market values.

We are disappointed in our city's stewardship of its residents' interests. We are appreciative of city commission and council members' service, but are convinced that the council performed poorly in this matter. We will soldier through this four-year-inconvenience but have lost faith in the process. We hope there hasn't been fraud or malfeasance involved but won't be surprised to hear of it.

Steve and Nancy Hopkins
3910 Mapleton Drive

Pelz, Zach

From: Scott Gerber <jumpin@cmn.net>
Sent: Monday, January 06, 2014 5:57 PM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: LUBA REMAND AP-12-02 and AP-12-03

Hi Zach

Below are further comments for the record regarding the LUBA remand. I would like this entered into the record and acknowledged as such. I am also awaiting acknowledgement of comments sent earlier.

Thank you

Scott Gerber

LUBA Remand of AP-12-02 and AP-12-03

To the West Linn City Council:

In the Public Notice for the hearing on the LUBA remand of the LOT appeal Issue B states that the Council will conduct the proceedings required by CDC 99.180(B) and adopt appropriate findings. The notice goes on to say that only testimony addressing issue A will be considered.

The City obviously thinks that this satisfies the LUBA remand regarding this issue and that no further testimony is necessary to comply with the remand.

I would argue that the City's response to this portion of the remand is completely interpretive and would further argue that this response is incomplete, and in shutting out further testimony only exacerbates the errors that led to this particular remand.

The LUBA ruling on this matter states:

"Petitioners allege in the petition for review that due to the city council's failure to act on the challenges, the city council allowed what could be a biased decision maker to participate in deliberations and the vote at the February 11, 2013 hearing, which prejudiced the petitioners' substantial rights to have a decision by impartial decision makers....."

The 'substantial right' protected by the process at CDC 99.180(B) is the right to an impartial decision maker, a right that is protected by allowing participants to challenge the impartiality of decision makers, and requiring the hearings body to resolve that challenge. The city effectively denied petitioners the ability to challenge the Mayor's impartiality during the proceedings below. We agree with petitioners that the city's failure to comply with CDC99.180(B) prejudiced, their substantial rights, regardless of whether the Mayor would have been disqualified had the city acted on the challenge, and regardless of whether the Mayor's participation influenced other decision makers."

LUBA is very clear in its comment, "PREJUDICED THEIR SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS". LUBA does not state how or if this might be corrected. The city has made its own interpretation and expects those whose substantial rights have been prejudiced to blindly

accept this. I do not. I do not believe that the council, one year after the fact, with the LOT project under way, can be expected to deliver a fair assessment of the bias issues that have been raised. Furthermore, I see no way that this decision can be reached at the same council meeting that is addressing the mayor's ex parte actions. That remand issue in and of itself will bring new evidence that very likely could relate to the bias issues that are related to CDC99.180(B).

Additionally the city has planned a meeting on Jan 15 for the final order. Scheduling this meeting presupposes that this entire remand will be nicely put away in one meeting. LUBA makes it very clear that citizens have a right to impartial decision makers. What we are getting here are biased decision makers deciding on the impartiality of their peers. It simply doesn't work and is not in the spirit of the LUBA decision. I have written previous comments arguing that the only correct course of action is remand to the PC decision. This second LUBA remand issue reinforces that opinion. Furthermore, the city's attempt to silence comment on this and arrive at a swift and predetermined decision is contrary to the LUBA decision.

In the staff report addressing the LUBA remands it states, "In its remand (attached), LUBA was clear about the necessary actions required of the City to cure the MINOR deficiencies of its approval of the project." I have emphasized the term "minor" in this statement. I most emphatically do not consider the prejudice of my substantial rights to be "minor". Nor do I consider the mayor's ex parte and subsequent dismissal of the public process to be "minor". These are serious procedural and ethical errors which influenced the outcome of a decision which will have a major impact on this city.

I implore this council to come clean and remand back to the Planning Commission decision. It is the only right and ethical position to take.

Respectfully

Scott Gerber

2740 Warwick

West Linn

Sent from my iPad

Pelz, Zach

From: LOTWP
Sent: Tuesday, January 07, 2014 1:59 PM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: FW: LOT Meeting on 1/13/2014

From: lamontking@comcast.net [mailto:lamontking@comcast.net]
Sent: Tuesday, January 07, 2014 12:10 PM
To: Jones, Michael
Cc: Tan, Jennifer; Frank, Thomas
Subject: LOT Meeting on 1/13/2014

Hi Mike,

There is nothing in this email that should concern you regarding exparte communication. If you feel there is, simply report it and you are fine.

In the CC Meeting last night I was concerned with your take on Neighborhood Associations. I have only been active the last 5-6 years and we both know the attendance is usually dismal. But, when an item of concern appears in a neighborhood that effects the general population, turnout increases dramatically. Whether it is trails, LOT or some other hot button issue, our NA's are an outlet for citizens to become involved and communicate their feelings to the CC. Until we have an effective alternative, I think we need NA's.

On the Planning Commission. On mayor said they were in disarray last year and apparently brought in new people to straighten things out. I attended many of those meetings and the "disarray" was directly related, in a large part, to the unprofessional conduct of our city staff. The Cut the red tape program was a good example. The Economic Development Commission made some recommendations and then our city staff added a great number of additional ones. These were not well thought out and the PC wasted hours sorting through the mess created by staff. Michael Babbitt did an exemplary job in maintaining control and working through complex issues but he failed to be a "yes" man to Jordan and now he is gone.

If you are still reading this, I have one more concern. I have been hearing that the 1/13/14 meeting will not include community comments. I do not know if this is true, but if it is, it is wrong. The response to the Wilkerson Report is very one sided and the author(and our city) deserves to hear his rebuttal of LOT's and city staff's comments. I see very valid reasons that our mayor should be excluded due to bias and a simple vote by the existing council fall far short of what LUBA was asking for.

I look forward to your response!

Lamont

Pelz, Zach

From: Vicky and Pat <patvicsmith@q.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 7:30 AM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: LUBA Remand of AP-12-02 and AP-12-03

Zach -

Please include in the public record and in the information provided to the City Council

We request the City Council direct staff to convene a meeting with Mr. Wilkerson to discuss the information presented by Mr. Wilkerson. It is clear from Staffs' report, they have many questions about the information presented and so cannot adequately evaluate the recommendations. In addition Staff has incorrectly defined the duration and length of the business and residential impacts along Hwy 43 (page 5).

This should have been revised AFTER City Council broadly defined "Community" to include communities OUTSIDE of West Linn's boundaries. To be clear the LOT pipeline will impact OVER TWO miles of Hwy 43, with one mile of this work being in the limits of WEST LINN. This extends the duration assumed by Staff from 5 months to up to ONE year. Staff also FAILED to mention that LOT is NOW exploring alternative routes for the pipeline since the HDD installation under Lake Oswego is too expensive. This design change may require the 48-inch pipeline to continue on Hwy 43 even longer and therefore disrupt the primary customer and delivery routes on HWY 43 even longer.

This information was brought to Staff's and Council's attention during the previous public testimony on this project.

Also for Staff to suggest this is "a pipeline project" and therefore the information presented is irrelevant is a wrong conclusion. This is a major construction project in the middle of Hwy 43 that is a significant business travel corridor. A 2 mile, yearlong disruption to the West Linn' major travel corridor is clearly relevant to the impacts of a roadway project. While the majority of the pipeline work will occur at night, the condition of the roadway will be so compromised and existence of the large scale stockpiled materials and equipment parked just outside the travel ways will impact travel speeds and therefore peoples travel route choices.

These are real and significant impacts to our local businesses and we request the City Council re-evaluate this issue as suggested by LUBA.

Pelz, Zach

From: lamontking@comcast.net
Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 12:31 PM
To: Pelz, Zach
Cc: Jones, Michael; Kovash, John; Tan, Jennifer; Carson, Jody; Frank, Thomas
Subject: Request to keep record open on LOT


Hi Zach,

I read in your LOT write up a critical review of the Wilkerson Report and thought given that this is the largest industrial project to ever be forced on our community it only seem fair to allow Mr. Wilkerson to respond. I have spoken to him and I believe he will have a response prepared for the 1/13/14 CC Meeting. I would like to request you keep the record open for this report.

Have a great day!

Lamont

Written testimony from
Michael Monical, PE, LEED A/P, MASCE
Professional Civil Engineer
35 years engineering experience
West Linn Utility Advisory Board Member



January 8, 2014

Subject: Agenda Bill 2014-01-13-01 LUBA Remand

On January 28, 2014, due to Mayor Kovash's misconduct, Council President Mike Jones requested that Citizens recommend additional Conditions of Approval. At that time due to statements by Jenni Tan and Mike Jones, it seemed unnecessary as the appeal would not be approved.

The matter is now before us again. While we hope that the Council will now reject the appeal, we are aware that the appeal may be granted.

In the event that the Council decides to approve the Appeal, the following additional conditions of approval are recommended.

NOTE: This is a draft. A revised list with additional signatories shall be submitted on Monday, January 13, 2014 at the council meeting.

1. **All** of the Attorney's fees that Mapleton residents expended to defend their rights will be reimbursed in addition to the \$4,000 per parcel as required by the court.

Discussion: LOT agreed to reimburse up to \$2000 to a lot the legal fees spent to defend their rights from the lawsuit brought against West Linn Citizens. However that is significantly less then expended by several of the residents who shouldered the burden of the legal fees.

2. A temporary widening of Mapleton to 24 feet and an additional 4 foot walking path will be installed to provide for the safe usage of Mapleton for the duration of construction. The widening will be removed at the conclusion of construction if requested by the Mapleton community.

Discussion: This is a condition that many on Mapleton do not agree with. However it is a condition that the city should have required in the beginning and for which you have ample evidence of the need for now. Safety is the primary consideration and you have seen and heard sufficient evidence to validate the requirement.

3. The intersection of Mapleton and Hwy 43 shall be modified to provide for adequate turning radius per ASHTO and a safety refuge for School Children waiting for the bus.

Discussion: This is a condition that the city should have required in the beginning and for which you have ample evidence of the need for now and in fact have partially done.

4. The school bus stop on Mapleton and all on Kenthorpe will be identified and a safety plan prepared and approved for school children refuge from construction activities. Jersey barrier protection is envisioned

in this condition. The Plan will be continually reviewed and update as required based on changing construction activities.

Discussion: Self explanatory

5. It is physically impossible for the applicant to provide the specified emergency access at the Heron Creek crossing during Water Line installation. Detailed plans of the crossing of Herron Creek will be submitted to and agreed to the city with community comment. Special concern for the emergency access and WRA protection will be implemented.

Discussion: Staff did a miserable job in evaluated requirements at this key choke point of construction. There is testimony in the record of the risks associated with this location and is herewith included as a reminder.

6. Heron Creek WRA will be upgraded for 200' upstream and downstream of the waterline crossing with the removal of all invasive species and restoration of native plants.

Discussion: It is a fact already demonstrated that disturbance will not be limited to the pavement as claimed in the staff report. This is a reasonable accommodation for impacts, not that difficult for the applicant and would be a "community benefit".

7. The applicant will install traffic guards along Mapleton at the Heron Creek Crossing slopes prior to Water Linn installation for the safety of residents and construction workers.

Discussion: Same as No. 5.

8. Each day a resident is denied full access to their home, lodging will be provided at " Lakeshore Inn(?) " or agreed to substitute or a fee of \$75/day will be paid by LOTWP to deferred costs of resident relocation to local temporary lodging.

Discussion: Actual compensation and details to worked out.

9. Each day a resident is denied the enjoyment of their home due to construction activity, a fee of \$50 will be paid by LOTWP to allow residents to perform activities at local entertainment and service establishments.

Discussion: Actual compensation and details to worked out.

10. A \$1,000,000 fund will set up and administered by West Linn to receive claims and distribute fees per COA 9 and 10.

Discussion: Actual amount and details to worked out.

11. LOTWP, Lake Oswego and Tigard will provide for interconnection of the West Linn Water System to the Washington County and City of Portland Water System and sufficient FIRM capacity to deliver 2 MG/day supply to the West Linn Water Supply System. West Linn will adopt and fund the appropriate infrastructure project in coordination with LO and Tigard engineering departments

Discussion: Significant details to worked out. Agreement in principal needed. An alternative source could also include Tigard Aquifer Storage Reservoir.

12. The IGA will include provisions that in the event LOTWP no longer provides 4 MG/day water supply to West Linn, addition fees for use of West Linn ROW will be access in the amount of \$500,000 per year.

Discussion: Actual fees and details to worked out. Agreement in principal needed. IGA amendments needed.


Written Testimony
Michael Monical, PE
18735 Nixon Ave
West Linn, Oregon 97068

Water Transmission Pipeline CUP-12-04 fails to meet CDC Code requirements 60.070(A)(1) – “The site size and dimensions provide, a) adequate area for the needs of the proposed use; and, b) adequate area for aesthetic design treatment to mitigate any possible adverse effect from the use on surrounding properties and uses....” **and 60.070(A)(2)** “The characteristics of the site are suitable for the proposed use considering size, shape, location, topography, and natural features.”


These conditions are not met.

The applicant has burden of proof when addressing CDC Code Requirements. He has failed to provide evidence that the 42” Raw Water Pipeline can be installed along the eastern portion of Mapleton in the very narrow and geologically, environmentally, geologically and geotechnically constrained uphill winding segment immediately west of the intersection with Nixon Avenue.


Riparian Corridors



Landslides and steep slopes



Earthquake Hazards



Requested as early as January 25, 2012 Vicky and Pat Smith submitted at the preapplication meeting. "

14) Please have the applicant provide a series of "Typical Cross Sections" for the transmission line along Mapleton Drive. Specifically showing; relative depth to top of pavement, relationship with existing utilities, proximity to the right-of-way and typical trench width.

Staff's response was that "

' for the transmission
p of pavement.
ypical trench width.
t proposes installing

Comment [z13]: We anticipate the applicant's application will include this information

This information appears to never have been submitted for the record nor did staff require it.

At the October 17th hearing, allegedly (you can ask him) the verbal response to the same query was "Basically at the end of the day the City Engineer can waive this - and according to Zach - The City folks are fine with it ". While this is apparently true, and it **might** be technically feasible to accomplish this installation, the applicant has not demonstrated the means and methods by which this might be accomplished. The work cannot be done within the normal application of West Linn's Standard Design Details or the OAR 333-061 and will require variances with the review and approval by the City Engineer to whom all decision making will be delegated.

Like CUP 12-02 Water Plant CUP-12-02, the pipeline is a condition use permit required to meet all aspects of the code including review and comment by the citizens. Staff has failed to require the applicant meet the burden of proof criteria and has given a pass to the applicant in all aspects of the physical location of the oversized waterline in the ROW.

The Application includes the following criteria (pg 27):

APPROVAL STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS (60.070)

A. The Planning Commission shall approve, approve with conditions, or deny an application for a conditional use, except for a manufactured home subdivision in which case the approval standards and conditions shall be those specified in CDC 36.030, or to enlarge or alter a conditional use based on findings of fact with respect to each of the following criteria:

1. The site size and dimensions provide:

a. Adequate area for the needs of the proposed use; and

b. Adequate area for aesthetic design treatment to mitigate any possible adverse effect from the use on surrounding properties and uses.

2. The characteristics of the site are suitable for the proposed use considering size, shape, location, topography, and natural features.

.....

7. The use will comply with the applicable policies of the Comprehensive Plan.

The applicant then provides his response

Applicant Response:

The pre-application conference notes provided the following list of potentially applicable Comprehensive Plan and supporting plan goals, policies, and action measures.

The following 30 pages of the application are all in response to 60.070(A)(7) addressing the goals. The first 6 requirements are ignored completely in the entire application. 60.070(A)(1)&(2) are not address in any fashion, in spite of several requests from the citizens.

In other words, a complete blow off of identified concerns of the citizens on very critical engineering challenges.

Having been responsible for preliminary engineering in the Portland Metropolitan Region for over 20 years including several projects in West Linn, I have often been required to show plan, profile and sections for utilities in Preliminary Engineering for challenging aspects of design. If there is a question about saving a tree, show how it is done. If there is a question about gravity service or pipe cover, show a profile. If there is a question about a structure or geotechnical hazard, show a detail and discuss in depth how the safety of the public will be protected. Happily, by utilizing the engineering standards, challenging situations are usually avoided. **In this case, engineering standards have been ignored.**


There will be important decisions being made which will affect Mapleton Avenue in perpetuity. How deep are the 42" & 48" water lines, how will it affect the other utilities, what is the impact on crossing laterals which will have to be relocated, what is the impact of future laterals which will limit what development can be done, what is the impact to West Linn standard of undergrounding all franchise utilities? The list goes on and on. Many of these issues impact costs to the city in plan review and all future work on Mapleton Avenue. The Highway 43 ROW has identical issues but is under ODOT jurisdiction and has more physical space for accommodation. **These issues could be considered in determining an appropriate Franchise Fee.**


There is precedence to be set by this decision. If City Council passes on this authority, will the Planning Commission or City Council be able to ask for detailed explanation of critical engineering design choices in the future? Will they be able to demand that developers demonstrate that utilities can successfully service a site? Would a Neil Nedelisky, Herb Koss, or Vic Coombes have gotten away with such a nonchalant response to a requirement? My experience is no they would not have. I hope that City Council will agree that just because LOTWP represents two of our neighboring cities that they still have to abide by our codes when working in this city. I can also attest from personal experience that neither city would allow me to get away with not showing specific details of how to address the critical points of infrastructure installation during the planning process. I suppose in the future when asked by planning for details of how I plan to avoid impacts to the trees or conflicts with the existing utilities in West Linn I will just tell planning I will work it out with the City Engineer.

In all likelihood this work has been done by the applicant. However this information is not in the record and neither the Citizens, staff, Planning Commission, nor City Council are afforded the opportunity to review and comment. Among other problems this violates Goal 1 Citizen Involvement.

It would be imprudent and I am not saying that LOTWP would adopt a developer's approach to a difficult design situation, but it is said that some developers when faced with a challenging planning approval take the approach that it is better to ask forgiveness than permission. Is that the case here?


The following shows application layouts, photos and a rough cross section of a critical area.





Actual exact location and depth of any utility is unknown, there seems to be a number of challenges with this layout regardless of depth, how is the applicant going to solve this? Is sanitary above water, below, where do laterals go? Are you undercutting the new water line? Extra maintenance and design requirements.


THIS DETAIL DRAWING SHALL NOT BE ALTERED OR CHANGED IN ANY MANNER EXCEPT BY THE CITY ENGINEER. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE USER TO ACQUIRE THE MOST CURRENT VERSION OF THE DETAIL.




	CITY OF West Linn	DATE:	2010
		PROJECT NO.:	WL-500
TYPICAL UTILITY PLACEMENT DETAIL			




Herron Creek Crossing





Written testimony from
Michael Monical, PE, LEED A/P, MASCE
Professional Civil Engineer
35 years engineering experience
West Linn Utility Advisory Board Member



January 8, 2014

Subject: Agenda Bill 2014-01-13-01 LUBA Remand

Mayor Kovash should to recuse himself from the proceeding or the council needs to remove him from the proceedings and deliberations. His disgraceful behavior at the Jan 28, 2013 meeting, his continued belligerence in face of criticism, and his failure to apologize that has cost the city tens of thousands of dollars of unnecessary expense and many citizens untold grief.

Staff has erred in their analysis of the LUBA remand and demonstrated bias in their recommendations to the LUBA remand issues. Staff's report looks more like a Sales Brochure than something prepared by professional planners. Council should reject the report and all recommendations and give serious considerations to the issues before them.

This is the most monumental Land Use Case that West Linn has faced in recent years. Council should reject Staff's attempt to sweep this under the rug in a two day flurry of activity. There is no reason to rush this decision and every reason to carefully review and discuss the issues presented by citizens. The clear expectation of Staff that no testimony would be relevant of discussion and deliberation as demonstrated by scheduling a special meeting to sign a final order 2 days after hearing testimony is biased, unprofessional and frankly an embarrassing demonstration of misconduct. It is noted that Staff and the City Manager work for the City Council, not vice versa. City needs to start demanding professional and unbiased services directed by City Council, not the City Manager.

Submitted to the record by reference is the entire proceeding of the LUBA appeal for Council to consider in addition to substance of the final order. This includes all documents of the LUBA Appellants and the Responders which include the City, Lake Owego and Tigard. It is requested that Council read and understand the issues that are discussed. Also note that that **minor** issues are identified and dismissed by LUBA. Contrary to staff's assertion, there are no minor issues that are remanded. The Citizens of West Linn trust that Council will understand and addresses the substance of the remand.

Almost a year ago we saw Councilors Jones and Tan stand up to the overwhelming barrage of biased staff work, regional advocates, and testimony of lies, distortions, fabricated misfacts and partial truths about our code to focus on the issue that the LOTWP was not a benefit to this community. Unfortunately and under extremely suspicious circumstances, two weeks later we saw that stand was reversed and we were sold out for a mere \$5 million dollars in a deal that saves (at the time) LOTWP a minimum of \$50 million in construction cost nets them additional millions of dollars per years revenue. This "deal" leaves West Linn an ongoing liability of the oversized water line, increased risks, no permanent benefit of adequate emergency supply and the extraordinary pain of three years of major

construction of an Industrial Plant in our own residential neighborhood. In other words we were sold out and sold out cheap.

The change of the positions of the two councilors were a direct result of Mayor Kovash's misconduct, allowed additional testimony and changes to the Conditions which the Citizens of West Linn had no opportunity to respond to. Given the magnitude of the Council's action and the reversal of an extremely popular and widely supported Planning Commission Decision, Council should have allowed additional time to respond and should have sent the revised decision back to the Planning Commission for further deliberations.

In the intervening year Council has had the opportunity to see firsthand the negative impacts of the construction which has borne out the residents' fears and demonstrated the inability of the LOTWP to deliver an effective Construction Management Plan as promised.

I will address technical issues which are my area of expertise and specifically the so called benefits to our WSMP which was used to justify that sell out. The bottom line is there are none that justify the pain and suffering which the community of Mapleton residents is undergoing nor the future liability of the water line. The fact they sold a valuable city asset for virtually nothing is disgraceful. Two week before the final decision Council approved a 10 year PGE franchise agreement for a utility West Citizens actually use for over \$7 million and \$23 million over 40 years.

Addressing the Water System Master Plan benefits.

Due to Mayor Kovash's misconduct on January 28, 2014 the Appellant was able to submit testimony rebutting my submittal to the Council to which I had no opportunity to respond.

The facts are:

- 1. LOTWP does not meet the requirements for emergency water for West Linn.**
- 2. LOTWP does not provide \$11-\$12 Million water system improvement benefit to West Linn of water line improvements.**
- 3. LOTWP has delayed our own needed water system improvements.**

These points are addressed in detail in attachment 2 and summarized below.

The intertie with Lake Oswego was never an issue, it is a state policy by OAR 690-086-0170 that Municipal Water Supply Element include "(b) Interconnection with other municipal supply systems and cooperative regional water management;". Attachment 1.

The threat that they would take it out if we did not cooperate was a lie and a threat. It is an already existing mutual "benefit" for which we have already paid for.

The so called \$12 million dollar benefit of an additional crossing of the Willamette was a joke. The master plan specifically stated that it was not recommended. We already have a seismically secure water line on a seismically secure bridge. What the Master Plan calls for is either adequate storage or

access to a different source. The LOT waterline provides neither of those. This is like your neighbor parking his Cadillac in your driveway and claiming it is a benefit, equal to its value to you because you can use it to go to the emergency room if you are hurt. Even if that was an acceptable "benefit" and your own car does not work you would not sell him the parking space and you would require the benefit last as long as the Cadillac is there.

As is known by common sense and written specifically into the engineering calculations which appears in the Water System Master Plan, TWO straws in the SAME glass is NOT an emergency supply. Councilors please think about that statement.

About my testimony on these issues, no one, not our Public Works Director nor the representative from MSA could dispute the facts. Ed Sullivan the applicant's legal counsel challenged my testimony but he could not and did not say that it was wrong on two points and, as shown in attachment 3, his characterization of my third point as false is incorrect.

The LOTWP debacle has delayed needed work on our water system and preparations for the water reservoir. Sacrificing West Linn needs to service Lake Oswego's need without adequate mitigation and compensation has been a huge blunder by the City Council. Please take this opportunity to correct that blunder.

Attachments

1. State Policy on Interconnection.
2. Response to appellant testimony.

Monical Testimony Attachment 1

OAR 690-086-0170

Municipal Water Supply Element

The water supply element shall include at least the following:

- (1) A delineation of the current and future service areas consistent with state land use law that includes available data on population projections and anticipated development consistent with relevant acknowledged comprehensive land use plans and urban service agreements or other relevant growth projections;
- (2) An estimated schedule that identifies when the water supplier expects to fully exercise each of the water rights and water use permits currently held by the supplier;
- (3) Based on the information provided in section (1) of this rule, an estimate of the water supplier's water demand projections for 10 and 20 years, and at the option of the municipal water supplier, longer periods;
- (4) A comparison of the projected water needs and the sources of water currently available to the municipal water supplier and to any other suppliers to be served considering the reliability of existing sources;
- (5) If any expansion or initial diversion of water allocated under existing permits is necessary to meet the needs shown in section (3) of this rule, an analysis of alternative sources of water that considers availability, reliability, feasibility and likely environmental impacts. The analysis shall consider the extent to which the projected water needs can be satisfied through:
 - (a) Implementation of conservation measures identified under OAR 690-086-0150;
 - (b) Interconnection with other municipal supply systems and cooperative regional water management; and
 - (c) Any other conservation measures that would provide water at a cost that is equal to or lower than the cost of other identified sources.
- (6) If any expansion or initial diversion of water allocated under existing permits is necessary to meet the needs shown in section (3) of this rule, a quantification of the maximum rate and monthly volume of water to be diverted under each of the permits;
- (7) For any expansion or initial diversion of water under existing permits, a description of mitigation actions the water supplier is taking to comply with legal requirements including but not limited to the Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act; and
- (8) If acquisition of new water rights will be necessary within the next 20 years to meet the needs shown in section (3) of this rule, an analysis of alternative sources of the additional water that considers availability, reliability, feasibility and likely environmental impacts and a schedule for development of the new sources of water. The analysis shall consider the extent to which the need for new water rights can be eliminated through:
 - (a) Implementation of conservation measures identified under OAR 690-086-0150;
 - (b) Interconnection with other municipal supply systems and cooperative regional water management; and
 - (c) Any other conservation measures that would provide water at a cost that is equal to or lower than the cost of other identified sources.

Stat. Auth.: ORS 536.027, ORS 537.211 & ORS 540.572

Stats. Implemented: ORS 537.230, ORS 537.630 & ORS 539.010

Hist.: WRD 11-1994, f. & cert. ef. 9-21-94; WRD 4 2002, f. & cert. ef. 11-1-02, Renumbered from 690-086-0140(4)

Monical Testimony - Attachment 3

In the Appellant's February 8th, written testimony by Appellants Council Edwards Sullivan's begins on page 8.

"In this testimony Mr. Monical asserts:

1. "The water master plan directs the connection to Portland's Water System, not support for another connection to the Clackamas River"

The appellant in testimony before the Planning Commission stated that existing hydraulic constraints in the piping between the Tigard and Lake Oswego water systems that would allow water from Portland to pass into Lake Oswego is constrained to only 2 million gallons per day. The 2008 West Linn Water Master Plan identifies that pursuing this option would involve negotiating new intergovernmental agreements and "...probable participation in funding a portion of the transmission system intertie improvements." The water master plan included an estimated cost of \$2.2 million dollars (2006 dollars) for this connection. In subsequent testimony to the Council, the Partnership has testified it is ready to provide a more reliable source of backup and emergency water of at least 4 mgd of water through 2041 and access to multiple sources of supply at NO COST TO WEST LINN."

Note that Mr. Sullivan does not deny the Water System Master plan directs connection to the Portland/ Washington County Water Systems. He obscures that fact that there are NO plans to install FIRM pumping capacity to get up to two million gallons of water (more than enough in an emergency) of water from an ALTERNATE SOURCE WITH CAPACITY or that LOTWP offers a substitute which is **neither another source nor a permanent capacity**. Two straws in the same glass are not an emergency supply. The fact is the existing LO line already supplies that capability and does not meet the criteria for emergency supply as identified in the WSMP which is why a Portland/Washington County Intertie is included in the Master Plan.

Page 6-9 of the WSMP states

Solution Approach C: Improve the Emergency Supply Capacity and Reliability of the Lake Oswego Emergency Supply Connection

...

An element of these discussions includes the construction of a transmission system intertie that connects the City of Portland supply to Tigard through the Washington County Supply

....

Page 6-15 "It was further directed to pursue development of reliable emergency supply capacity with the cities of Lake Oswego, Tigard and others in accordance with Solution Approach C."

This approach is hopelessly outdated now but the fact remains that the **LOTWP project does nothing to support our water supply needs as defined by the Water System Master Plan.**

Mr. Sullivan continues

[Mr. Monical] 2. "An \$11 million savings to West Linn does not and never has existed: it is a fabrication on the part of LOT to claim benefits which do not exist."

The appellant directs the Council's attention to Figure ES-1 on page ES-6 of the 2008 Water Master Plan. In this figure Solution Approach B would involve construction of a new parallel water transmission main crossing the Willamette River. The cost of that solution is estimated at \$8 million dollars (2006 dollars). This was updated in the October 16, 2012 letter from Murray Smith & Associates to a current value of \$11.6 million dollars. The assertions by Mr. Monical are false, misleading, and contradicted by West Linn's consulting engineers and Public Works Director.

This is a joke and I assume Mr. Sullivan correctly assumes that neither Council nor Staff will actually look has his citation.

WSMP pg 5-8

"Finished Water Transmission Main (Willamette River Crossing)

Given that the existing 24-inch diameter transmission main has adequate capacity to meet the long-term transmission needs of the City, it is not recommended that the City pursue development of a new river crossing at this time."

WSMP pg ES-11

"Study Recommendations

It is recommended that the City of West Linn take the following actions:

- 1. Formally adopt this study as the City of West Linn's Water System Master Plan.*
- 2. Adopt the prioritized recommended system improvements described in Section 8 and specifically listed in Tables 8-5 and 8-6 as the CMP and the CIP for the City's water service area.*
- 3. Immediately proceed with supply system reliability improvements referred to as Approach C, which improves the emergency supply capacity and reliability of the Lake Oswego Emergency Supply Connection.*
- 4. Proceed with the detailed water rate and SDC analysis recommended above and follow the recommendations generated through these processes.*
- 5. Review and update this plan within seven (7) to 10 years or sooner, to accommodate changes or new conditions."*

Approach C does not recommend a parallel crossing of the Willamette. Tables 8-5 & 8-6 do not include a project for the crossing.

Mr. Sullivan continues

[Mr. Monical] 3. "Reliance on Lake Oswego for emergency supply is detrimental to West Linn, not a benefit. It delays the construction of our needed storage, storage that EVERY other jurisdiction in the area has."

There is no evidence, testimony or facts supporting Mr. Monical's assertion that approval of AP 12-02 and AP 12-03 will delay construction of any water system improvements recommended in the City's approved Water Master Plan. On the contrary, the \$5 million dollars that the City intends to assess the appellant for use of its right of way, if the applications are approved, could be used to fund over 56% of the cost of a new 4 MG gallon Bolton Reservoir⁴, which could start immediately rather than depend on the outcome of a future bond measure that would have to be approved by voters due to the City's water rate charter limitations.

As a member of the Utility Advisory Board I have been personally involved AS DIRECTED BY COUNCIL, in planning funding for the both Water Line repair and a new Water Reservoir. We have been personally briefed as early as 2009 and as late as 2012 that we needed to start serious engineering investigations for the Water Reservoir in 2012 and programing for construction in 2014-2015. That has not happened. It was Goal No. 4 of the City Council's 2012 Priorities.

The Utility Advisory Board spent all of 2011 and 2012 discussing how to fund these items. In 2012 staff formed a special Water System Improvement Task Force committee to assist in evaluating and educating the public on the need. On Dec 10 2012 Council voted to a ballot measure to fund water line repairs which also would have freed capital for needed preliminary planning and preparation for the Water Reservoir. On Jan 14 2013 Council "postponed" our own needs and as I understand it the City sued Clackamas County to remove the water measure from the ballot in order that it would not interfere with the LOT citing the "citizens would be confused". Thereby wasting a year of work by the UAB and others and tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees and staff time.

So the facts are that:

- 1. LOTWP does not meet the requirements for emergency water for West Linn.**
- 2. LOTWP has delayed ballot measures for our own needed water system improvement.**
- 3. LOTWP does not provide \$11-\$12 Million benefit to West Linn.**

REEVES, KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS

H. PHILIP EDER (1927-2004)
TIFFANY A ELKINS*
J. MICHAEL HARRIS
PEGGY HENNESSY*
GARY K KAHN*
MARTIN W REEVES*

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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PORTLAND OREGON 97286-0100

Please Reply To P O Box


TELEPHONE (503) 777-5473
FAX (503) 777-8566

direct e-mail:
phennessy@rke-law.com

*Also Admitted in Washington

July 10, 2013

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Curt Sommer' (curt.sommer@comcast.net)
Mike Monical (mike.monical@comcast.net)
Pete Bedard (pete.bedard@gmail.com)
Katie Oakes (karieokee@aol.com)
Dave Froode (dfroode@comcast.net)
Shanon Vroman (shanonmv@comcast.net)
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Scott Gerber' (jumpin@cmn.net)
Stowell Bob (Stowell5050@aol.com)
Crary Grace (craryg@reagan.com)
Ken Pryor (paragon399@yahoo.com)
Sherry Pryor: (peacefulheart@msn.com)
Thomas Holder (holder.thom@gmail.com); (thom holder@comcast.net)



RE: *Stop Tigard Oswego Project, LLC, et al v City Council of West Linn*
Clackamas County Circuit Court Case No. CV13040373

Dear Clients:

Attached please find Defendants' First Request for the Production of Documents. This is part of the pre-trial process known as discovery during which each side gets to inquire about the other sides' position. Unless there is a valid reason to object to a particular request, we must comply to the maximum extent possible.

In producing documents which are responsive to these requests, please do not produce any communication or correspondence between any of you and any of the lawyers involved in this process. Those are absolutely privileged and need not be provided. In reviewing the requests, while some of them are very broad, we believe they are all within the rules and we must respond. Although I don't think this is an issue, with respect to requests number 3 and 5, the only pertinent documents relate to the violation of the public meeting laws that we have alleged in the complaint. If you have documents pertaining to any other type of violation of the public meeting laws, those do not need to be provided.

Clients
July 10, 2013
Page 2

It is possible, if not likely, that there will be no documents responsive to several requests including numbers 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11. If this is the case, please let us know. As I believe you are aware, all deadlines in the case have been temporarily suspended pending a ruling on several motions. Thus, we have no pending deadline but one could be imposed at any time. Thus we urge you to begin compiling the documents as quickly as possible.

We understand this is a burdensome task, however, it is part of the process and must be followed.

Please call us with any questions.

Sincerely,

REEVES, KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS


Peggy Hennessy

PH/blb
Enclosure

June 5, 2013

SENT VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL


Andrew H. Stamp
Andrew H. Stamp, P.C.
4248 Galewood St., Ste 16
Lake Oswego, OR 97035-2405

Re: *STOP, et al. v. City Council of West Linn, et al*
Clackamas County Circuit Court Case No. CV13040373

Dear Andrew:

Enclosed please find Defendants' First Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiffs.

Sincerely,



Christopher D. Crean

CDC/yh
Enclosure
cc: Megan Thornton

1
2
3
4 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
5 FOR THE COUNTY OF CLACKAMAS

6 STOP TIGARD OSWEGO PROJECT, LLC,
7 ("STOP"), an Oregon Limited Liability
8 Company, NORMAN KING, KEVIN
9 BRYCK, WILLIAM J. MORE, CURT
10 SOMMER, MIKE MONICAL, PETE
11 BEDARD, KARIE OAKES, DAVE
12 FROODE, SHANON VROMAN, THOMAS
13 J. SIEBEN, KEN PRYOR, SHERRY
14 PRYOR, JAY ERIC JONES, GRACE
15 CRARY, MCKINZEY HOLDER, ALISON
16 HENDERSON, BOB STWOELL, and
17 SCOTT GERBER,

18 Plaintiffs,

19 v.

20 CITY COUNCIL OF WEST LINN, the
21 Governing body of the City of West Linn,
22 JOHN KOVASH, JODY CARSON, JENNI
23 TAN, and MIKE JONES,

24 Defendants.

Case No. CV13040373

DEFENDANTS' FIRST REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO
PLAINTIFFS

25 To: PLAINTIFFS STOP TIGARD OSWEGO PROJECT, LLC, NORMAN KING,
26 KEVIN BRYCK, WILLIAM J. MORE, CURT SOMMER, MIKE MONICAL,
PETE BEDARD, KARIE OAKES, DAVE FROODE, SHANON VROMAN,
THOMAS J. SIEBEN, KEN PRYOR, SHERRY PRYOR, JAY ERIC JONES,
GRACE CRARY, MCKINZEY HOLDER, ALISON HENDERSON, BOB
STOWELL, and SCOTT GERBER, and their attorney of record, ANDREW H.
STAMP, P.C., 4248 Galewood St., Ste. 16, Lake Oswego, OR 97035-2405

Pursuant to ORCP 36 and 43, Defendants West Linn City Council, John Kovash, Jody
Carson, Jenni Tan and Mike Jones (collectively "Defendants") request that Plaintiffs Stop Tigard
Oswego Project, LLC, Norman King, Kevin Bryck, William J. More, Curt Sommer, Mike
Monical, Pete Bedard, Karie Oakes, Dave Froode, Shanon Vroman, Thomas J. Sieben, Ken

1 Pryor, Sherry Pryor, Jay Eric Jones, Grace Crary, McKinzey Holder, Alison Henderson, Bob
2 Stowell, and Scott Gerber (collectively "Plaintiffs"), and their attorneys, respond to the following
3 Request for Production, and produce the following documents and things for inspection and
4 copying **within 30 days** of service of these Requests, at the law offices of Defendants' counsel,
5 Christopher D Crean, Beery, Elsner & Hammond, LLP, 1750 SW Harbor Way, Suite 380,
6 Portland, Oregon 97201-5106.

7 **DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS**

8 A. The terms "document" or "documents" as used herein refer to all written,
9 graphic and/or media matter, however produced or reproduced, of every kind and description
10 that is in the actual or constructive possession of Plaintiffs or under the custody, care, or control
11 of any agent, representative, or person that will respond to Plaintiffs' direction, including, but not
12 limited to emails, text messages, video clips, voice messages, papers, books, letters, photographs,
13 maps, objects, tangible things, floppy disks or other magnetic or photo electronic media,
14 correspondence, drafts, memoranda, interoffice communications, reports, contracts, agreements,
15 journals, calendars, appointment books, diaries, logs, notations, plans, computer printouts,
16 pleadings, depositions, notes or sound recordings of any conversation, notes of meetings or
17 conferences, and minutes of any meetings.

18 B. The term "relating to" as used herein shall mean relevant in any way to the
19 subject matter

20 C. The term "identify" means the full name of the person, place of employment, title
21 of employment, and relation to **Plaintiffs**.

22 D. The term "or" as used herein means both the disjunctive and conjunctive as in the
23 expression "and/or."

24 E. The term "**Plaintiffs**" refer collectively and individually to Stop Tigard Oswego
25 Project, LLC, Norman King, Kevin Bryck, William J More, Curt Sommer, Mike Monical, Pete
26 Bedard, Karie Oakes, Dave Froode, Shanon Vroman, Thomas J. Sieben, Ken Pryor, Sherry

1 Pryor, Jay Eric Jones, Grace Crary, Mckinzey Holder, Alison Henderson, Bob Stowell, and Scott
2 Gerber, or any individual or entity acting on their behalf, and their predecessors and successors.

3 F. The term "**Complaint**" refers to the First Amended Complaint filed by **Plaintiffs**
4 in the Clackamas County Circuit Court on May 9, 2013, captioned *Stop Tigard Oswego Project,*
5 *LLC, et al v. West Linn City Council, et al*, Case No. CV 13040373.

6 G. If you contend you are entitled to withhold from production any or all **documents**
7 identified herein on the basis of attorney/client privilege, work product doctrine, or other ground,
8 then do the following with respect to each and every **document**:

9 1. Describe the nature of the **document**, in sufficient particularity to **identify**
10 it and to enable you to identify or disclose it in response to an order of the Court, including the
11 date and subject matter of such **document**;

12 2. **Identify** the person(s) who prepared the **document**;

13 3. **Identify** the person(s) who sent and received the original and copy of the
14 **document**, or to whom the **document** was circulated, or its contents communicated or
15 disclosed;

16 4. State the basis upon which you contend you are entitled to withhold the
17 **document** from production; and

18 5. State the date of the **document**.

19 H. This request is a continuing one. If, after producing **documents**, you obtain or
20 become aware of any further **documents** responsive to this request, you are required to produce
21 such additional **documents**.

22 REQUESTED DOCUMENTS

23 REQUEST NO. 1: All **documents** relating to any and all communications whatsoever,
24 including but not limited to correspondence, email, faxes, text messages, voice messages and
25 other forms of memorialized communications, between, among and/or by:
26

1 (1) Stop Tigard Oswego Project, LLC, on the one hand, and any person that was a
2 council or staff member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to
3 the present;

4 (2) Norman King, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
5 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

6 (3) Kevin Bryck, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
7 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

8 (4) William J. More, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
9 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

10 (5) Curt Sommer, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
11 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

12 (6) Mike Monical, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
13 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

14 (7) Pete Bedard, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
15 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

16 (8) Karie Oakes, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
17 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

18 (9) Dave Froode, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
19 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

20 (10) Shanon Vroman, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
21 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

22 (11) Thomas J. Sieben, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
23 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

24 (12) Ken Pryor, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member of
25 the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;
26

1 (13) Sherry Pryor, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
2 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

3 (14) Jay Eric Jones, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
4 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

5 (15) Grace Crary, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
6 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

7 (16) McKinzey Holder, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
8 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

9 (17) Alison Henderson, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff
10 member of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present;

11 (18) Bob Stowell, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
12 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present; and

13 (19) Scott Gerber, on the one hand, and any person that was a council or staff member
14 of the City Council of West Linn from the period of January 17, 2012 to the present

15 **RESPONSE:**

16
17 **REQUEST NO. 2:** All documents relating to any and all communications whatsoever
18 between any Plaintiff and any Neighborhood Association and/or any Neighborhood Association
19 member relating to Lake Oswego Tigard Partnership's ("LOT") appeal of the West Linn
20 Planning Commission's denial of the proposed water treatment plan and pipeline at issue in this
21 lawsuit.

22 **RESPONSE:**

1 **REQUEST NO. 3:** All documents relating to any and all communications whatsoever
2 between any Plaintiff and any Neighborhood Association and/or any Neighborhood Association
3 member relating to any purported violation of the Public Meeting Laws (ORS 192.610 *et seq.*)
4 by any Defendant.

5 **RESPONSE:**

6
7 **REQUEST NO. 4:** All documents relating to any and all communications
8 whatsoever between and/or among any Plaintiffs relating to LOT's appeal of the West Linn
9 Planning Commission's denial of the proposed water treatment plan and pipeline at issue in this
10 lawsuit.

11 **RESPONSE:**

12
13
14 **REQUEST NO. 5:** All documents relating to any and all communications whatsoever
15 between and/or among any Plaintiffs relating to any purported violation of the Public Meeting
16 Laws (ORS 192.610 *et seq.*) by any Defendant.

17 **RESPONSE:**

18
19
20 **REQUEST NO. 6:** All documents that identify any and all witnesses to the purported
21 meeting or meetings that allegedly violated the Public Meeting Laws (ORS 192.610 *et seq.*).

22 **RESPONSE:**

1 **REQUEST NO. 7:** All documents that identify any and all persons with knowledge of
2 the purported meeting or meetings that allegedly violated the Public Meeting Laws (ORS
3 192.610 *et seq.*)

4 **RESPONSE:**

5
6
7 **REQUEST NO. 8:** All documents that record or otherwise memorialize the purported
8 meeting or meetings that allegedly violated the Public Meeting Laws (ORS 192.610 *et seq.*)

9 **RESPONSE:**

10
11
12 **REQUEST NO. 9:** All documents of agreements between or among any Plaintiffs
13 relating to the subject matters of this action, including, but not limited to, the water treatment
14 plan, pipeline, and purported meeting or meetings in violation of the Public Meeting Laws (ORS
15 192.610 *et seq.*)

16 **RESPONSE:**

17
18
19 **REQUEST NO. 10:** All documents demonstrating or otherwise supporting Plaintiffs'
20 allegation in paragraph 15 of the **Complaint** that Mayor Kovash "knowingly and purposefully
21 scuttled the voting process that would have otherwise taken place" and that Mayor Kovash's
22 "purpose in disclosing *ex parte* contacts" was to delay the vote.

23 **RESPONSE:**

1 **REQUEST NO. 11:** All documents that demonstrate or otherwise support Plaintiffs'
2 allegations that Defendants' alleged violations were an "intentional" disregard or "willful
3 misconduct," as alleged in paragraph 37 of the **Complaint**.

4 **RESPONSE:**

5
6
7 **REQUEST NO. 12:** All documents that demonstrate or otherwise support Plaintiffs'
8 allegations in Paragraph 21 of the **Complaint** that Mayor Kovash committed perjury.


9 **RESPONSE:**

10
11
12 **REQUEST NO. 13:** All documents relating to any and all efforts, if any, by Plaintiffs
13 to inquire about and explore the alleged *ex parte* contacts disclosed by Mayor Kovash during the
14 period of January 17, 2012 to the present

15 **RESPONSE:**

16
17
18 DATED this 5th day of June, 2013.

19 BEERY, ELSNER & HAMMOND, LLP

20 
21 _____
22 Christopher D. Crean, OSB #942804
23 chris@gov-law.com
24 Paul C. Elsner, OSB #820476
25 paul@gov-law.com
26 Of Attorneys for Defendants

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I hereby certify that on the date indicated below, I caused to be served a copy of the
3 foregoing DEFENDANTS' FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO
4 PLAINTIFFS on:


5
6 Andrew H Stamp
Andrew H Stamp PC
4248 Galewood St., Ste. 16
7 Lake Oswego, OR 97035-2405
Attorney for Plaintiff
8
9

10 by the following indicated method or methods:

- 11 by First-Class Mail
12 by Hand-Delivery
13 by Overnight Delivery
14 by Facsimile Transmission
15 by Electronic Mail
16 by CM/ECF
17

18 DATED this 5th day of June, 2013.

19 BEERY, ELSNER & HAMMOND, LLP

20 

21 Christopher D. Crean, OSB #942804
22 chris@gov-law.com
Of Attorneys for Defendants
23
24
25
26

REEVES, KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS

H. PHILIP EDER (1927-2004)
TIFFANY A. ELKINS*
J. MICHAEL HARRIS
PEGGY HENNESSY*
GARY K. KAHN*
MARTIN W. REEVES*

ATTORNEYS AT LAW


4035 SE 52ND AVENUE
P.O. BOX 86100
PORTLAND OREGON 97286-0100

Please Reply To P.O. Box

TELEPHONE (503) 777-5473
FAX (503) 777-8566

direct e-mail:
phennessy@rke-law.com

*Also Admitted in Washington



Clerk
Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals
DSL Building
775 Summer Street NE, Suite 330
Salem OR 97301-1283

Re: Stop Tigard Oswego Project ("STOP") et al. vs. City of West Linn, et al.
Consolidated LUBA Case Nos. 2013-021, 2013-022 and 2013-023
Petitioners' Reply Brief (LUBA Case No. 2013-023)

Dear Clerk:

I am enclosing the original plus four copies of Petitioners' Reply Brief for filing in LUBA Case No. 2013-023. Please note that this case has been set for oral argument on Thursday morning, October 3, 2013 at 11:00am.

Thank you

Sincerely,

REEVES, KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS

Peggy Hennessy
Peggy Hennessy

PH:blb
Enclosures
cc w/Enclosure (via Federal Express-Overnight Delivery):

Andrew H. Stamp; Attorney for Petitioners (LUBA Nos. 2013-021 & 022)
Megan K. Thornton; Attorney for City of West Linn
Edward J. Sullivan/Carrie A. Richter; Attorneys for Intervenor-Respondents
City of Lake Oswego and Lake Oswego-Tigard Water Partnership
Christopher D. Crean; Attorney for City of West Linn
Timothy V. Ramis; Attorney for Intervenor-Respondent City of Tigard

1
2 BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
3 FOR THE STATE OF OREGON

4 STOP TIGARD OSWEGO PROJECT, LLC
5 ("STOP"), NORMAN KING, PETE BEDDARD,
6 MICHAEL MONICAL, CAROL ELSWORTH,
7 MARK ELSWORTH, SHANNON VROMAN,
8 JENNE HENDERSON, LAMONT KING,
9 THOMAS J. SIEBEN, GWEN SIEBEN,
10 SCOTT GERBER, JAN GERBER, JACK NORBY,
11 THOM HOLDER, GARY HITESMAN,
12 REBECCA WALTERS, and DARRYL WALTERS,

13 Petitioners,

14 vs.

15 CITY OF WEST LINN,

16 Respondent,

17 CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE
18 OSWEGO-TIGARD WATER PARTNERSHIP, and
19 CITY OF TIGARD

20 Intervenor-Respondents.

21 LUBA Nos. 2013-021 and 2013-022

22 WILLIAM J. MORE, CARL L. EDWARDS,
23 LINDA S. EDWARDS, CURT SOMMER and
24 ROBERT STOWELL,

25 Petitioners,

26 vs.

CITY OF WEST LINN

Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE
OSWEGO-TIGARD
WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF TIGARD,

Intervenor-Respondents

LUBA No 2013-023


LUBA Nos. 2013-021, 2013-022, and
2013-023 (consolidated)

PETITIONERS' MOTION TO FILE
REPLY BRIEF IN LUBA No. 2013-023

1 COME NOW Petitioners in LUBA Case No 2013-023, by and through their attorney,
2 Peggy Hennessy, and move this Board pursuant to 661-010-0039 for an Order Allowing a Reply
3 Brief to address new matters raised in the briefs of Respondent West Linn and
4 Intervenor-Respondent Lake Oswego

5
6 DATED: September 30, 2013

7 REEVES, KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS

8 
9 Peggy Hennessy, OSB #872505
10 Of Attorneys for Petitioners in
11 LUBA Case No. 2013-023

12
13 *****

14
15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioners May File a Reply Brief in LUBA No.
16 2013-023.

17 DATED: October _____, 2013.

18 LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS

19
20 By: _____

21 Title: _____
22
23
24
25
26

CERTIFICATE OF FILING

I hereby certify that on September 30, 2013, I filed the original, plus four copies of this PETITIONERS' MOTION TO FILE A REPLY BRIEF and [PROPOSED] ORDER in LUBA Case No. 2013-023, together with four copies of PETITIONERS' [PROPOSED] REPLY BRIEF, with the Land Use Board of Appeals, DSL Building, 775 Summer Street NE, Suite 330, Salem OR 97301-1283 by FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Dated this 30th day of September, 2013.

REEVES KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS

Peggy Hennessy
Peggy Hennessy, OSB #872505
Of Attorneys for Petitioners
(LUBA Case No 2013-023)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing PETITIONERS' MOTION TO FILE A REPLY BRIEF and [PROPOSED] ORDER in LUBA Case No. 2013-023, together with two true copies of PETITIONERS' [PROPOSED] REPLY BRIEF on September 30, 2013, via FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY to the following individuals to the following addresses:

Andrew H. Stamp, OSB #974050
Andrew H Stamp PC
4248 Galewood St. Ste. 15
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
Attorney for Petitioners
(LUBA Nos. 2013-021 & 022)

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Portland, OR 97201
Attorney for City of West Linn

Megan K. Thornton, OSB # 075413
City of West Linn
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West Linn, OR 97068
Attorney for City of West Linn

Timothy V. Ramis, OSB #753110
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Lake Oswego, OR 97035
Attorney for Intervenor-Respondent
City of Tigard

Edward J. Sullivan, OSB # 691670
Carrie A. Richter, OSB #003703
Garvey Schubert Barer
121 SW Morrison St. #1100
Portland, OR 97204
Attorneys for Intervenors-Respondent
City of Lake Oswego and Lake
Oswego-Tigard Water Partnership

DATED this 30th day of September, 2013.

REEVES KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS

Peggy Hennessy
Peggy Hennessy, OSB #872505
Of Attorneys for Petitioners
(LUBA Case No 2013-023)

**BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF OREGON**

STOP TIGARD OSWEGO PROJECT, LLC ("STOP"),
NORMAN KING, PETE BEDDARD,
MICHAEL MONICAL, CAROL ELSWORTH,
MARK ELSWORTH, SHANNON VROMAN,
JENNE HENDERSON, LAMONT KING,
THOMAS J. SIEBEN, GWEN SIEBEN,
SCOTT GERBER, JAN GERBER, JACK NORBY,
THOM HOLDER, GARY HITESMAN,
REBECCA WALTERS, and DARRYL WALTERS,
Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF WEST LINN,
Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-TIGARD
WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF TIGARD
Intervenor-Respondents.

LUBA Nos. 2013-021 and 2013-022

WILLIAM J. MORE, CARL L. EDWARDS, LINDA S. EDWARDS,
CURT SOMMER and ROBERT STOWELL,
Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF WEST LINN
Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-TIGARD
WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF TIGARD,
Intervenor-Respondents.

LUBA No. 2013-023

**PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF
LUBA NO. 2013-023**

Filed on Behalf of Petitioners
WILLIAM J. MORE, CARL L. EDWARDS, LINDA S. EDWARDS,
CURT SOMMER and ROBERT STOWELL

SEPTEMBER, 2013

Andrew H. Stamp, OSB #974050
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Email: andrewstamp@comcast.net
Attorney for Petitioners
LUBA Nos. 2013-021 & 022

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Reeves, Kahn, Hennessy & Elkins
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Attorney for Petitioners
LUBA No. 2013-023

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Intervenors-Respondent
City of Lake Oswego and Lake
Oswego-Tigard Water Partnership

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Intervenor-Respondent
City of Tigard

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..... 1

II. ARGUMENT..... 1

A. Mayor Kovash’s *ex parte* contacts had a bearing on a material issue and related to applicable approval criteria so the failure to adequately disclose the substance of the communications warrants remand 1

B. The City Council’s failure to vote on multiple challenges to Mayor Kovash’s impartiality violated CDC 99.180 and prejudiced Petitioners’ substantial rights..... 2

C. Applicant’s criticism of Petitioners’ expert does not relieve Respondent of its obligation to address the expert evidence in its findings..... 4

III. CONCLUSION 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Court of Appeal Case

Norvell vs Portland Area LGBC, 43 Or App 849, 604 P2d 896 (1979) 1, 5

LUBA Cases

Carrigg vs. City of Enterprise, 48 Or LUBA 328 (2004) 1

Foland vs Jackson County, 61 Or LUBA 264 (2010) 4

Hines vs Marion County, 56 Or LUBA 333 (2008) 5

Link vs. City of Florence, 58 Or LUBA 348 (2009) 1

Olson vs City of Springfiled, 56 Or LUBA 229 (2008) 5

Regulations

CDC 60 070 (A) (3) 2, 4, 5

CDC 99 180 2

CDC 99.180 (B) (1) 3

CDC 99.180 (B) (3) 2, 3

CDC 99.180 (E) 3

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioners file this [proposed] reply brief to address new matters raised in the Response Briefs of the City of West Linn (hereinafter, “WL Response”) and the City of Lake Oswego (hereinafter, “LO Response”) Petitioners’ Reply Brief will focus on replies to West Linn’s arguments relating to Mayor Kovash’s *ex parte* contacts and the City Council’s failure to vote on challenges to Mayor Kovash’s impartiality. In addition, Petitioners will respond to Lake Oswego’s attack on the credentials and qualifications of Petitioners’ expert, Dr. Michael Wilkerson, as it relates to Respondent’s obligation to adopt *Norvell* findings

II. ARGUMENT

A. Mayor Kovash’s *ex parte* contacts had a bearing on a material issue and related to applicable approval criteria so the failure to adequately disclose the substance of the communications warrants remand.

West Linn relies on *Link vs. City of Florence*, 58 Or LUBA 348 (2009) to support its position that the subject of Mayor Kovash’s *ex parte* communication does not affect the basis of the City’s decision. WL Response at 9-10. In *Link*, LUBA found that

[T]here must be some indication that the communication had something to do with the factual determinations or legal standards that govern approval or denial of the application. The goal of prohibiting undisclosed *ex parte* contacts is to ensure that land use decisions are based on information or evidence the decision makers receive within the public process, and are not based on legal arguments or evidence received outside the public process. *Carrigg v City of Enterprise*, 48 Or LUBA 328, 333 (2004). *Link*, 58 OR LUBA at 353

In *Link*, one of the councilor’s stated that “the crowd he has been in contact with has been very supportive of the annexation.” *Link*, 58 Or LUBA at 352. This generic reference to support by a crowd can be distinguished from Mayor Kovash’s actions in seeking out statements from neighborhood associations to controvert evidence in the record. In this case, Mayor Kovash’s *ex parte* communications pertain to issues that were *material considerations* for both Councilor Jones and Councilor Tan when they made their January 28, 2013 announcements that they would be voting to deny the LOT applications.

As explained in the Petition for Review, Councilor Jones relied heavily on the neighborhood associations' opposition to the LOT project to support his January 28, 2013 position that the granting of the proposal *fails to meet CDC 60.070 (A) (3)* because it will **NOT** provide for a facility that is consistent with the overall needs of the community. Councilor Jones specifically stated:

While the overall needs of LOT are being met it is clearly asserted by the Planning Commission that the overall needs of the community are not being met. That is, considering the totality of need West Linn and, in particular, communities inside West Linn will be made to suffer disproportionat[e]ly. This is supported by the record which states that 7 Neighborhood Associations voted, at one level or another, to support the Robinwood Neighborhood Association's opposition to these applications. LUBA No. 2013-023 Petition for Review at 23, *citing* R at 620B.

Neighborhood association support is directly relevant to the "overall needs of the community." Moreover, neighborhood support was a "material issue" that influenced both Councilor Jones' and Councilor Tan's January 28, 2013 announcements that they did not believe that LOT had satisfied the mandatory approval criteria. While Mayor Kovash did disclose the fact of two *ex parte* contacts, notwithstanding multiple requests, he refused to disclose the source of those contacts. Remand is required to provide for full disclosure of the substance of the communication and allow all parties a *meaningful* opportunity to respond.

B. The City Council's failure to vote on multiple challenges to Mayor Kovash's impartiality violated CDC 99.180 and prejudiced Petitioners' substantial rights.

In West Linn's response to Petitioners' Third Assignment of Error, West Linn attempts to rewrite CDC 99 180 (B) (3) by changing the word "shall" to "may." CDC 99.180 (B) (3) clearly states that "[a]ny challenge ***SHALL*** require that the hearing body vote on the challenge pursuant to subsection E." [Emphasis added]. Subsection E provides:

E. Abstention and disqualification. Disqualification for reasons other than the member's own judgment may be ordered by a majority of the members of a hearing body present and voting. The member who is the subject of the motion for disqualification may not vote on the motion but shall be allowed to participate in the deliberation of the hearing body on that motion.

The first sentence of subsection E simply acknowledges that a member of the hearing body *may* disqualify him/herself based upon his/her own judgment (voluntary abstention); or, the voting members *may* disqualify the challenged member based upon a majority vote (disqualification). The word “may” pertains to the disqualification – not to the vote. The vote is mandatory (“shall”), but disqualification by the hearing body is permissive (“may”). The vote may be to deny the challenge, in which case there would be no disqualification.

The second sentence of subsection E allows the challenged member to participate in the deliberation regarding disqualification (e.g. member can argue against disqualification), but prohibits the challenged member from voting. Nothing in CDC 99.180 (E) takes away the *absolute right* of any affected party (as evidenced by use of the word “shall” in CDC 99.180 (B) (3)) to have the hearing body vote on a challenge to impartiality.

West Linn claims that “because the basis for the challenges questioned only the *Mayor’s judgment*, the City Council properly exercised its *discretionary* authority and declined to schedule a vote on the challenges.” WL Response at 20. However, all challenges relating to bias, pre-judgment, personal interest, and other indications of impartiality are necessarily going to question the challenged member’s judgment. These are precisely the challenges an affected party is allowed to bring under CDC 99.180 (B) (1).

The vote is mandatory under CDC 99.180 (B) (3). Disqualification is discretionary under 99.180 (E), but there is no discretion to eliminate the affected party’s absolute right to have the hearing body vote on the challenge.

West Linn also contends that Petitioners’ claim of prejudice resulting from the City Council’s failure to vote on the challenge to Mayor Kovash’s impartiality is “merely speculative.” WL Response at 22. The City goes on to admit that it can be assumed that

every member of the City Council who participated in the February 11 meeting influenced the outcome to some degree, including the Mayor. *Id.* This is precisely the point.

In order to show prejudice, Petitioners need not show that there would be a different outcome if the vote had been taken and the Mayor had been disqualified. There is sufficient evidence in the record to show that two votes were leaning toward denial as of January 28, 2013 (Councilors Jones and Tan) and the Mayor was leaning toward approval. If the City Council voted on the challenge to the Mayor's impartiality, the Mayor may have been disqualified and the ultimate outcome of the February 11, 2013 vote may have been to uphold the Planning Commission's denial of both LOT projects.

West Linn attempts to shift the burden to Petitioners to show that the vote would have resulted in disqualification of the Mayor. However, the point is that *there was no vote*. Petitioners need not prove a hypothetical outcome to show that they have been prejudiced by the hearing body's failure to proceed with a mandatory vote on a properly raised challenge.

C. Applicant's criticism of Petitioners' expert does not relieve Respondent of its obligation to address the expert evidence in its findings.

In their opening brief, Petitioners explained how the business community economic impacts are relevant to whether the LOT pipeline project meets CDC 60.070 (A) (3) regarding the need to show "consistency with the overall needs of the community." Petition for Review at 43. Lake Oswego responds by attacking Dr. Wilkerson's credentials and criticizing his report. LO Response at 21-22. Dr. Wilkerson holds a PhD in *economics* and is qualified to analyze the *economic* impacts of these kinds of construction projects on local businesses.

Relying on *Foland vs. Jackson County*, 61 Or LUBA 264 (2010) (*aeronautical* engineer not recognized as an "expert" for purposes of analyzing safe and operational feasibility of a *road* design), Lake Oswego claims that Dr. Wilkerson is not a qualified traffic expert whose testimony requires any detailed response. LO Response at 25. However, Dr.

Page 4 – PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF (LUBA No. 2013-023)

Wilkerson is a qualified expert in *economics* who presented evidence on the *economic* impacts of the LOI project on the business community. Thus, he is not disqualified under *Foland*

Lake Oswego cites *Hines vs Marion County*, 56 Or LUBA 333 (2008) and *Olson vs. City of Springfield*, 56 Or LUBA 229 (2008) in support of its position that the City was not required to address the Wilkerson evidence because the approval criteria are subjective. However, those cases dealt with general concerns about possible interference – not expert testimony directed to a specific approval criterion. While the City need not address every issue raised, it must respond to specific issues relevant to compliance with applicable approval standards. *Norvell vs. Portland Area LGBC*, 43 Or App 849, 853, 604 P2d 896 (1979).


In this case, Dr. Wilkerson raised specific concerns and provided his expert opinion regarding the *economic* impact of the LOI project on the Robinwood business community. Lake Oswego claims that Respondent was not required to address the Wilkerson Report in its findings because CDC 60.070 (A) (3) does not impose any limit on the extent of economic impact the LOI project is allowed to have on the business community. LO Response at 24. However, there need not be a precise limit or a quantifiably acceptable percentage of economic impact in the standard. The expert opinion regarding the extent of the *economic* impact on the business community is directly relevant to a finding of whether the LOI project is “consistent with the overall needs of the community.” CDC 60.070 (A) (3). Under *Norvell*, West Linn was required to address those adverse economic impacts in its findings.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this decision must be reversed or remanded.

Respectfully submitted this 30th day of September, 2013.

REEVES, KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS



Peggy Hennessy, OSB #872505
Of Attorneys for Petitioners (LUBA No. 2013-023)

CERTIFICATE OF FILING

I hereby certify that on September 30, 2013, I filed the original of this PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF, (LUBA NO. 2013-023), in Consolidated Case Nos. 2013-021, 2013-022 and 2013-023, together with four copies, with the Land Use Board of Appeals, DSL Building, 775 Summer Street NE, Suite 330, Salem OR 97301-1283 by FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY.

Dated this 30th day of September, 2013.

REEVES, KAHN, HENNESSY & ELKINS

Peggy Hennessy
Peggy Hennessy, OSB #872505
Of Attorneys for Petitioners
(LUBA Case No. 2013-023)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served the PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF, (LUBA NO. 2013-023), in Consolidated Case Nos. 2013-021, 2013-022 and 2013-023 on September 30, 2013, by mailing via FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY to the following individuals two true copies thereof contained in a sealed envelope with postage prepaid to the following addresses:

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DAIED this 30th day of September, 2013.


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August 6, 2013

SENT VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL

Ms. Kelly Burgess
Land Use Board of Appeals
DSL Building
775 Summer Street NE, Ste. 330
Salem, OR 97301-1283



Re: *STOP et al. v. City of West Linn et al.*
LUBA Nos. 2013-021, 2013-022 and 2013-023 (Consolidated)

Dear Kelly:

Enclosed please find an original and four copies of the City of West Linn's Response Brief for filing in the above matter.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Christopher D. Crean".

Christopher D. Crean

CDC/yh
Enclosures

cc: Megan K. Thornton
Andrew Stamp
Peggy Hennessy
Timothy V. Ramis
Carrie Richter

BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STOP TIGARD OSWEGO PROJECT, LLC
("STOP"), NORMAN KING, PETE BEDDARD,
MICHAEL MONICAL, CAROL ELSWORTH,
MARK ELSWORTH, SHANNON VROMAN,
JENNE HENDERSON, LAMONT KING, THOMAS
J. SIEBEN, GWEN SIEBEN, SCOTT GERBER, JAN
GERBER, JACK NORBY, THOM HOLDER, GARY
HITESMAN, REBECCA WALTERS, DARRYL
WALTERS,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF WEST LINN,

Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-
TIGARD WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF
TIGARD,

Intervenor-Respondents.

LUBA Nos. 2013-021 and 2013-022

WILLIAM J. MORE, CARL L. EDWARDS, LINDA
S. EDWARDS, CURT SOMMER, AND ROBERT
STOWELL,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF WEST LINN,

Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-
TIGARD WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF
TIGARD,

Intervenor-Respondents.

LUBA No. 2013-023

CITY OF WEST LINN'S RESPONSE BRIEF

August 2013

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. STANDING OF PETITIONERS	1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
A. Nature of the Decision and Relief Sought	1
B. Summary of Arguments.....	1
1. More First Assignment of Error	1
2. More Second Assignment of Error	2
3. More Third Assignment of Error.....	2
4. STOP First Assignment of Error	2
5. STOP Fifth Assignment of Error.....	2
C. Summary of Material Facts	2
D. Jurisdiction.....	8
III. ARGUMENT.....	8
A. Response to More First Assignment of Error.....	8
1. The <i>Ex Parte</i> Communications Have No Bearing on the Applicable Approval Criteria.....	9
2. The City Complied with the Requirements of ORS 227.180(3) by Disclosing the Substance of the <i>Ex Parte</i> Communication and Allowing an Opportunity for the Parties to Respond.....	11
B. Response to More Second Assignment of Error	13
1. There is No Evidence the Mayor was Biased in Favor of the Applications.....	14
2. The Mayor did not Independently Gather Evidence in Support of the Applications.....	16
C. Response to More Third Assignment of Error	18
1. WLCDC 99.180 Does Not Confer an Unlimited Right to a Vote.....	18
2. The Failure to Vote on the Challenges Did Not Prejudice Petitioners’ Substantial Rights.....	20
D. Response to STOP First Assignment of Error.....	23

1. STOP Failed to Raise the Issue Below.....	23
2. STOP Lacks Standing to Assert the Rights of a Another Party	25
3. The City Has Authority to Impose a Fee for Use of the Public Rights of Way in the City	26
a. The Community Impact Fee is a Fee for Use of the Right of Way	26
b. ORS 221 Does Not Preempt City Authority to Impose the Fee.....	26
c. The Fee is Authorized by the City Code and Charter	28
d. The IGA Required in Condition 16 Must Comply with Applicable Law	29
e. Because the Fee is Not Preempted, the City has Authority Under ORS 190	29
f. ORS 271 Does Not Apply	29
E. Response to STOP Fifth Assignment of Error	30
1. LUBA Should Disregard STOP's Fifth Assignment of Error Because it Relies on Facts That are Not in the Record	30
2. Communication between a City Councilor and Staff are Not <i>Ex Parte</i> Contacts Provided New Evidence is Not Communicated	31
IV. CONCLUSION	33

1 **I. STANDING OF PETITIONERS**

2 Respondent City of West Linn (“City”) agrees that Petitioners have standing to
3 pursue this appeal.

4 **II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

5 **A. Nature of the Decision and Relief Sought**

6 The City approved two land use applications submitted by the Lake Oswego-Tigard
7 Partnership (“LOT”) on behalf of the City of Lake Oswego and the City of Tigard. The first
8 decision (AP-12-02) approved a conditional use permit and design review for the expansion
9 of Lake Oswego’s water treatment plant. The second decision (AP-12-03) approved a
10 conditional use permit, design review and related permits for the installation of a raw water
11 line from the Willamette River to the treatment plant, and a finished water line from the
12 treatment plant to Lake Oswego.

13 The Petitioners in LUBA 2013-021 and 2013-022 (collectively referred to as
14 “STOP”), appealed both decisions. STOP seeks an order of the Board remanding both
15 decisions. STOP Pet. at 1.

16 The Petitioners in LUBA 2013-023 (collectively referred to as “More”), appealed
17 only the decision in AP-12-03. More seeks an order from the Board reversing or remanding
18 the decision. More Pet. at 4.

19 **B. Summary of Arguments**

20 The City’s brief only addresses More’s First, Second and Third Assignments of Error
21 and STOP’s First and Fifth Assignments of Error. For all other Assignments of Error in the
22 opening briefs, the City joins the answering briefs filed Intervenor-Respondents City of Lake
23 Oswego, Lake Oswego-Tigard Water Partnership and City of Tigard.

24 **1. More First Assignment of Error**

25 ORS 227.180(3) does not require remand when the substance of the *ex parte*
26 communication has no bearing on an applicable approval criterion. Even if the

1 communications were relevant to an approval criterion, the City complied with ORS
2 227.180(3) by disclosing the substance of the communication and allowing the parties an
3 opportunity to respond.

4 2. More Second Assignment of Error

5 Petitioners have not demonstrated that the Mayor was biased in favor of the
6 applications or that he departed from his role as trier of fact and advocated in favor of the
7 applications.

8 3. More Third Assignment of Error

9 The City properly declined to vote on Petitioners' challenge to Mayor Kovash's
10 impartiality because West Linn Community Development Code ("CDC") § 99.130.B
11 requires the City Council to vote on a challenge to a City Councilor only for reasons other
12 than the Councilor's judgment and Petitioners' challenge was based on allegations regarding
13 the Mayor's judgment.

14 4. STOP First Assignment of Error

15 Petitioners did not raise the issue of the City's authority to impose a fee for use of the
16 right of way below and cannot do so for the first time here. Further, Petitioners lack standing
17 to assert the rights of another party. Finally, the City has home rule authority to impose a fee
18 for use of public rights of way in the City that is not preempted by state law.

19 5. STOP Fifth Assignment of Error

20 Councilor Jones' communications with staff are not *ex parte* communications.
21 Further, staff briefing the City Council regarding discussions with the applicant also does not
22 constitute an *ex parte* communication.

23 **C. Summary of Material Facts**

24 With one exception, the City generally accepts both Petitioners' Statement of
25 Material Facts. Where differences exist, they will be addressed under specific assignments
26 of error. The exception is More's Statement of Material Fact No. 4 regarding the City

1 Council decision, which omits a number of material facts and misstates others. The City
2 writes separately here only to clarify those facts and provide a more complete picture of the
3 proceedings below.

4 The Lake Oswego Tigard Water Partnership submitted two land use applications for
5 permits necessary to expand its water operations. As noted above, application AP-12-02 was
6 to expand Lake Oswego's existing water treatment plant, and application Ap-12-03 was for
7 new water lines to convey water from the Clackamas River to the water treatment plant and
8 from the treatment plant to Lake Oswego (the "Projects"). R. at 11222-11881; 8230-8794.
9 On November 26, 2012, the Planning Commission denied both applications. R. at 2991.
10 The applicant appealed the Planning Commission's decision on December 10, 2012. R. at
11 2949.

12 The City Council held public hearings on January 14 and 15, 2013. R. at 2905. At
13 the beginning of the hearing on January 14, Mayor Kovash and Councilors Carson, Jones,
14 and Tan (hereinafter "Councilors") stated that they had reported any *ex parte* contacts by
15 sending an email to City staff that disclosed the *ex parte* contact and the substance of the
16 communication; those emails were then included in the record by City staff. R. at 1452-
17 1456. On January 14, the Mayor and Councilors stated that they were free of bias and,
18 therefore, capable of making an impartial decision. R. at 1453. However, Councilor Frank
19 previously heard and voted on the applications as a member of the Planning Commission
20 and, for that reason, recused himself from the proceedings. R. at 1452-1453.

21 During the appeal proceeding alone, more than 1,600 pages of testimony were
22 submitted into the record (R. at 844-1229; 1238-1332; 1458-1546; 1833-2097; 2185-2898),
23 and the Mayor and Councilors were often approached by citizens attempting to discuss the
24 Projects (R. at 1452-1453; 762; 366). The record was left open to accept written testimony
25 until January 22 at 10:00 a.m. R. at 1237. In an effort to prevent further *ex parte* contacts
26 after the record closed on January 22, a filter was placed on the Council's email that sent all

1 subsequent emails regarding the Projects to a new mailbox, "LOTWP," and notified senders
2 that the Council would not receive the email. R. at 710-729.

3 When the Council reconvened on January 28 (R. at 1237), Councilor Jones disclosed
4 that he had received an email at his personal email address that he forwarded to his city
5 address to be reviewed by staff (R. at 762). The email was originally caught by the filter
6 when the sender, Dave Froode, sent the email to each Councilor's City email address before
7 forwarding it to Councilor Jones' personal email address. R. at 710; 713. Councilor Carson
8 and Mayor Kovash stated that they had not had any further *ex parte* contacts. R. at 762.

9 After the public testimony was complete, the Council prepared to ask questions of
10 staff and the applicant. The Mayor cautioned the Council, staff and the applicant that the
11 questions and answers should not elicit new evidence:

12 So, since the record was closed on January 22nd, we are asking questions and
13 we should not ask questions that require any new evidence. And having said
14 that, uh, if we ask, inadvertently, a question that requires new evidence, be
15 very cautious and tell us, and we, I think we would not then receive the
16 answer. And there has been so much said over so many months that if
someone asked the question that required something new, or wasn't in the
record, please tell us. Because sometime we may be surprised at the things
that are not in the record. Alright? Okay.

17 Index of Oversized and Difficult to Duplicate Documents to be Provided to LUBA at Oral
18 Argument ("Index"), Video: 01/28/13 at 00:11:20. After the question and answer period, the
19 Mayor closed the public hearing and the Council moved to deliberations. R. at 766.

20 The Mayor began the deliberations by explaining that he supported the Projects
21 because the Projects met all of the criteria for approval. Index, Video: 01/28/13 at 00:57:38.
22 Councilor Jones then explained his position that the applications failed to meet the "overall
23 needs of the community" under CDC § 60.070(A)(3). R. at 766; 620B-620D. He pointed
24 out that the record indicates that "seven Neighborhood Associations voted . . . to support the
25 Robinwood Neighborhood Association's opposition to these applications . . . I can only
26 assume that they voted to support the Robinwood Neighborhood not because they would

1 suffer from the affects of this application but because they believed that the Robinwood
2 Neighborhood would carry a disproportionate burden.” R. at 620B.

3 Councilor Carson responded that the “overall needs” were met because the applicant
4 had a plan to mitigate concerns, and the projects will provide significant benefits such as a
5 seismically secure facility and a redundant water supply. R. at 766-767; Index, Video:
6 1/28/13 at 1:18:25. Finally, Councilor Tan expressed that she agreed with Councilor Jones’
7 conclusion that the “overall needs of the community” requirement was not met by the
8 Projects. Index, Video: 1/28/13 at 1:24:53. In addition to CDC 60.070(A)(3), Councilor Tan
9 cited the conflicting expert testimony and her belief that the Projects did not comply with
10 Comprehensive Plan, Goal 2, Land Use Policy 8, as grounds for denying the applications. R.
11 at 767; Index, Video: 1/28/13 at 1:25:40.

12 After all of the Councilors announced their positions, the Mayor emphasized that any
13 decision must be based on the approval criteria:

14 As I said early on, this is a quasi-judicial hearing, and decisions must be based
15 on applicable approval criteria. That’s the goal. It’s not always I think the
16 case. I think I have heard tonight some decision criteria which are not in the
17 code. I’ve also heard a lot of assumptions. And one of the things that this
18 body and the Planning Commission should be very attuned to is information,
19 where it comes from, how it’s processed, and is it applicable. For example, I
20 heard several times, and it is in, throughout the literature that LOT is opposed
21 by seven neighborhood associations, and the assumption I heard tonight was
22 that they were against this because it was bad for the community. I didn’t
23 make that assumption. I called them. I called two of them. The first one I
24 called said, “Well, we have some minutes on that. I’ll send them to you.”
25 What the minutes said was that they opposed LOT until there was better
26 dialogue between Lake Oswego Tigard and neighborhood associations. They
were keying on something else that was said, that there are some problems
with the way this issue has been handled. And that’s a problem. The other
neighborhood association I called, I asked the neighborhood association
president what the impact was, or what they heard. And he said, “Well, I
can’t send you minutes because we haven’t had a meeting since last June or
July.” And I said, “Well what about LOT?” He said, “Never heard of it.”
That neighborhood association didn’t have an opinion about LOT. And that
should be bothersome to us. Index, Video: 1/28/13 at 1:27:15.

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Councilor Jones then made additional comments, including:

We could use the intertie. We could use cooperation with Lake Oswego. What we've got going right now is a 2-2 Council vote, and if our attorney is correct, what's gonna happen is the record as completed by the Planning Commission, will go to LUBA if it's appealed to LUBA. Okay, now, I'm going to make a suggestion. It seems to me, and if you heard my discussion, I really have two areas, two areas, and maybe we can work on some conditions of approval that the applicant probably won't accept. Index, Video: 1/28/13 at 1:31:45; R. at 768.

Councilor Jones then requested staff develop conditions of approval that would require LOT to develop a business mitigation plan, compensation for residents' attorneys' fees incurred during associated condemnation proceedings, an evaluation of Nixon Avenue, and penalties for violations of the Construction Management Plan. R. at 768. Councilor Carson then requested that the City Attorney address the *ex parte* issue raised by the Mayor's conversations with the neighborhood associations (R. at 768), and the following exchange occurred:

- City Attorney: Those would constitute an *ex parte* communication. Were they disclosed in an earlier proceeding?
- Councilor Jones: I don't believe so.
- Mayor Kovash: They're on the website.
- Councilor Jones: Did you disclose the *ex parte* contact in an earlier proceeding?
- Councilor Carson: As one of the emails?
- Mayor Kovash: Umm, the whole record there is on who I talked to, so...
- City Attorney: In order for the error to result in reversal or remand, somebody would need to be able to demonstrate that it, it prejudices a substantial right. Is there something about that communication that informed your decision, that they were not allowed, they were denied the opportunity to respond to because they weren't aware of the communication. So, I'll need to look a little more closely at that and I should be able to get back to you after the break. Index, Video: 1/28/13 at 1:38:30.

1 During the break, it was determined that the communications were not in the record
2 and the Council reopened the record until February 4 to allows the parties an opportunity to
3 respond to the communications, after which the applicant would be given until February 8 to
4 respond to any new testimony. R. at 768. During the discussion of the motion, Councilor
5 Jones explained, “this is one of these things we have to go through because we all didn’t
6 follow the rules.” Index, Video: 01/28/13 at 1:42:00. To which Mayor Kovash responded,
7 “No, just one of us didn’t. Unbeknownst to him, so thank you, and it can be corrected.”
8 Index, Video: 01/28/13 at 1:42:29. The Council also directed staff to draft provisional
9 language regarding a number of possible conditions of approval. R. at 769. Although each
10 Councilor discussed his or her position regarding compliance with the applicable CDC
11 provision as of January 28, no vote was taken. The record was held open through February
12 4, staff was directed to draft additional conditions of approval, and the hearing and
13 deliberations were continued to February 11. R. at 768.

14 During the open-record period, the Mayor sent an email to the Assistant City
15 Attorney stating: “[I] called two NA presidents regarding any meetings their NA’s may have
16 had concerning LOT. The substance of these contacts was disclosed at the January 28, 2013
17 Council Meeting.” This email was placed in the record. R. at 660. City resident Dave
18 Froode responded to the Mayor’s comments in an email that explained that “[O]ne NA was
19 inadvertently included in a letter that should not have been . . . [T]here were actually eight
20 NAs that have voiced opposition in one form or another . . . But, not all had quorums or are
21 active.” R. at 368-369.

22 On February 11, the Council continued the hearing. R. at 259. Even after the
23 Council determined it was necessary to reopen the record for written testimony to respond to
24 the Mayor’s *ex parte* communication, citizens continued to approach Mayor Kovash and
25 Councilor Jones to discuss the Project. R. at 259; 366. Those *ex parte* communications were
26

1 disclosed, and after a few brief questions were answered, the public hearing was closed. R.
2 at 259-260.

3 Councilor Jones then moved to add five new conditions to the proposed conditions of
4 approval. R. at 260; Index, Video: 02/11/13 at 00:10:56. After the motion passed and Mayor
5 Kovash stated his position, Councilor Jones reiterated the sentiment that he had expressed at
6 the January 28 meeting, "I woke up at 3 o'clock on Saturday morning and said, what possible
7 conditions would work to make this work because if this doesn't work we're going to be
8 dealing with asking our voters for a 30% increase in their water bill." Index, Video: 02/11/13
9 at 00:19:10. He then explained that his position had changed because of the additional
10 conditions of approval, including modifications to the Intergovernmental Agreement for the
11 intertie and limitations on the size of the clearwell. R. at 261.

12 Similarly, Councilor Tan determined that CDC 60.070(A)(3) was satisfied after
13 reviewing the numerous benefits to West Linn, such as the emergency intertie and the receipt
14 of Lake Oswego's abandoned waterlines along Highway 43, in conjunction with the
15 mitigation efforts to lessen the burden on the Robinwood Neighborhood and businesses. R.
16 at 261-262. The Council voted unanimously to overturn the Planning Commission's decision
17 on February 11, and the Council's decision was adopted on February 18, 2013. R. at 262;
18 176.

19 **D. Jurisdiction**

20 The City agrees LUBA has jurisdiction over this appeal.

21 **III. ARGUMENT**

22 **A. Response to More First Assignment of Error**

23 Petitioners' first assignment of error argues that the City failed to comply with ORS
24 227.180(3) when, after disclosing his communications with two neighborhood associations
25 and holding the record open to allow the parties an opportunity to respond, Mayor Kovash
26 "failed and refused to disclose important information, including the identity of the people

1 from whom he received the *ex parte* contact, the names of the neighborhood associations, the
2 timing of the communications, and the authority of the speaker to communicate on behalf of
3 a particular neighborhood association.” More Pet. at 28. In effect, Petitioners are arguing
4 that the Mayor failed to disclose “the substance” of the communication. For the following
5 reasons, Petitioners first assignment of error should be denied.

6 1. The *Ex Parte* Communications Have No Bearing on the Applicable Approval
7 Criteria.

8 ORS 227.180 (3) provides:

9 (3) No decision or action of a planning commission or city governing body
10 shall be invalid due to *ex parte* contact or bias resulting from *ex parte* contact
11 with a member of the decision-making body, if the member of the decision-
12 making body receiving the contact:

13 (a) Places on the record the substance of any written or oral *ex parte*
14 communications concerning the decision or action; and

15 (b) Has a public announcement of the content of the communication and
16 of the parties’ right to rebut the substance of the communication made at the
17 first hearing following the communication where action will be considered or
18 taken on the subject to which the communication related.

19 Petitioners do not argue that Mayor Kovash failed to disclose the *ex parte*
20 communications or that the City failed to allow them an opportunity to respond as required
21 by the statute. Accordingly, Petitioners’ argument is limited to the narrow issue of whether
22 the Mayor disclosed the “substance” of the communication. However, for purposes of this
23 assignment of error, it is immaterial whether the Mayor disclosed the substance of the
24 communication because the subject of the communication has no bearing on any applicable
25 approval criteria.

26 In *Link v. City of Florence*, 58 Or LUBA 348 (2009), LUBA held that the failure to
disclose *ex parte* contacts that have no bearing on an applicable approval criteria or material
issue does not warrant remand. In *Link*, the city approved two ordinances annexing and
rezoning property. After the record was closed and during the city council’s deliberations,
one of the councilors stated “that the crowd he has been in contact with has been very
supportive of the annexation.” *Link*, 58 Or LUBA at 352. The councilor then went on to

1 describe generally the nature of that support. Before LUBA, the petitioners argued that the
2 councilor's *ex parte* communications with supporters of the proposed annexation violated
3 ORS 227.180(3), particularly because the city failed to reopen the record to allow the
4 petitioners to respond. In rejecting petitioners' argument, LUBA held:

5 [I]n order to provide a basis for remand based on *ex parte* contacts, there must
6 be some indication that the communication had something to do with the
7 factual determinations or legal standards that govern approval or denial of the
8 application. The goal of prohibiting undisclosed *ex parte* contacts is to ensure
9 that land use decisions are based on information or evidence the decision
makers receive within the public process, and are not based on legal
arguments or evidence received outside the public process. *Carrigg v. City of
Enterprise*, 48 Or LUBA 328, 333 (2004).

10 *Link*, 58 Or LUBA at 353.

11 In this case, Petitioners' entire assignment of error is premised on a discussion among
12 the City Council regarding how many neighborhood associations opposed the land use
13 applications. Petitioners had testified that seven associations opposed them, a position noted
14 by Councilor Jones in his comments. Conversely, Mayor Kovash believed that at least two
15 of the seven had not taken a position based on his communication with those associations.
16 Regardless of how many neighborhood associations actually opposed the applications,
17 Petitioners do not point to any applicable criteria that requires the City to make such a
18 determination or otherwise explain how the issue relates to an applicable approval criterion.

19 The approval criteria and the findings upon which the City Council relied are set forth
20 in detail in the final decisions and the Mayor's failure to respond to Petitioners' subsequent
21 interrogatories does not magically elevate neighborhood support into an approval criterion.
22 Elected officials will always be concerned about public support for or against a proposed
23 development, and those concerns will find their way into the officials' public comments.
24 Nonetheless, in this case, the fact that the City Council's larger discussion of the project and
25 compliance with the applicable criteria included comments about the extent of neighborhood
26 support does not make the measure of that support an applicable approval criterion. More

1 salient are the Council's discussion of CDC 60.070.A(3) (overall benefit to the community);
2 60.070.A(7) (compliance with the comprehensive plan); compliance with the City's water
3 master plan (increasing capacity of the intertie) upon which the decisions were ultimately
4 based. R. at 198-200; 200-223; 212-213; 222-223.

5 Because nothing in the City development code requires the city to determine the
6 number of neighborhood associations that support or oppose a quasi-judicial land use
7 application, remanding the decision to allow additional evidence and testimony on the issue
8 would have no bearing on the applicable approval criteria.

9 2. The City Complied with the Requirements of ORS 227.180(3) by Disclosing
10 the Substance of the *Ex Parte* Communication and Allowing an Opportunity
11 for the Parties to Respond

12 A local decision is not invalid due to *ex parte* communication provided the decision-
13 maker discloses the substance of the communication and the parties are allowed an
14 opportunity to respond. ORS 227.180(3). Here, at the close of the public hearing, the Mayor
15 opened the deliberations by reiterating that the Council could consider only the applicable
16 approval criteria. Index, Video: 1/28/13 at 1:27:15. The Mayor then reminded the Council
17 not to reach a decision based on criteria that are not in the code and to scrutinize any
18 assumptions when weighing the evidence:

19 As I said early on, this is a quasi-judicial hearing, and decisions must be based
20 on applicable approval criteria. That's the goal. It's not always I think the
21 case. I think I have heard tonight some decision criteria which are not in the
22 code. I've also heard a lot of assumptions. And one of the things that this
23 body and the Planning Commission should be very attuned to is information,
24 where it comes from, how it's processed, and is it applicable. For example, I
25 heard several times, and it is in, throughout the literature, that LOT is opposed
26 by seven neighborhood associations. And the assumption I heard tonight was
that they were against this because it was bad for the community. I didn't
make that assumption. I called them. I called two of them. The first one I
called said, "Well, we have some minutes on that. I'll send them to you."
What the minutes said was that they opposed LOT until there was better
dialogue between Lake Oswego Tigard and neighborhood associations. They
were keying on something else that was said, that there are some problems
with the way this issue has been handled. And that's a problem. The other
neighborhood association I called, I asked the neighborhood association

1 president what the impact was, or what they heard. And he said, "Well, I
2 can't send you minutes because we haven't had a meeting since last June or
3 July." And I said, "Well what about LOT?" He said, "Never heard of it."
That neighborhood association didn't have an opinion about LOT. And that
should be bothersome to us. (Index, Video: 1/28/13 at 1:27:15.)

4 In this instance, the Mayor was clearly using the testimony regarding the number of
5 neighborhood associations that oppose the applications as an example of how evidence
6 should be weighed and scrutinized rather than accepted at face value. Be that as it may, the
7 precise issue presented by his comments was the number of neighborhood associations that
8 actually opposed the land use applications. In response to testimony that seven associations
9 formally opposed the applications, the Mayor stated that he had spoken with two of the
10 associations, one of which had not heard of the applications and the other was concerned
11 only with the way "the issue has been handled." Thereafter, as described above and
12 consistent with the City practice of documenting *ex parte* communications in an email to
13 staff, the Mayor sent an email to the City Attorney stating that he "called two NA presidents
14 regarding any meetings their NA's may have had concerning LOT." R. at 660. The Mayor
15 also sent an email to the City Planning Director describing the calls: "One was concerned
16 that LOT treat WL citizens right and the other knew nothing about LOT." R. at 36. Both
17 email were placed in the record and are consistent with the Mayor's comments during the
18 January 28 public meeting.

19 On these facts, the Mayor clearly disclosed the "substance" of the communication for
20 purposes of ORS 227.180(3). He reported with whom he spoke (the neighborhood
21 association presidents), the subject of the conversation (opposition to the land use
22 applications) and the substance of the conversations (neither had taken a position opposing
23 the applications). Notwithstanding Petitioners' desire for a detailed accounting of the
24 conversations, more is not required. The statute requires only the "substance" of the
25 communications be disclosed and the record held open to allow interested parties an
26 opportunity to respond. Here, because the City was concerned the communications were not

1 previously disclosed, the Mayor disclosed the substance of the conversations and the record
2 was held open for an additional seven days to allow interested parties an opportunity to
3 respond. Significantly, while several Petitioners demanded the Mayor recuse himself for the
4 belated disclosure of his communications with the neighborhood associations, only Dave
5 Froode actually responded to the substance of the Mayor's comments.¹ R. at 368-69.

6 Because the City complied with the requirements of ORS 227.180(3), Petitioners'
7 reliance on *Horizon Construction, Inc. v. City of Newberg*, 114 Or App 249, 834 P2d 543
8 (1992) is misplaced. In *Horizon*, a city councilor disclosed relevant *ex parte*
9 communications after the record was closed and the city declined to reopen the record to
10 allow the parties an opportunity to respond. As the Court noted in *Horizon*, "the city could
11 have reopened and extended the proceedings" to allow the petitioner a meaningful
12 opportunity to respond and the city's failure to do so required the decision to be remanded for
13 additional local proceedings. In this case, the City did precisely what the statute and the
14 decision in *Horizon* contemplate—it immediately reopened the record to allow the parties a
15 meaningful opportunity to respond. And, as noted, the lone response simply substantiated
16 the Mayor's comments.

17 For these reasons, LUBA should deny More's first assignment of error.

18 **B. Response to More Second Assignment of Error**

19 In their second assignment of error, Petitioners argue that Mayor Kovash
20 impermissibly departed from his role as an impartial decision-maker by independently
21 developing evidence which he then used to support the LOT land use applications.
22 According to Petitioners: "[T]he Mayor's actions in conducting his own investigation to
23

24 ¹ Mr. Froode's response is addressed in the findings for both decisions: "Mr. Froode took advantage of this
25 opportunity in his email of February 4, 2013 to say that one of the supposed opposition neighborhood
26 associations did not, in fact, oppose and that those who did, did so 'in one form or another' (such as, perhaps, to
urge further discussions). Moreover, he suggests that not all such associations 'had active quorums or are
active' as well. The Mayor's point appears to be well-taken." Final Order AP-12-03, p.4, fn 2, Rec. at 183;
Final Order AP-12-02, p.3, fn 3, Rec. 64.

1 obtain evidence in support of the LOT Project, coupled with his failure to disclose the
2 evidence until he could use it to manipulate the deliberation and timing for the final decision,
3 does show that he was not acting as an impartial decision maker.” More Pet. at 32. For the
4 reasons set forth below, LUBA should deny the second assignment of error.

5 1. There is No Evidence the Mayor was Biased in Favor of the Applications

6 The core of Petitioners’ argument is that the Mayor was biased in favor of the LOT
7 Project and, acting on that bias, that he independently developed evidence to support the
8 Projects which he intentionally and surreptitiously hid until he could use it to delay a
9 decision. In doing so, Petitioners argue, the Mayor crossed the line from an impartial trier of
10 fact to become an advocate for the Projects. More Pet. at 31-32. Petitioners’ argument
11 misunderstands both the facts and the law.

12 LUBA does not lightly infer bias. *Catholic Diocese of Baker v. Crook County*, 60 Or
13 LUBA 157, 165 (2009). Bias may be found only where there is evidence of a strong
14 emotional commitment by the decision-maker to a particular outcome. *Id.* at 166; *Oregon*
15 *Natural Desert Association v. Harney County*, LUBA 2011-097, 2012 WL 1964616 (May 3,
16 2012). The question is whether the decision-maker failed to engage in the necessary fact-
17 finding and apply the facts to the law and instead voted based on a predisposition for or
18 against the application. *Claus v. Sherwood*, 62 Or LUBA 67, 74 (2010).

19 In this case, Petitioners entire claim of bias is based on dialogue in a City Council
20 work session in which the Mayor attempted to keep the City Council focused on the subject
21 of the work session, and the belated disclosure more than a year later of two *ex parte*
22 communications the Mayor believed were already in the record. More Pet. at 15, 31-33.
23 These disparate and disconnected facts fall far below the level necessary to demonstrate the
24 Mayor was biased in favor of the Project.

1 In *Halvorson-Mason Corp. v. City of Depoe Bay*, 39 Or LUBA 702 (2001), LUBA
2 found a city councilor was irretrievably biased where there was evidence that the councilor
3 actively opposed the development before and during his tenure on the city council, including
4 writing letters that verged on personal attacks on the applicant. In *Friends of Jacksonville v.*
5 *City of Jacksonville*, 42 Or LUBA 137, *aff'd* 183 Or App 581, 54 P3d 636 (2002), two city
6 councilors were members of a church that filed a land use application. LUBA found that one
7 of the councilors was biased and should have recused himself where there was evidence that,
8 among other things, he had advocated in favor of the proposed use prior to his election, stated
9 he did not believe he needed to be objective, and signed a petition in favor of the proposed
10 use while a member of the city council. Conversely, LUBA found that the other councilor
11 was not biased simply by virtue of being a member of the church. Similarly, in *Catholic*
12 *Diocese*, LUBA held that a city councilor was not biased despite evidence that he attended a
13 planning commission meeting with his wife who opposed the proposed development.

14 The facts of this case do not remotely rise to the threshold for bias established in
15 *Halvorson-Mason* and *Friends of Jackson County*. The December 2011 work session was
16 called for the purpose of providing the City Council with a general sense of the project and
17 its effects on West Linn. When Councilor Cummings tried to broaden the discussion to
18 include whether Lake Oswego actually needed more water, the Mayor reminded her that was
19 not the subject of the meeting and that “we will get to those other questions” at a later date.
20 More Pet. at p.15. This colloquy is nothing more than an example of a presiding officer
21 maintaining control of a public meeting by limiting extraneous discussion and keeping the
22 focus on the purpose of the meeting. It does not remotely show evidence of bias by the
23 Mayor in favor of the Project.

24 Similarly, as shown above, the Mayor failed to disclose his *ex parte* communication
25 with two neighborhood associations because he believed the substance of the
26 communications was already in the record. When it was determined it was not, the record

1 was immediately reopened and the parties allowed an opportunity to respond. Again, the
2 belated disclosure of two *ex parte* communications followed by an immediate reopening of
3 the record is not remotely evidence of a “strong emotional commitment” in favor of the
4 Project.

5 2. The Mayor did not Independently Gather Evidence in Support of the
6 Applications

7 Petitioners repeatedly assert that the Mayor contacted the neighborhood associations
8 for the purpose of supporting the land use applications. More Pet. at 31-33. According to
9 Petitioners, the Mayor “chose not to disclose [the communications] to his fellow decision
10 makers unless or until he could use it to manipulate the public process” and, in doing so,
11 “was acting as LOT’s advocate.” More Pet. at 32. Here again, neither the facts nor the law
12 support Petitioners’ argument.

13 The City is required to provide an impartial tribunal when reviewing and reaching a
14 decision on a quasi-judicial land use application. *Fasano v. Washington County*
15 *Commission*, 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973). A city councilor is not expected to be free of
16 all bias but must be able to set aside any such bias and “engage in the necessary fact finding
17 and attempt to interpret and apply the law to the facts as they find them so that the ultimate
18 decision is a reflection of their view of the facts and the law rather than the product of any
19 positive or negative bias.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v City of Central point*, 49 Or LUBA 697
20 (2005). In short, a city councilor sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity serves as an impartial
21 trier of fact who must assess and weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses,
22 and dispassionately apply the facts to the applicable law. Accordingly, a city councilor may
23 not act as an advocate in a quasi-judicial proceeding while simultaneously voting on the final
24 decision. *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Hood River*, LUBA 2013-009, 2013 WL 2390547
25 (May 21, 2013) (“where the potential decision maker participated as an advocate in his or her
26 personal capacity in the very case that person is now being asked to decide . . . it is

1 inappropriate for the former advocate to step forward and participate on the same panel he or
2 she advocated a position before).

3 The heart of Petitioners' argument is that the Mayor "conduct[ed] his own
4 investigation to obtain evidence in support of the LOT Project" and that, in doing so, became
5 and advocate rather than an impartial trier of fact. More Pet. at 32. To support this claim,
6 Petitioners rely on *Woodard v. City of Cottage Grove*, 54 Or LUBA 176 (2007) in which
7 LUBA wrote:

8 [I]t is highly unusual and at least potentially improper for a decision maker to
9 independently seek out or attempt to obtain additional evidence outside the
10 scope of a public hearing with respect to a quasi-judicial application pending
11 before that decision maker. The role of the local government decision maker
12 is not to *develop* evidence to be considered in deciding a quasi-judicial
application, but to impartially consider the evidence that the participants and
city planning staff submit to the decision maker in the course of the public
proceedings.

13 *Woodard*, 54 Or LUBA at 186 (emphasis in original).

14 The problem with Petitioners' argument is that it mischaracterizes the nature of the
15 Mayor's action. The Mayor was not attempting to "*develop*" new evidence to support or
16 oppose the land use applications; rather, he was attempting to confirm the accuracy of
17 information that was already in the record. Such an exercise is consistent with the role of the
18 trier of fact who is required to assess the credibility and determine the weight of evidence
19 that is presented to him. In this way, the Mayor's actions are no different than conducting a
20 site visit to confirm descriptions of a development site, or looking up the background of
21 competing traffic engineers to determine which traffic study should be given greater weight.
22 As long as the site visit or background check is disclosed so that interested parties may
23 respond to it, the decision-maker stays firmly within his role as an impartial trier of fact and
24 does not cross the line into advocacy.

25 Certainly, there is a line beyond which determining the weight or credibility of
26 evidence crosses over into developing new evidence. For example, in *Woodard*, a city

1 councilor (Councilor Haskell) requested the city police chief provide “police logs” on three
2 opponents of the land use application, then presented the logs to the mayor and other
3 councilors at a meeting in his home. Thereafter, another councilor attempted to enter the
4 logs into the record of the proceedings before the city council. On those facts, LUBA had no
5 trouble concluding that Councilor Haskell was clearly developing *new* evidence to enter into
6 the record in support of the applicant, rather than simply seeking to confirm the accuracy of
7 testimony already in the record. In this case, Mayor Kovash’s calls to two neighborhood
8 associations to confirm whether they in fact opposed the land use applications falls well short
9 of the egregious evidence-gathering and advocacy that was present in *Woodard*. Instead, the
10 Mayor’s actions are well within the scope of due diligence that should reasonably be
11 expected of the trier of fact when assessing and weighing evidence that is already in the
12 record.

13 For these reasons, LUBA should deny More’s second assignment of error.

14 **C. Response to More Third Assignment of Error**

15 In their third assignment of error, More Petitioners argue that the City was required to
16 vote on their challenges to Mayor Kovash’s impartiality pursuant to CDC 99.180(B). More
17 Pet. at 33, 35. Petitioners claim their substantial rights were prejudiced because of the
18 Mayor’s disclosure of *ex parte* contacts at the January 28, 2013, meeting, and because he
19 “may well have influenced” the final decision on February 11, 2013. More Pet. at 36.
20 Because CDC 99.180 does not confer an unlimited right to a vote by the City Council on a
21 challenge to the Mayor’s impartiality and the failure to do so did not prejudice Petitioners’
22 substantial rights, LUBA should deny the third assignment of error.

23 1. WLCDC 99.180 Does Not Confer an Unlimited Right to a Vote

24 Petitioners argue that the City is “required” by CDC 99.180(B)(3) to conduct a vote
25 on their challenges to Mayor Kovash. More Pet. at 35. CDC 99.180 provides in relevant
26 part:

1 99.180. B. Challenges to impartiality.

2 1. An affected party or a member of a hearing body may challenge the
3 qualifications of a member of the hearing body to participate in the hearing
and decision. The challenge shall state the facts relied upon by the challenger
relating to a person's bias, pre-judgment, personal interest, or other facts from

4 which the challenger has concluded that the member of the hearing body
5 cannot participate in an impartial manner.

6 2. The challenged person shall have an opportunity to respond orally to the
challenge. The challenge shall be incorporated into the record of the hearing.

7 3. Any challenge shall require that the hearing body vote on the challenge
8 pursuant to subsection E of this section.

9 * * *

10 E. Abstention or disqualification. Disqualification for reasons other than the
11 member's own judgment may be ordered by a majority of the members of a
hearing body present and voting. The member who is the subject of the
12 motion for disqualification may not vote on the motion but shall be allowed to
participate in the deliberation of the hearing body on that motion.

13 Because CDC 99.180(B)(3) requires a vote on a challenge "pursuant to subsection E
14 of this section," the provisions of subsections (B) and (E) must be read together. Subsection
15 (B)(1) authorizes "an affected party" to challenge the qualifications of a member of the
16 hearing body. When such a challenge is made, subsection (B)(3) directs the hearing body to
17 vote on the challenge "pursuant to subsection (E)," which, in turn, states that the hearing
18 body "may" order a member disqualified, but only "for reasons other than the member's own
19 judgment."

20 Read together, provisions of CDC 99.180 do not create an unlimited or guaranteed
21 right to a vote when a person files a challenge based on bias or impartiality. Instead, it
22 authorizes the hearings body to act on a challenge and disqualify a member from continued
23 participation in the proceedings but only for reasons that do not involve the member's
24 exercise of his or her own judgment.

25 In this case, Petitioners' challenges clearly relate to their conviction that Mayor
26 Kovash's judgment is clouded by his alleged bias in favor of the Project. Of the 17

1 challenges that were filed, 15 assert that the *ex parte* contacts are evidence of the Mayor's
2 bias, one calls for a vote on the challenges, and the other simply claims that the Mayor "is
3 obviously impartial." More Pet. at 21, 34-35. None assert a basis for the challenge other
4 than a subjective belief that the Mayor's bias prevents him from remaining impartial.
5 Petitioners cite no other basis for disqualification that would allow the City Council to
6 disqualify the Mayor under the provisions of CDC 99.180.

7 The authority granted to a hearings body under CDC 99.180(E) is not only limited, it
8 is also discretionary—the hearing body "may" vote to disqualify a member if there is a basis
9 for doing so other than the member's judgment. Here, because the basis for the challenges
10 questioned only the Mayor's judgment, the City Council properly exercised its discretionary
11 authority and declined to schedule a vote on the challenges.

12 2. The Failure to Vote on the Challenges Did Not Prejudice Petitioners'
13 Substantial Rights

14 Petitioners argue that their substantial rights were prejudiced when the City declined
15 to "address the disqualification request." More Pet. at 36. Petitioners first assert that a vote
16 by the City Council at the January 28 meeting was postponed by the Mayor's disclosure of *ex*
17 *parte* communications. *Id.* Second, Petitioners claim that the Mayor's continued
18 participation "may well have influenced" the final vote on February 11. *Id.* Petitioners'
19 arguments fail for a number of reasons.

20 Procedural error provides a basis for reversal or remand only if the error results in
21 prejudice to Petitioners' substantial rights. ORS 197.835(9)(a)(B); *Ramsey v. Multnomah*
22 *County*, 44 OR LUBA 722, 725 (2003); *Stallkamp v. City of King City*, 43 Or LUBA 333,
23 351-52 (2002), *aff'd* 186 Or App 742, 66 P3d 1029 (2003); *Furler v. Curry County*, 27 Or
24 LUBA 546, 550 (1994). Merely claiming or speculating that such harm may have occurred
25 does not establish a basis for reversal or remand. *O'Shea v. City of Bend*, 49 Or LUBA 498,
26 502 (2005).

1 Petitioners' first claim of prejudice is, frankly, baffling. Petitioners filed their
2 challenges to the Mayor's impartiality during the open record period between January 28 and
3 February 4, 2013. More Pet. at 21. But because the challenges were filed *after* the January
4 28 meeting, they could not possibly have affected the outcome of the meeting even if the
5 Council subsequently voted on them. Petitioners do not explain how a vote of the City
6 Council on a challenge under CDC 99.180 could have any affect on a meeting that occurred
7 before the challenge was ever filed. Accordingly, the City's decision not to vote on
8 Petitioners' challenges could not have affected Petitioners' rights at the January 28 meeting.

9 Moreover, with respect to Petitioners' claim that the failure to vote on their
10 challenges affected the "stated vote" at the January 28 meeting, the record shows that the
11 City Council never intended to vote that evening as demonstrated by Councilor Jones'
12 comments made *prior* to the disclosure of the Mayor's *ex parte* contacts and the decision to
13 reopen the record:

14 Okay, now, I'm going to make a suggestion. It seems to me, and if you heard
15 my discussion, I really have two areas, two areas, and maybe we can work on
16 some conditions of approval that the applicant probably won't accept. (Index,
Video: 1/28/13 at 1:31:45; R. at 768.)

17 As noted in the above Statement of Material Facts, Councilor Jones then requested
18 staff develop conditions of approval that would require LOT to develop a business mitigation
19 plan, compensation for residents' attorneys' fees incurred during associated condemnation
20 proceedings, an evaluation of Nixon Avenue, and penalties for violations of the Construction
21 Management Plan. R. at 768. From these comments, it is clear that Councilor Jones at least
22 did not expect to vote that evening and intended to continue working on additional conditions
23 of approval for consideration by the City Council. Accordingly, Petitioners' repeated
24 assertions that the City Council would have voted at the January 28 meeting lacks support in
25 the record.
26

1 Petitioners also claim that they were prejudiced because the Mayor's continued
2 participation "may well have influenced" the vote on February 11. More Pet.at 36. The first
3 problem with this argument is that it is merely speculative. Petitioners claim only that the
4 Mayor "may" have influenced the outcome of the February 11 meeting, but do not point to
5 any specific facts to substantiate the claim or to show how the Mayor's participation
6 prejudiced a substantial right. It can be assumed that *every* member of the City Council who
7 participated in the February 11 meeting influenced the outcome to some degree, including the
8 Mayor, but absent a showing of material harm to Petitioners, the mere allegation that a
9 member of a hearings body participated in the proceedings and "may" have influenced the
10 outcome is insufficient to substantiate a claim that Petitioners suffered prejudice to a
11 substantial right. *O'Shea* at 502-503

12 More important, the core of Petitioners' argument, again, appears to be that the
13 Mayor was biased and that by failing to vote on Petitioners' challenges under CDC 99.180,
14 the City Council allowed the Mayor to exert a biased influence over the proceedings. The
15 essential predicate of this argument is the allegation that the Mayor was, in fact, biased,
16 which Petitioners have not, and cannot, show. The only facts Petitioners point to are the
17 Mayor acting in his role as the presiding officer to control the discussion at a City Council
18 work session in December 2011 (More Pet. at 13-14), and the belated disclosure of two *ex*
19 *parte* contacts more than a year later at the January 28, 2013, public meeting. As explained
20 above, these two facts fall far short of a cognizable showing of bias. Accordingly, even
21 under Petitioners' interpretation of CDC 99.180, the City Council would have lacked any
22 basis for excluding the Mayor from the proceedings.

23 Petitioners' bias argument also relies on the assumption that the other members of the
24 City Council share Petitioners' view of the Mayor and would have voted to uphold the
25 challenges, thereby excluding him from participating in the February 11 meeting. However,
26 given that the members of the City Council declined to act on Petitioners challenges and are

1 themselves authorized to challenge the participation of a member under CDC 99.180 but
2 similarly declined to do so, it is unlikely the other members of the City Council share
3 Petitioners' view of the Mayor alleged bias. On these facts, absent a showing of actual bias
4 or that the remainder of the City Council likely would have voted to uphold the challenges
5 and exclude the Mayor, the failure to do so is merely a procedural violation that did not
6 prejudice Petitioners' substantive rights.

7 Finally, it is significant that CDC 99.180 does not require the City Council to hear
8 public testimony or argument when voting on a challenge. Accordingly, other than the
9 written statements in the challenges themselves, Petitioners would not have had the
10 opportunity to testify regarding the Mayor's alleged bias, present additional evidence or
11 additional legal arguments. Thus, Petitioners were not denied the opportunity to advocate in
12 favor of the challenges.

13 For these reasons, LUBA should deny More's third assignment of error.

14 **D. Response to STOP First Assignment of Error**

15 In their first assignment of error, STOP Petitioners argue that the City lacks legal
16 authority to impose an impact fee for use of the public right of way as a condition of
17 approval. STOP Pet. at 15-27. For the following reasons, LUBA should deny Petitioners'
18 first assignment of error.

19 **1. STOP Failed to Raise the Issue Below**

20 It is well established that the failure to raise an issue at the local level precludes an
21 appeal to LUBA based on that issue. ORS 197.763(1), 197.835(3); *Pliska v. Umatilla*
22 *County*, 240 Or App 238, 233-244, 246 P3d 1146 (2010); *Stewart v. City of Salem*, 231 Or
23 App 356, 363-64, 219 P3d 46 (2009), *rev. den.* 348 Or 415, 233 P3d 818 (2010) (discussing
24 "raise it or waive it" principle); *Vanspeybroeck v. Tillamook County*, 221 Or App 677, 691,
25 191 P3d 712 (2008) (failure to raise an issue to a local decision-maker precludes appeal to
26 LUBA based on that issue.).

1 Both decisions below impose the same “community impact fee” (“Fee”) obligation on
2 the applicant “for use of the public streets in West Linn.” R. at 249. Condition 16 states:

3 16. Community Impact Fee. The applicant shall enter into an
4 intergovernmental agreement with West Linn in lieu of a franchise or other
5 licensing fee for use of the public streets in West Linn. The agreement shall
6 require a one-time payment of \$5 million to be used for West Linn water
7 system improvements to meet the overall needs of the community.

8 Petitioners argue that “there is no legal authority for the City to charge an *ad hoc*
9 impact fee to a developer” under various provisions of ORS 221 (organization of municipal
10 government), ORS 223 (infrastructure financing), ORS 271 (disposition of public real
11 property), or the “nexus requirement” in *Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n*, 483 U.S.
12 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).² STOP Pet. at 17, 20-21, 24-25. However, at no time during
13 the proceedings did Petitioners ever question the City’s authority to impose such a fee, much
14 less under any specific statutory scheme. To the contrary, to the extent Petitioners addressed
15 the Fee at all, they argued that the City was not demanding enough. Petitioners’ written
16 materials address the “\$5M right of way license fee.” R. at 504. But rather than challenging
17 the City’s authority to impose the Fee, they argued that “[t]his is just a bad business deal,
18 need to apply perpetual royalty in the neighborhood of 10-20% gross revenue share per year,
19 for life of agreement.” *Id.* Petitioners go on to assert that the City has a “fiduciary and
20 ethical responsibility to negotiate BEST POSSIBLE DEAL for West Linn, not easiest deal.”
21 *Id.* (capitalization in original).

22 It is clear from Petitioners’ own statements that they believe the City has authority to
23 impose a fee for use of the public right of way within the city. Indeed, their only objection
24 was that the City wasn’t demanding a larger payment. Other comments in the record follow
25 a similar theme. R. at 705 (“low ball offer”); 943 (“Is West Linn for sale?”); 1215
26 (“\$5million is far too cheap); 2828 (“scant and quickly spent \$5 million”); 2833 (“insist on

² Presumably as modified by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Management District*,
__ U.S. __, Docket No. 11-1447 (2013)

1 more than the \$5 million fish tossed at us by LO.”). Nowhere in the record is there any
2 evidence that Petitioners claimed that the proposed Fee for use of the public right of way
3 violates the provisions of ORS 221, 223, 271 or the U.S. Constitution either generally or by
4 reference to the specific statutes, and Petitioners do not point to any. *See also Bundy v. City*
5 *of West Linn*, 63 Or LUBA 113 (2011) (constitutional provision at issue must be cited or the
6 substance of the constitutional provision argued to the decision maker); *Larson v. Multnomah*
7 *County*, 24 Or LUBA 629 (1993) (petitioner is required to raise constitutional claim during
8 the local proceedings or waive the right to raise the issue at LUBA). Again, all of their
9 testimony was to the contrary—that the City wasn’t exercising its authority enough.

10 Having failed to raise the issue of the City’s authority to impose the Fee for use of the
11 right of way, Petitioners cannot now raise it for the first time at LUBA. *Pliska* at 233-244.

12 2. STOP Lacks Standing to Assert the Rights of a Another Party

13 It is also well established that a petitioner cannot assert the rights of another party.
14 *Columbia Riverkeeper v. Clatsop County*, 61 OR LUBA 1996 (2010) (prejudice to another
15 party is not a sufficient basis to warrant remand of the decision); *Gordon v. Polk County*, 50
16 Or LUBA 502 (2005) (petitioner may not seek reversal or remand based on prejudice to other
17 persons); *Bauer v. City of Portland*, 38 Or LUBA 432, 436 (2000) (prejudice must be to
18 petitioner, not a third party).

19 Here, the condition of approval imposes a payment obligation only on the
20 applicants—LOT, Lake Oswego and Tigard. To the extent the condition affects a party’s
21 substantial rights, it only affects the cities and their respective ratepayers. Accordingly, only
22 those parties may advance legal arguments that the condition violates their substantive rights.

23 Simply stated, STOP may not argue the cities legal rights on their behalf. Petitioners
24 do not, and cannot, explain why the Fee prejudices their substantial rights in a manner that
25 would allow them to assert the rights of the Lake Oswego and Tigard ratepayers who will
26 have to pay the fee. Arguably, Intervenor-Respondents could have appealed the City’s

1 decisions on the basis that Condition 16 violates state or federal law, but Petitioners lack
2 standing to do so.

3 3. The City Has Authority to Impose a Fee for Use of the Public Rights of Way
4 in the City

5 Petitioners' argument that the City lacks authority to impose the Fee is based on a
6 misunderstanding of the scope of local authority granted in the Oregon Constitution and
7 West Linn's Charter. The appropriate inquiry is not, as Petitioners suggest, whether there is
8 a statutory grant of authority. Rather, Petitioners must show an affirmative preemption of
9 City home rule authority to impose the Fee. Petitioners have not pointed to any statute that
10 preempts that authority.

11 a. *The Community Impact Fee is a Fee for Use of the Right of Way*

12 As a preliminary matter, Petitioners assert a list of potential bases for the Fee,
13 including claims that it may be a Systems Development Charge under ORS 223.297 *et seq.*
14 (STOP Pet. at 16-17), "some sort of ad-hoc development fee" (STOP Pet. at 17) or a
15 franchise fee (STOP Pet. at 18), then decides it must be payment for an improper transfer for
16 real property (STOP Pet. at 24-26). Despite the Petitioners' effort to make it so, the Fee is
17 not complicated. The Fee is required as part of an intergovernmental agreement between
18 LOT and the City for use of the public streets in the City and is "in lieu of a franchise or
19 other licensing fee." As shown below, the City has authority to impose a fee for use of the
20 rights of way, as it has done here. Petitioners' attempts to re-label the Fee are unsupported in
21 the record and irrelevant as a matter of law.

22 b. *ORS 221 Does Not Preempt City Authority to Impose the Fee*

23 Petitioners argue the Fee is a franchise fee that the City lacks authority to impose
24 because ORS 221.415 and 221.420 do not apply to municipal utilities. This position is based
25 on a fundamental misunderstanding of the City's home rule authority. The City does not
26 need express statutory authority to impose the Fee, nor does ORS 221 in any way preempt

1 the City from impose the Fee (or a franchise fee for that matter) on Lake Oswego. The City
2 has a home rule charter that expressly reserves to it “all powers which the Constitution,
3 statutes and common law of the United States and of this State now or hereafter expressly or
4 implied grant or allow the City, as fully as though this Charter specifically enumerated each
5 of those powers.” 1994 West Linn Charter Sec. 4.

6 Municipal home rule authority is rooted in two 1906 amendments to the Oregon
7 Constitution. The primary purpose of the home rule amendments was “to allow the people of
8 the locality to decide upon the organization of their government and the scope of its powers
9 under its charter without having to obtain statutory authorization from the legislature, as was
10 the case before the amendments.” *LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB*, 281 Or 137, 142, 576 P2d
11 1204, 1208, *aff’d on reh’g* 284 Or 173 (1978). Recognizing the broad authority granted
12 Oregon home rule jurisdictions, the Oregon Supreme Court has looked at the issue not as
13 whether the city needs state authorization to act, but “[r]ather, whether state or federal law
14 prohibits the city from doing so.” *US West Communications, Inc. v. City of Eugene*, 336 Or
15 181, 186, 81 P3d 702, 705 (2003).

16 The proper analysis in this case, then, is to look at whether there is a statute that
17 preempts the City’s authority to impose the Fee. This is fundamentally different from
18 Petitioners’ argument, which incorrectly asserts that since municipal utilities are not subject
19 to ORS 221.420, the City has no authority to impose the Fee. The correct analysis actually
20 leads to the opposite result: Since ORS 221.420 does not apply on these facts, it cannot
21 possibly preempt the City from imposing the Fee.

22 In fact, the statutes on which Petitioners rely expressly underscore the City’s
23 independent home rule authority to impose the Fee. In ORS 221.415, the Legislature
24 “[r]ecogniz[es] the independent basis of legislative authority granted to cities in this state by
25 municipal charters” and states its intention that ORS 221.420 “reaffirm the authority of cities
26 to regulate use of municipally owned rights-of-way” *AT&T Communications of the*

1 *Pacific Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene*, 177 Or App 379, 398, 35 P3d 1029 (2001), *rev.*
2 *den.*, *AT&T Communications of Pacific Northwest, Inc. v. City of Eugene*, 334 Or 491, 52 3d
3 1056 (2002) (noting with respect to telecommunications carriers that ORS 221.415 expressly
4 recognizes the “independent basis” of municipal authority and that ORS 221.450 “expressly
5 ... confirm[s] the authority of any city to charge telecommunications carriers for the use of
6 local rights-of-way”). With this context, it is clear that ORS 221.420 “reaffirms” the City’s
7 existing authority to regulate its rights of way with respect to certain entities, and has no
8 impact whatsoever on entities not covered by the statute.

9 In other words, there can be no “preemption by omission.” To the contrary,
10 “LaGrande/Astoria and its progeny require an expressly stated intent to preempt particular
11 municipal enactments in order for a state statute to have that effect.” *Thunderbird Motor*
12 *Club*, 234 Or App 457, 471, 228 P3d 650 (2010). Accordingly, a court must begin its
13 preemptive review with a presumption against preemption. *See id.* at 271. This is especially
14 true in the area of local taxation and finance. *See LaGrande/Astoria*, 281 Or at 143.

15 Because ORS 221.415 and 221.420 do not apply to municipal utilities, it cannot and
16 does not preempt the Fee. As the Legislature acknowledged in ORS 221.415, the City has
17 “an independent basis of legislative authority” in its Charter, and Petitioners have shown no
18 preemption of the authority to impose the Fee.

19 *c. The Fee is Authorized by the City Code and Charter*

20 Petitioner claims the City imposed the Fee “out of thin air” because they believe there
21 is not an applicable ordinance authorizing the Fee. STOP Pet. at 19. This is false. The West
22 Linn Municipal Code (“WLMC”) clearly states that “[t]he City has jurisdiction to control
23 public rights of way within the City and *may* regulate the use of rights of way by ordinance,
24 franchise, license, permit or any combination thereof.” WLMC 9.030 (emphasis added).
25 Petitioners mistake the word “may” for “shall.” This is not an exclusive list of the City’s
26 rights of way management tools. Nothing in this section prohibits the City from controlling

1 the rights of way through an intergovernmental agreement and an associated fee, nor in any
2 way restricts the imposition of fees for use of the rights of way. Here, the City has exercised
3 its authority over the rights of ways by intergovernmental agreement and an associated fee, a
4 power that is clearly within the scope of authority granted in the home rule charter and the
5 terms of WLMC Chapter 9.

6 *d. The IGA Required in Condition 16 Must Comply with Applicable Law*

7 Having tried (unsuccessfully) to paint the Fee as an impermissible franchise fee,
8 Petitioners go on to argue that the intergovernmental agreement must then be an
9 impermissible perpetual franchise. STOP Pet. at 18, citing ORS 221.460. This position is
10 unsupportable. First, Condition 16 does not address the duration of the intergovernmental
11 agreement. Second, assuming arguendo the intergovernmental agreement is a “franchise” as
12 Petitioners assert, then the City and Lake Oswego must comply with applicable laws,
13 including any applicable limits on the duration of the agreement. Nothing in Condition 16 is
14 inconsistent with ORS 221.460, and thus the condition is lawful on its face.

15 *e. Because the Fee is Not Preempted, the City has Authority Under ORS 190*

16 Petitioners claim the City and Lake Oswego lack the authority to enter into the
17 intergovernmental agreement required in Condition 16 because the City lacks authority to
18 impose the Fee. STOP Pet. at 23. As shown above, Petitioners’ premise lacks legal support.
19 The City has authority to regulate its rights of way and impose the Fee, and the cities have
20 the authority to enter into an intergovernmental agreement to achieve that purpose. (“A unit
21 of local government may enter into a written agreement with any other unit or units of local
22 government for the performance of any or all functions and activities that a party to the
23 agreement, its officers or agencies, have authority to perform.” ORS 190.010.

24 *f. ORS 271 Does Not Apply*

25 Petitioners’ argument that the City has conveyed an interest in its rights of way in
26 violation of ORS 271.300 *et seq.* is not supported by the record. That statute applies where a

1 political subdivision decides to “sell, exchange, convey or lease” real property. ORS
2 271.310(1). It is clear on the face of Condition 16, which states that there will be an
3 intergovernmental agreement and an associated fee for using the public rights of way in the
4 City, that the City has not agreed to lease the rights of way. One of the hallmarks of a
5 property right, including a lease, is the right to exclude others. *See Dolan v. City of Tigard*,
6 512 US 374, 384, 114 S Ct 2309 (1994) (right to exclude others is one of the most
7 fundamental property rights). It is readily apparent that the Condition does not and could not
8 transfer such a right to Lake Oswego. In short, the City did not follow the terms of ORS
9 271.300 *et seq.* because the statute does not apply.

10 **E. Response to STOP Fifth Assignment of Error**

11 In their fifth assignment of error, STOP Petitioners argue that communications
12 between Councilor Jones and city staff, and between city staff and LOT, constitute *ex parte*
13 contacts under ORS 227.180(3) to which they were not allowed to respond and the decision
14 should be remanded on that basis. STOP Petition at 46-50. For the following reasons,
15 LUBA should deny the fifth assignment of error.

16 **1. LUBA Should Disregard STOP’s Fifth Assignment of Error Because it Relies**
17 **on Facts That are Not in the Record**

18 LUBA has repeatedly held that it will disregard those portions of a petition for review
19 that are based on facts that are not in the record. *Mannenbach v. City of Dallas*, 25 Or LUBA
20 136, 138, *aff’d* 121 Or App 441 (1993); *Spiro v. Yamhill County*, 38 Or LUBA 133 (2000).
21 In this case, Petitioners acknowledge that the fifth assignment of error is “premised on facts
22 that are not in the record.” Because it is based on evidence that is admittedly not in the
23 record, LUBA should disregard the fifth assignment of error.
24
25
26

1 2. Communication between a City Councilor and Staff are Not Ex Parte
2 Contacts Provided New Evidence is Not Communicated

3 Communication between a city councilor and staff is not *ex parte* communication
4 provided staff does not act as a conduit for new evidence that is not already in the record.
5 ORS 227.180(4); *Richards-Kreitzberg v. Marion County*, 31 Or LUBA 540, 541, *aff'd*
6 *without opinion* 145 Or App 603, 930 P2d 905 (1997); *McInnis v. City of Portland*, 25 Or
7 LUBA 376 (1993), citing *Toth v. Curry County*, 22 Or LUBA 488 (1991).

8 Here, there is no evidence or allegation, and Petitioners do not argue otherwise, that
9 the applicant used staff as a conduit to provide new evidence that was not already in the
10 record. At most, Petitioners allege that staff was directed to draft conditions of approval
11 proposed by Councilor Jones, then to “run the conditions by the applicant.” STOP Pet. at 48.
12 Thereafter, whether or not staff briefed one or more councilors on that discussion is of no
13 consequence. Local staff routinely works with the parties (including an applicant) on staff
14 reports and conditions of approval, then brief the governing body on those discussions. As
15 long as no new evidence is provided to the governing body upon which the governing body
16 relies in reaching a decision, such briefings do not constitute *ex parte* contacts that must be
17 disclosed. *McInnis v. City of Portland*, 25 Or LUBA at 381-82.

18 In *Mcinnis*, the Portland City Council was considering a comprehensive plan
19 amendment and zone change. Having missed most of an earlier hearing, one city councilor
20 reviewed the extensive record and “received a personal briefing” from staff. *Id.* at 380. The
21 petitioners argued that the councilor was influenced by information he received from the
22 staff, which should have been disclosed and an opportunity to respond provided. LUBA
23 rejected the argument, concluding:

24 Here, there is nothing to suggest that the city staff briefed the city
25 commissioner on anything other than the evidence already in the record.
26 Nothing suggests the city staff impermissibly advocated denial of the proposal
 or did anything other than perform its role of providing administrative support
 to the city council.

1 *Id.* at 382.

2 So too in this case. Even according to Petitioners' unsubstantiated facts, staff was
3 directed on Saturday, February 9, by Councilor Jones to work on additional conditions of
4 approval for consideration by the full City Council at the meeting scheduled for Monday,
5 February 11. Thereafter, according to the news media cited by Petitioners, the City Manager
6 was "in contact with both Jones and LOT officials in regard to the new conditions, and that
7 other city staff, such as attorneys, dealt with drafting the conditions." STOP Pet. at 48.
8 Significantly, Petitioners do not allege that any new evidence was presented to Councilor
9 Jones or any other member of the City Council, or even that LOT was involved in drafting
10 the conditions of approval, which were drafted by "other city staff, such as attorneys." There
11 is no authority, and Petitioners do not cite to any, for the argument that informing an
12 applicant that city staff is preparing additional conditions of approval and briefing members
13 of the governing body on those discussions constitutes *ex parte* contacts for purposes of ORS
14 227.180(3). *See also Hunt v. City of Ashland*, 35 Or LUBA 467, 481 (1999) (staff
15 recommendation regarding appropriate conditions of approval is not new evidence).

16 The only authority Petitioners cite regarding the treatment of *ex parte* contacts under
17 ORS 227.180(3) affirms the City's position that "a decision-maker talking to staff outside of
18 the public record is not an *ex parte* contact." STOP Pet. at 49 (citing *Richards-Kreitzberg*,
19 31 OR LUBA at 541, *Dickas v. City of Beaverton*, 16 OR LUBA 574, 581, *aff'd* 92 Or App
20 168 (1988)). However, in a footnote, Petitioners attempt to rely on a Lane County Circuit
21 Court case that not only does not provide a basis for authority at LUBA but involved claims
22 under Oregon's public meetings laws (ORS 192.610 to 192.690), not *ex parte*
23 communications under ORS 227.180 (3). STOP Petition at 48-49. As such, it provides no
24 authority to support a claim under ORS 227.180(3). *See also Falls v. Marion County*, 61 Or
25 LUBA 39 (2010) (LUBA will not consider an assignment of error that is presented only in a
26 footnote).

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For these reasons, LUBA should deny STOP's fifth assignment of error.


IV. CONCLUSION

The City respectfully requests the Board denying all of Petitioners' assignments of error and affirming the City's decisions.

DATED this 6th day of August, 2013.

Respectfully submitted,

BEERY, ELSNER & HAMMOND, LLP



Christopher D. Crean, OSB #942804
Of Attorneys for Respondent City of West Linn

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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

I certify that on the date indicated below, I filed the original and four copies of the foregoing CITY OF WEST LINN'S RESPONSE BRIEF with the:

Land Use Board of Appeals
DSL Building
775 Summer Street NE, Suite 330
Salem, OR 97301-1283

by first-class mail, postage prepaid. On the same date, I served a true and correct copy of the same, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on the following parties:

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
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


TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. STANDING	1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE	1
A. Nature of the Land Use Decision and the Relief Sought	1
B. Summary of Arguments	1
C. Statement of Material Facts	2
III. JURISDICTION	6
IV. RESPONSE TO STOP'S SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR	6
A. Scope of Review	6
B. Response to Assignment of Error	6
V. RESPONSE TO STOP'S THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR	15
A. Scope of Review	15
B. Response to Assignment of Error	15
VI. RESPONSE TO STOP'S FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR AND MORE'S FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR, IN PART	17
A. Scope of Review	17
B. Response to Assignment of Error	17
VII. RESPONSE TO MORE'S FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR	26
A. Scope of Review	26
B. Response to Assignment of Error	26
VIII. RESPONSE TO MORE'S FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR, IN PART	31
A. Scope of Review	31
B. Response to Assignment of Error	31
IX. CONCLUSION	37

APPENDICES

	APP PAGE
Pipeline Alignment Map	1
Construction Site Plan for OPRD-Owned Lots	2
West Linn Water Resources Area Maps	3-4
David Evans and Associates Horizontal Directional Drilling Evaluation	5-13
Pipeline Plans for Trillium-Heron Creeks	14-17
Excerpt From West Linn Water System Master Plan	18-19

1 **I. STANDING**

2 Intervenor-Respondent City of Lake Oswego (jointly known with the City of Tigard as
3 the Lake Oswego-Tigard Water Partnership and hereinafter referred to as the "Partnership"),
4 do not challenge Petitioners' standing to seek review of the challenged decisions.

5 **II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

6 **A. Nature of the Land Use Decision and Relief Sought**

7 Respondent City of West Linn (hereinafter "Respondent") approved two permit
8 packages: one allowing for the construction of an expanded water treatment plant (WTP) and
9 the second, for raw water and finished water pipelines conveying water to and from that plant.
10 Petitioners Stop Tigard Oswego Project, LLC *et al* (hereinafter referred to as "STOP") and
11 William J. More *et al*. (hereinafter referred to as "More") seek reversal or remand of these two
12 decisions. However, LUBA should reject these requests and affirm the two decisions.

13 **B. Summary of Arguments**

14 Respondent and Intervenors have divided their response amongst three separate briefs.
15 Respondent City of West Linn's Brief deals with the numerous procedural challenges raised
16 primarily by More in their First through Third Assignments of Error, STOP's Fifth Assign-
17 ment of Error as well as a response to STOP's First Assignment of Error. Intervenor City of
18 Tigard's brief addresses STOP's First Assignment of Error. This brief, filed on behalf of the
19 City of Lake Oswego, deals with the remaining assignments. The City of Lake Oswego
20 hereby adopts, and incorporates by reference, Respondent and the City of Tigard Response
21 Briefs.

22 As for STOP's Second and Third Assignments of Error, Respondent interpreted its
23 Water Resource Area regulations, CDC Chapter 32, to apply only to areas that exhibit
24 particular water resource characteristics, including those elements occurring underground. The
25 proposed pipeline installation activities occur outside of, above, or below Water Resource
26 Areas and will not "disturb" any water resource. Therefore, the mitigation obligations

1 triggered as a result of a “permanent disturbance” under CDC 32.050(C) do not apply.

2 In response to STOP’s Fourth Assignment of Error as well as a portion of More’s Fifth
3 Assignment of Error, Respondent’s findings adequately consider and respond to the
4 conditional use criteria contained within CDC 60.070(A)(1), to mitigate “adverse effects” and
5 (A)(3), to provide a proposal that is “consistent with the overall need of the community.”

6 Respondent’s findings explain and impose mitigation obligations such as a robust Construction
7 Management Plan, including (1) limiting the Highway 43 work hours to between 8:00 pm and
8 5:00 am and requiring that the road be re-opened to allow for a fully functioning street during
9 the other 15 hours per day; (2) limiting the length of the construction zone to 200 feet; and (3)
10 maintaining at least one driveway or access for vehicles to every business that is operating
11 during hours which overlap with nighttime construction hours. R. 193-194. In addition, the
12 findings go on to require additional mitigation including additional business access signage as
13 well as implementation of a “Shop Local” Marketing Plan, which was not challenged.

14 In response to More’s Fourth Assignment of Error, Respondent’s interpretation of
15 “overall needs of the community,” set out in CDC 60.070(A)(3) is plausible and therefore, is
16 entitled to deference under ORS 197.829. Respondent’s interpretation that the West Linn
17 community does benefit from a proposed development that also benefits other communities is
18 consistent with the express language of CDC 60.070(A)(3), its purpose and the comprehensive
19 plan.

20 In response to the remainder of More’s Fifth Assignment of Error, Respondent’s
21 finding that the pipeline is “consistent with the overall needs for the community” is plausible
22 and supported by substantial evidence.

23 **C. Statement of Material Facts**

24 Petitioners statements of material fact focus on self-serving facts, ascribe particular
25 motives to the Respondent’s Mayor and City Council that are not supported by the record,
26 mischaracterize the agreement requirements between Respondent and the Partnership entities,

1 present argument, contain many facts that are irrelevant to resolution of the issues raised
2 before LUBA, and fail to focus upon the evidence that Respondent relied on in finding that the
3 applicable approval criteria are satisfied. Therefore, a much more abbreviated statement of
4 those facts material to resolution of the issues raised is provided here.

5 On January 17, 2012, the Partnership filed Conditional Use and Design Review
6 applications to expand Lake Oswego's existing water treatment plant ("WTP") on property
7 zoned R-10, Single Family Residential. R. 77. The new plant would replace a 47-year old
8 facility with obsolete and unreliable electrical, mechanical and treatment technologies with a
9 state-of-the-art treatment facility that is energy efficient and designed to remain operable and
10 usable after a magnitude 9.0 seismic event. The project would expand the plant's water
11 treatment capacity from 16 million gallons per day (mgd) to 38 mgd with only a 9% increase
12 in overall area occupied by the plant. R. 66.

13 The WTP expansion would be part of an updated water treatment and distribution
14 system that begins in the City of Gladstone and ends in the City of Tigard. In June 2012, the
15 Partnership submitted a number of applications including a Conditional Use, Design Review,
16 Water Resources Area and Willamette River Greenway Permits for a water transmission line.
17 A 42-inch diameter raw-water pipeline (RWP) would begin in the Clackamas River, in
18 Gladstone, and would extend under the Willamette River via horizontal directional drilling
19 (HDD) to the WTP in West Linn. The boring would continue at a depth between 60 and 34
20 feet under wetlands and streams in Mary S. Young (MSY) Park. App. p. 1. Then the RWP
21 would gradually rise toward the surface as it extends toward two Oregon Parks and Recreation
22 District (OPRD)-owned lots (i.e., tax lots 100 and 200 that are not part of Mary S. Young State
23 Park) at the south end of Mapleton Drive, until arriving at the terminus of drilling
24 operations/staging area on tax lot 200, 7-feet below grade, but outside the boundaries of any
25 Water Resource Area. App. p. 2. From there, the pipe would be located in an open-cut trench
26 on OPRD tax lot 200 at a depth of approximately 5- to 7-feet that would extend north and west

1 along Mapleton Drive, terminating at the WTP. After installation of the pipe, the trench will
2 be filled. R. 180.

3 A finished-water pipeline (FWP) leading from the WTP to destinations in Lake
4 Oswego and Tigard would be installed via open-cut trench from the WTP to Mapleton Drive
5 and then west at a depth of approximately 5- to 7-feet beneath Mapleton Drive, primarily in an
6 open-cut trench, to its intersection with Highway 43 where it would then extend north in the
7 Highway 43 right-of-way to Lake Oswego. R. 180. Trillium Creek and Heron Creek pass
8 underneath Mapleton Drive within culverts. Using tunneling/boring methods, the pipeline will
9 be located within the Mapleton Drive right-of-way but underneath the culvert carrying
10 Trillium Creek. R. 8472. The pipeline will be laid within an open trench in Mapleton Drive
11 well above the Heron Creek culvert. R. 8477. Following construction, Mapleton Drive,
12 Kenthorpe Way and affected portions of Highway 43 would be repaved to their existing width.
13 R. 180.

14 The WTP was considered by the Planning Commission during a series of hearings held
15 in April and May 2012. The pipeline applications were filed in July 2012 so that the WTP and
16 pipeline applications could be considered together, although these two development permit
17 packages were never formally consolidated. In the fall of 2012, the Planning Commission
18 voted to deny the two proposals. R. 62 and 182. The denial was based primarily upon a
19 finding that the applications failed to provide sufficient "enhancement to the community that
20 offset the impacts" as necessary to satisfy a conditional use criterion requiring that the
21 proposal further the "overall needs of the community," CDC 60.070(A)(3). R. 62, 2994. On
22 December 10, 2012, the Partnership appealed the Planning Commission's decision. In
23 response to concerns raised by the Planning Commission, the Partnership included with its
24 appeal further revisions to the plant proposal including removal of the existing Operations
25 Building, reducing the overall building footprint and thus, reducing impacts to the surrounding
26 neighborhood, as well as an offer to mitigate impacts in other ways. R. 63.

1 In addition to reducing the overall WTP footprint, the Partnership identified additional
2 benefits to West Linn flowing from an approval, a number of which are listed below as they
3 are relevant to this appeal:

- 4 • Provide a reliable back-up supply of water to West Linn in furtherance of the 2008
5 Water Master Plan because it offers the most redundancy and lowest cost.
- 6 • Replace an existing 2003 intergovernmental agreement (IGA) between West Linn,
7 Lake Oswego, and South Fork Water Board¹ (SFWB) that provides a non-specific
8 quantity of emergency water that is unilaterally terminable, with a new agreement
9 (adding Tigard as a party) that commits at least 4 million gallons per day (mgd) of
10 emergency water and requires consent of all parties for termination and amendment.
- 11 • Eliminate capital improvement costs that would otherwise be required to achieve an
12 equivalent level of water supply reliability, and in doing so reduce water rate
13 increases for residents and businesses in West Linn.
- 14 • Connect with and provide access to 450 million gallons of reservoir storage in Lake
15 Oswego and Tigard.
- 16 • Provide a more reliable water conveyance system than currently exists as
17 demonstrated by professional civil and seismic engineers.
- 18 • Impose a utility access fee that would consist of a one-time payment of \$5 million
19 from the Partnership to Respondent to be negotiated through a separate user-fee
20 agreement consistent with the conditions of approval.
- 21 • Replace and upsize existing asbestos cement waterlines owned by West Linn in
22 Mapleton Drive, Kenthorpe Way, and Old River Road.
- 23 • Fund \$90,000 worth of restoration and enhancement work within Mary S. Young
24 Park. R.782-783, 841.

25 _____
26 ¹ South Fork Water Board is an ORS 190 municipal water supply agency formed between the cities of West
Linn and Oregon City.

1 On February 18, 2013, following de novo hearings, the West Linn City Council voted
2 to approve the WTP and pipeline applications with conditions of approval requiring among
3 other things, the execution of a new IGA and payment of the utility access fee. These appeals
4 followed.

5 **III. JURISDICTION**

6 The Partnership accepts Petitioners' statement of LUBA's jurisdiction as adequate for
7 purposes of LUBA's review.

8 **IV. RESPONSE TO STOP'S SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR – Respondent's**
9 **interpretation of CDC 32.010, concluding that the horizontally drilled directional pipe**
10 **located outside of water resource areas will not "disturb" water resource areas, was**
11 **plausible. Therefore, such activities are not subject to mitigation requirements.**

12 **A. Scope of Review**

13 In the context of a review of a governing body's interpretation of its own development
14 code, as is the case here, LUBA applies the standard of review described in *Siporen v. City of*
15 *Medford*, 349 Or 247, 259, 243 P3d 776 (2010), and determines that if the governing body's
16 interpretation is "plausible," the interpretation must be upheld. LUBA does not overturn a
17 city's interpretation of its own code, even if a petitioner or LUBA itself finds another
18 interpretation more persuasive. *Id.* Rather, the question is not whether the City's
19 interpretation is "correct" in some absolute sense of the term, as suggested by STOP's
20 arguments, but instead, the question is whether the Respondent's interpretation is plausible
21 under the "highly deferential" standard imposed by ORS 197.829(1) and *Siporen. Tonquin*
22 *Holdings v. Clackamas County*, 247 Or App 719, 722, 270 P3d 397 (2012), *rev. den.* 352 Or
23 170, 285 P3d 720 (2012).

24 **B. Response to Assignment of Error**

25 **1. Water Resource Area Regulation Generally.**

26 CDC Chapter 32 sets out the steps that must be satisfied in order to develop property

1 containing a mapped Water Resource Area (WRA). First, CDC 32.025 requires a permit in
2 order "to fill, strip, install pipe, undertake construction, or in any way alter an existing water
3 resource area."² The proposal was to "install pipe" on property containing existing water
4 resource areas and therefore, a WRA permit was required and was obtained.

5 After the permit obligation is triggered, an applicant must identify "all water resource
6 areas on the project site" including drainage ways, wetlands, and riparian corridors. CDC
7 32.050(A) and (E).³ "Water Resource Area" is defined in CDC 2.030 to include:

8 Any area that consists of a wetland identified in the West Linn Local
9 Wetlands Inventory and the required transition and setback area around the
10 wetland pursuant to Chapter 32 CDC, or any major or minor open channel
11 drainageway identified by the most recently adopted West Linn Surface Water
12 Management Plan and the required transition and setback area around the
13 major or minor open channel pursuant to Chapter 32 CDC, except for small
14 manmade open roadside drainage swales in residential areas, or any riparian
15 corridor (not including lands adjacent to the Willamette or Tualatin Rivers)

13 ² CDC 32.025 provides:

14 No person shall be permitted to fill, strip, install pipe, undertake construction, or in any way alter
15 an existing water resource area without first obtaining a permit to do so from the decision-making
16 authority, paying the requisite fee, and otherwise complying with all applicable provisions of this
17 chapter.

17 ³ CDC 32.050 provides:

18 No application for development on property containing a water resource area shall be approved
19 unless the decision-making authority finds that the following standards have been satisfied, or can
20 be satisfied by conditions of approval.

21 A. Proposed development submittals shall identify all water resource areas on the project site.
22 The most currently adopted Surface Water Management Plan shall be used as the basis for deter-
23 mining existence of drainageways. The exact location of drainageways identified in the Surface
24 Water Management Plan, and drainageway classification (e.g., open channel vs. enclosed storm
25 drains), may have to be verified in the field by the City Engineer. The Local Wetlands Inventory
26 shall be used as the basis for determining existence of wetlands. The exact location of wetlands
27 identified in the Local Wetlands Inventory on the subject property shall be verified in a wetlands
28 delineation analysis prepared for the applicant by a certified wetlands specialist. The Riparian
29 Corridor Inventory shall be used as the basis for determining existence of riparian corridors.

E. *The protected water resource area shall include the drainage channel, creek, wetlands, and
the required setback and transition area. (Emphasis added.)*

1 and the required transition and setback area for the riparian corridor pursuant
2 to Chapter 32 CDC.

3 In other words, a WRA is the natural feature coupled with a transition or setback area that is
4 necessary for resource protection and to improve water quality. App. pgs. 3-4.

5 Once the WRA is identified, particular regulations of those areas are imposed when
6 required by Chapter 32. For example, CDC 32.050(C) provides:

7 C. Development shall be conducted in a manner that will *minimize adverse*
8 *impact on water resource areas*. Alternatives which avoid all adverse
9 environmental impacts associated with the proposed action shall be considered
10 first. For unavoidable adverse environmental impacts, alternatives that reduce
11 or minimize these impacts shall be selected. If any portion of the *water quality*
12 *resource area is proposed to be permanently disturbed*, the applicant shall
13 prepare a mitigation plan as specified in CDC 32.070 designed to restore
14 disturbed areas, either existing prior to development or disturbed as a result of
15 the development project, to a healthy natural state. (Emphasis added.)

12 2. Respondent's Interpretation That Mitigation Obligations Apply Only To
13 WRAs is Plausible.

14 STOP argues that Respondent misinterpreted CDC 32.050(C) when it found that
15 horizontal drilling to install a pipe between 34 to 60 feet underneath identified creek and
16 wetland resources within MSY Park and beyond the boundaries of WRAs within the OPRD
17 parcels will not cause a "disturbance" triggering mitigation. STOP characterizes Respondent's
18 interpretation to be that WRAs and the regulations protecting them apply only to the surface of
19 resources. Pet. p. 33, lns. 4-6.

20 STOP's argument represents a gross misunderstanding of Respondent's interpretation
21 of the applicable standards that include the consideration of all impacts to water resources that
22 extend below ground as well as on the surface based on uncontroverted expert evidence
23 establishing identified WRA boundaries. In other words, the obligation to mitigate activities is
24 limited to those activities occurring within the WRA itself. The findings making such an
25 interpretation state:
26

1 WRA Disturbance – Chapter 32 limits the amount of disturbance allowed in a
2 Water Resource Area (WRA). The evidence in the record establishes that
3 using HDD construction methods well below (34 to roughly 60 feet) a WRA
4 will have no effect on the resources protected by the WRA. Protected WRA's
5 include the drainage channel, creek, wetlands, and the required setback and
6 transition areas that exist above ground while the wetland component of a
7 WRA can extend below-ground to a depth that is, "inundated or saturated by
8 surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
9 that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
10 typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." This definition
11 provides a limit upon which to measure the below-ground extent of wetlands
12 and therefore, WRAs. The applicant's plans demonstrate that their RWP
13 alignment avoids WRAs by going around (beneath) them and containing
14 impacts to WRAs in Mapleton Drive and Highway 43 to already disturbed
15 areas of the right-of-way. Therefore, the disturbance limits contained in
16 Chapter 32 do not apply. Rec. 188.

17 Respondent made absolutely no findings that its interpretation was limited to activities
18 occurring only on the surface as STOP suggests. Rather, what Respondent's found, based on
19 evidence in the record, was that WRAs do not extend all of the way down to the center of the
20 earth simply because they manifest on the surface, as would be the result of STOP's reasoning.
21 Respondent interpreted its code to conclude that in addition to limits to water resource areas
22 occurring horizontally on the surface, there are similarly limits to the vertical depth of the
23 resource as well. Such an approach is not only entirely plausible, it is correct given the
24 language and structure of the CDC.

25 STOP states for the first time before LUBA that the WRA purpose statements of CDC
26 32.010(A) identifying underground benefits of resource protection such as "providing
filtration, soil infiltration, and natural water purification, and stabilizing slopes to prevent
landslides" support STOP's claim that a disturbance of a resource may occur underground.
Even though this argument was not preserved on appeal, no party disputes that WRAs may
include components such as soil filtration or purification qualities occurring underground.
However, nothing in the CDC suggests that these underground benefits exist *ad inferos* in all
cases for every resource area, and there was no evidence presented that they exist given the
depths of the HDD drilling in this case. Rather than the map or the property boundaries, it is

1 the resource itself and the transition area that constitutes the WRA and is subject to mitigation
2 obligations if disturbed.

3 The CDC sections quoted above are particularly directed to the wetland, riparian and
4 drainage resources (and setback areas) identified on the subject property by reference to maps
5 and direct investigation rather than as identified on the City's Zoning Map or throughout an
6 entire property, from property line to property line and extending *ad coelum et ad inferos*, as
7 STOP argues. In fact, nothing in the text or context of the WRA regulations suggests that
8 Respondent's interpretation limiting the disturbance obligation to water resource areas and
9 their setbacks, rather than to the entire property, was in any way implausible or incorrect.

10 3. STOP's Allegations of Particular Disturbances Were Not Raised and
11 Have Been Waived Under ORS 197.835(3).

12 As an introductory matter, within the over 11,000 page record, the only instance where
13 STOP cites to the record as evidence of preservation of error is to the testimony of Kari Oakes
14 at pages 1015-1016 in the Record. Ms. Oakes assertion was only that installation of a pipeline
15 "by definition imposes a permanent disturbance" requiring mitigation. Other than a claim that
16 installation of the pipe constituted a "disturbance" per se, no party challenged Respondent's
17 interpretation that the activities proposed would not "disturb" any WRA.

18 Under ORS 197.835(3), a petitioner must demonstrate that the proposal's compliance
19 with that criterion was raised below accompanied by statements or evidence sufficient to
20 afford other parties an adequate opportunity to respond in order to raise a similar challenge
21 before LUBA. *Bruce Packing Company v. City of Silverton*, 45 Or LUBA 334 (2003).
22 Neither STOP, nor any other party challenged Respondent's reliance on a previous
23 interpretation of the term "disturbance," nor did any party challenge the Partnership's expert
24 evidence that the activities would occur outside of the WRA so as not to "disturb" them.
25 *Slepack v. City of Manzanita*, 44 Or LUBA 301(2003) (Petitioner's evidentiary challenge to a
26 city's conclusion that an applicable criterion is satisfied provides no basis for reversal or

1 remand, where the challenge is based on petitioner's interpretation of what the criterion
2 requires, and that interpretation was not presented during the local proceedings.) *Lofgren v.*
3 *Jackson County*, 55 Or LUBA 126 (2007) (Arguments that the county road is inadequate are
4 insufficient to raise an argument that the road cannot be improved without amending the
5 county's transportation system plan.)

6 Lacking any facts in the record to support an assertion that installation of a lateral pipe
7 34-60 feet below ground will impact wetland or riparian area operations consistent with
8 Respondent's interpretation, STOP inserts entirely new facts not found in the record regarding
9 asserted difficulties in the filtration of *Giardia* and *E. Coli* resulting from soils found under
10 natural resource areas. This new evidence should be disregarded and not considered by
11 LUBA. *Spiro v. Yamhill County*, 38 Or LUBA 133 (2000); *Mannenbach v. City of Dallas*, 25
12 Or LUBA 136 (1993).

13 STOP goes on to suggest that it does not take a "PhD in hydrology" to understand the
14 impacts if the pipeline springs a leak. STOP Pet. p. 36, lns. 1-11. No party asserted below that
15 the pipeline encased within bedrock located underneath MSY Park could possibly leak or
16 negatively impact wetlands or stream resources. Similarly, if there was any testimony below
17 identifying concerns over hydrofracture of the bore hole during installation damaging WRAs,
18 STOP fails to cite to it. If it was raised, there was no substantial evidence identifying what
19 impacts would result. Any such evidence would have been met by a response by a qualified
20 expert, such as the David Evans and Associates technical memorandums discussed below.
21 Further, STOP for the first time includes an entirely conclusory statement that the "violent
22 nature of the HDD process" will disturb water resource areas and that the type of rock subject
23 to the boring is highly earthquake vulnerable. STOP Pet. p. 39, lns. 24-26, p. 40, fn. 22.
24 Therefore, STOP cannot be heard to raise these new issues now.
25
26

1 4. Respondent's Interpretation of "Disturbance" To Mean A "Change To
2 The Physical Status" of the WRA is Plausible and is Supported by
3 Substantial Evidence.

4 Although not raised as a substantial evidence question, STOP proceeds to identify a
5 laundry list of ways it believes that HDD of a pipeline within bedrock underneath a WRA
6 constitutes a "disturbance." Should LUBA decide that these arguments were properly raised,
7 or presented here, Respondent's interpretation of the term "disturbance" is plausible and
8 supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable person
9 would rely on in reaching a decision. *Younger v. City of Portland*, 305 Or 346, 360, 752 P2d
10 262 (1988); *Dodd v. Hood River County*, 317 Or 172, 179, 855 P2d 608 (1993).

11 STOP is correct that the CDC does not define the term "disturbance" but their argument
12 stops short in failing to address the Planning Director's interpretation of "disturbance" in
13 response to *Horsey v. West Linn* relied on by STOP. 59 Or LUBA 185 (2009). In *Horsey*,
14 LUBA remanded an interpretation of "disturbance" limits to "development" within a WRA to
15 exclude temporary activities such as site clearing and it failed to include underground storm
16 drainage facilities within the calculation of the area to be "disturbed."

17 The Planning Director's interpretation (adopted by Respondent's Council) responding
18 to LUBA's decision in *Horsey* provides:

19 **Disturb:** man-made changes to the existing physical status of the land, which
20 are made in connection with development that would result in the destruction,
21 damage, or removal of vegetation; or the compaction or contamination of the
22 soil, not including stormwater run-off or the routine maintenance of the
23 property consistent with CDC Chapter 32. Rec. 8411.

24 This interpretation makes it clear that underground impacts such as the compaction or
25 contamination of soil was included in its interpretation of the WRA standards. The
26 interpretation that was made and applied in this case continues along this same trajectory;
27 activities occurring outside of WRAs that do not "disturb" WRAs are not subject to mitigation.

1 The only evidence, qualified or otherwise, regarding the function and extent of the
2 identified resource areas was presented by the Partnership and includes detailed analysis of
3 impacts to vegetation, wetlands, and soils, including soil contamination and compaction. The
4 Partnership's technical memorandum concludes:

5 It is important to note HDD has become a standard construction method that is
6 designed to specifically avoid impacts to sensitive areas. Utilities of all types,
7 such as Portland General Electric and NW Natural, routinely use HDD
8 construction to avoid streams, rivers, wetlands, and sensitive upland areas.
9 Projects that propose open cut construction in sensitive areas typically change
10 the proposed construction method, at the urging of permit and resource
11 agencies, during the permit review process.

12 This technical memorandum identified that there are no significant impacts of
13 the RWP HDD project component that might be considered by the planning
14 department as 'disturbance' in MSY Park or in the two OPRD properties. R.
15 8415 and App. p. 11.

16 Relying in this evidence, the findings state:

17 Section 6 of the applicant's proposal contains a technical memorandum
18 prepared by ecologists from David Evans and Associates, which demonstrates
19 that the HDD that will occur between 65- to 34-feet below the park and 7 feet
20 below OPRD lots 100 and 200 and *will not disturb the soils, wetlands, and*
21 *vegetation associated with nearby WRAs.* Consistent with CDC 32.050(C), the
22 applicant has selected an alternative that avoids all adverse environmental
23 impacts to the WRAs associated with the park and the two OPRD lots. R. 239.
24 (*Emphasis added.*)

25 Although no Petitioner raises any challenge to the findings or substantial evidence
26 regarding Respondent's decision, the record includes an explanation of the HDD boring
27 procedure and explains that the risk is minor given the inclusion of a conductor casing and
28 other techniques. This evidence was uncontested by any similarly qualified expert. After a
29 lengthy discussion of the characteristics of the drilling fluid, the drilling method and the
30 underground geographic features that will serve to reduce the risk of leaks, the report states:

31 In summary there is a very low likelihood of hydrofracture occurrence.
32 Measures will be in place to monitor and limit the extent of hydrofracture
33 leakage should hydrofracture occur. Drilling fluids are comprised on non-toxic
34 substance, most of which is water. Therefore, no impacts to groundwater
35 resources are anticipated from the project. R. 8413, App. p. 9.

1 It was appropriate for Respondent to rely on that evidence to conclude that HDD at the
2 depths identified would not “disturb” any WRA and thus, no mitigation was required.

3 STOP concludes by asserting that the pipe itself constitutes a permanent disturbance,
4 which under LUBA’s decision in *Horsey v. City of West Linn* requires mitigation. However,
5 as noted above and unlike the situation in *Horsey*, the term “disturb” was interpreted by the
6 City to include development that would result in the “destruction, damage or removal of
7 vegetation; or the compaction or contamination of soil.” This definition is consistent with the
8 CDC provisions, is not challenged by STOP any further than its failure to acknowledge the
9 same, and most importantly such an interpretation of “disturb” is plausible.

10 5. Pipeline Construction and Staging Activities Occurring on the OPRD
11 Lots Will Occur Outside of WRAs and Will Not Disturb Them.

12 With regard to the OPRD lots located north of MSY Park, the record shows that all of
13 the staging, mobilizing, drilling and pullback activities where soil compaction will occur are
14 located entirely *outside* the water resource and setback areas. R: 8369, App. p. 2. As noted
15 above, the only evidence presented below by a qualified expert was that all disturbances,
16 including soil compaction and vegetation removal will occur outside WRAs. Any other
17 interpretation would subject all development on any property containing a mapped water
18 resource to impact and mitigation restrictions even when development will not occur anywhere
19 near the water resource area and as a result, will not “disturb” it in any way. It is STOP’s
20 interpretation that is implausible.

21 In conclusion, there is simply nothing in the text or context of the CDC water resource
22 regulatory standards or the purpose statements to suggest that disturbance limits and mitigation
23 obligations are imposed for activities that are outside of and do not “disturb” water resource
24 areas. Rather, Respondent’s interpretation that the regulations protect natural resources by
25 restricting activities, even those occurring underground, that would “disturb” them is plausible
26 and is entitled to deference. Respondent found that the activities proposed did not disturb

1 WRAs and therefore, no mitigation was required. For these reasons, Respondent's decision
2 should be affirmed on this assignment.

3 **V. RESPONSE TO STOP'S THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR - Respondent**
4 **properly interpreted and applied CDC 32.050 with regard to open trench pipeline**
5 **installation along Mapleton Drive near Trillium and Heron Creek water resource areas.**

6 **A. Scope of Review**

7 Again, LUBA applies the standard of review described above in *Siporen*. If the
8 governing body's interpretation is "plausible," the interpretation must be upheld.

9 **B. Response to Assignment of Error**

10 In its Third Assignment of Error STOP argues that Respondent's interpretation of the
11 term "disturb" as set out in CDC 32.050 was incorrect and therefore pipe installation within
12 the asphalt-covered, improved right-of-way of Mapleton Drive running over Trillium and
13 Heron Creeks required mitigation. Trillium and Heron Creeks currently run underneath
14 Mapleton Road through piped culverts. The Partnership proposed to run the pipeline
15 underneath the Trillium Creek culvert using tunneling/boring methods; then an open-trench
16 will be used within Mapleton Drive before locating the pipe over the culverted Heron Creek.
17 Rec. 8472 and 8477.⁴ App. pgs. 16-17.

18 Again, CDC 32.050(C) provides in relevant part that "if any portion of the water
19 quality resource area is proposed to be permanently disturbed, the applicant shall prepare a
20 mitigation plan...."

21 Respondent's findings analyzing Heron and Trillium Creeks were correctly quoted by
22 STOP and are contained here for convenient reference. They state:

23 Testimony was submitted regarding the impact the pipeline would have on two
24 WRA crossings on Mapleton Drive, namely Trillium Creek and Heron Creek.
25 The 60 percent RWP and FWP alignment drawings in the record show the

26 ⁴ The record cites contained in the STOP brief do not identify the culvert, nor do they locate the pipe in relation to the culvert.

1 pipeline alignment through each of these two WRAs but by passing under these
2 areas, there is no disturbance. With regard to Trillium Creek, the applicant
3 proposed that the FWP be tunneled underneath the Trillium Creek culvert in the
4 Mapleton Drive right-of-way to avoid any disturbances to this resource. Entry
5 and exit bore pits for the pipeline tunnel will be located on either side of the
6 creek, at a sufficient distance to ensure that there will be no surface impacts to
7 the resource. The FWP alignment (as shown in the 60 percent alignment
8 drawings) and the bore pits required for the tunnel will be completely located
9 within areas already disturbed (i.e., pavement and parking) in the Mapleton
10 Drive right-of-way. There will be no impacts on adjacent storm drainage
11 channels, streamside vegetation, and water quality or water quantity as a result
12 of the proposed pipeline installation. As for Heron Creek, the applicant has
13 proposed that the RWP be installed over the top of the Heron Creek culvert via
14 open-cut construction methods in the Mapleton Drive right-of-way to avoid any
15 disturbances to this resource. The RWP alignment (as shown in the 60 percent
16 alignment drawings) is completely contained within paved areas in the
17 Mapleton Drive right-of-way. There will be no impacts on adjacent storm
18 drainage channels, streamside vegetation, and water quality or water quantity as
19 a result of the proposed pipeline installation. R. 239.

20 To reiterate, the starting point for Respondent's interpretation is that mitigation is only
21 required if activities occur within a WRA so as to "disturb" them. The evidence presented was
22 that proposed activities will occur outside WRAs. Further, the term "disturb," quoted above
23 and applied, includes only activities that "result in the destruction, damage, or removal of
24 vegetation; or the compactions or contamination of soil." These findings explain that the
25 proposed pipeline installation, either boring under Trillium Creek, or open trench above the
26 existing Heron Creek culvert, will not result in altering any vegetation, compaction or
contamination of soil protected within the defined WRA, and there was no evidence presented
to the contrary.

The definition of "disturb" provides that it is the "*proposed* man-made changes to the
existing physical status of the land" that is the criterion for triggering mitigation requirements.
The status of the land before the changes occur is only relevant to determining whether the
proposal will change the area. In this case, Trillium and Heron Creeks have already been
disturbed through their diversion to man-made culverts to allow for the installation of
Mapleton Drive over the top. As such, the likelihood of further "disturbance" may be less or
non-existent because the resource is fully encased at these points. In any event, so long as the

1 proposed activity will not impact vegetation or soils contained within the WRA, as the record
2 provides, no disturbance occurs and no further mitigation is required.

3 Finally, no evidence was submitted, beyond that provided by the Partnership, to
4 suggest that installing a pipeline within an existing improved roadway, either below or above a
5 water resource area that is already located within a man-made culvert, would in any way
6 further disturb the natural resource qualities of these resources.

7 For these reasons, this assignment of error should be denied.

8 **VI. RESPONSE TO STOP'S FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR AND MORE'S**
9 **FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR, IN PART – Respondent's findings adequately**
10 **consider and respond to the conditional use criteria CDC 60.070(A)(1) and (A)(3).**

11 **A. Scope of Review**

12 Generally, findings must "(1) identify the relevant approval standards, (2) set out the
13 facts which are believed and relied upon, and (3) explain how those facts lead to the decision."
14 *Heiller v. Josephine County*, 23 Or LUBA 551, 556 (1992). Adequate findings are required
15 only where they are essential to finding that the applicable approval criteria are satisfied. *Von*
16 *Lubken v. Hood River County*, 24 Or LUBA 271, 284-285 (1992), *rev'd on other grounds*,
17 118 Or 126 (1993). *See also Meadow Neighborhood Assoc. v. Washington County*, 54 Or LUBA
18 124 (2007). Where findings are required but not provided, LUBA may affirm the decision where
19 the record clearly supports the decision. ORS 197.835(11)(b).

20 **B. Response to Assignment of Error**

21 STOP, in their Fourth Assignment and More, in their Fifth Assignment argue that
22 Respondent's findings are inadequate because in responding to two conditional use criteria they
23 fail to consider certain impacts that installation of the pipeline in the Highway 43 right-of-way will
24 have on adjacent businesses. STOP claims that impacts to adjacent businesses must be analyzed in
25 order to satisfy CDC 60.070(A)(1), a conditional use criterion relating to mitigation of adverse
26 impacts and More relies on CDC 60.070(A)(3) with respect to furthering the "overall needs of the

1 community.” Under either standard Petitioners’ believe that Respondent erred by failing to make
2 any findings addressing a 14-page Business Impact Report submitted by Michael Wilkerson, PhD,
3 of Economic Market Analysis, LLC. R. 1308-1322. STOP asserts that in addition to the
4 Wilkerson report, Respondent failed to address the numerous objections raised by others.

5 1. Factual Background.

6 Petitioners’ assignments do not accurately and completely explain the evidence presented
7 and the findings relating to business impacts or the role those impacts play in the evaluation of the
8 applicable criteria. One of the consistent themes raised throughout the proceedings below was that
9 all of the Highway 43 businesses were opposed because this project would cause “devastating
10 harm” and be a “jobs killer.” R. 476, 1023-1024, 1182, 1904, 2874, 3201, 4352.⁵ Leaflets and
11 petitions were distributed containing inaccurate and misleading information.⁶ Although a uniform
12 and unswerving element within the opponents’ rhetoric below, these comments were consistently
13 vague as well.

14 This steady drumbeat of the sky-is-falling opposition never provided any particular

15 ⁵ These citations are the ones identified in STOP’s brief as examples where “specific challenges” were made
16 below. STOP Pet. p 46, lns 14-15 and fn. 25. These blanket statements are anything but “specific.”

17 ⁶ The Record is filed with multiple copies of a petition circulated by STOP members and others that
18 exaggerates the extent of the traffic impact. In relevant part, it provides:

19 Loss of businesses and jobs due to the extensive highway construction and bottleneck traffic that it
20 will create even with it being done in the evening as there will be 15,400 truck trips and 50,000
21 additional construction related vehicles on the road slowing down traffic. R. 4216-4236, 4263-
22 4266, 4416-4428, 6901-6903, 7038-7063.

21 The Partnership responded:

22 Pipeline construction along OR 43 will only occur between the hours of 8 PM and 5 AM. All
23 businesses will have full access during non-construction hours. Alternative access is provided for
24 most businesses during construction hours. The contractor will coordinate work activity with the
25 few business with only one driveway during nighttime construction hours. The project will move
26 approximately 50 feet per day along OR 43. The total increase in traffic volume along OR 43 due
to project related construction is .2%. See “Response to West Linn CUP 12-02 and CUP 12-04
Public Comments on Construction Traffic Calculations,” prepared by DKS Traffic Engineers,
November 1, 2012. R. 2259.

For a more complete explanation of the factual errors in opponent testimony, see R. 2257-2260.

1 explanation as to why the Partnership's Construction Management Plan (CMP) proposal,
2 including: (1) working entirely at night; (2) keeping all travel lanes open during the times when
3 most of the businesses on Highway 43 were open; and (3) requiring the contractor to maintain at
4 least one access to each of the few businesses on Highway 43 that are open during construction,
5 would be insufficient to meet the standard, or were not effective means of preventing impacts to
6 area businesses. R. 8532-8561. In addition, the Partnership offered a letter from Bill Hawkins, a
7 Construction Management Project Director from CH2MHill with pipeline and road construction
8 project experience, noting that the proposed CMP "equals and in some cases, exceeds mitigation
9 measures typically provided for projects of similar size and scope." More particularly with regard
10 to the pipeline, the letter states:

11 The RW/FW CMP addresses the limits to construction vehicle haul routes,
12 traffic control strategies and temporary lane closures, pedestrian/bicycle access,
13 emergency vehicle access, public transit circulation, residential/commercial
14 driveway access, and night time working hours to minimize impacts to all users
15 of the local streets and Hwy 43. R. 2244.

16 These conclusions were not challenged.

17 Further, no party provided any qualified, evaluative testimony responding to the
18 Partnership's expert construction traffic generation studies which, after analyzing the amount of
19 traffic generated from this project travelling along Highway 43, concluded that "impacts to
20 capacity and access along Highway 43 would be minimal or that nighttime construction on
21 Highway 43 would generate a maximum of ten additional truck trips per hour, having "negligible
22 impacts to capacity." R. 2227.

23 During the second day of the City Council's two-day set of hearings to consider the appeal,
24 Dr. Wilkerson testified and submitted his Report. R. 1308-1321. Dr. Wilkerson's credentials were
25 not identified. The fact that he is employed by Economic Market Analysis, LLC, suggests that he
26 is an economist with no particular expertise in evaluating the impacts to adjacent businesses or in
evaluating efforts to mitigate such impacts resulting from utility pipe construction projects. Unlike
the primary resource studies submitted by qualified experts for the Partnership, Dr. Wilkerson's

1 Report consists of extrapolations taken from other secondary studies that bear no relationship to
2 the subject fact set. The Report notes as much in stating: "there has not been an extensive amount
3 of research conducted on assessing the economic impact to businesses due to road construction."
4 Wilkerson goes on to discredit his own testimony noting that most studies are done on local
5 highways, in small towns and relate to lane expansions rather than a pipe installation on a state-
6 owned highway in a community that is an integral part of a large urban center. R. 1316.

7 STOP characterizes the Wilkerson Report as summarizing similar comparables, most
8 particularly a study in Sweet Home where the work was done at night. However, in addition
9 to the distinguishing features Dr. Wilkerson noted above, the work in Sweet Home dealt with
10 the repaving of 7.5 km or 4.6 miles of roadway where the proposed project was accomplished
11 in 200 foot intervals at a time. R. 1316-1318. Installation of the FWP in Highway 43 extends
12 for 5,200 linear feet (or a little less than a mile) where progress will move forward at
13 approximately 50 feet per night. R. 8535 & 8540. There is no indication that the ODOT
14 repaving project required the type of robust CMP proposed here, that requires keeping at least
15 one access to all operating businesses open or whether an additional "Shop Local" type
16 marketing campaign was required, as is required for the Partnership's project.

17 None of the roadway construction projects cited by Dr. Wilkerson are comparable to
18 the subject project because they did not require that roadways be fully functional, with no lane
19 blockages, closures or detours for 15 hours per day during the entire construction period. In
20 fact, other than dealing with construction within a roadway, there are very few similarities.
21 Respondent thus correctly rejected the assertions in that Report.

22 Moreover, Dr. Wilkerson went on to provide revised traffic count calculations for
23 traffic impact on Highway 43 and Mapleton Drive, even though he is not a licensed traffic
24 engineer. R. 1313-1315. The Partnership responded to Dr. Wilkerson's Report noting his lack of
25 credentials or training in measuring business impacts or traffic from this particular construction
26 project. No qualified transportation testimony, aside from that of the Respondent or the

1 Partnership, was provided.

2 Further, the Partnership's response explains that the Report's assumptions are incorrect.
3 R. 812-813. Dr. Wilkerson's extrapolation that there would be 174 percent increase in traffic
4 during the nighttime work hours on Mapleton Drive makes no sense when you consider that
5 installing a pipeline in Highway 43 (the only nighttime work allowed) will have no impact on
6 Mapleton Drive traffic volumes. Second, based on the traffic reports prepared by DKS
7 Engineering, licensed traffic engineers, the 6 minute spacing of construction vehicles leaving the
8 WTP would not result in gridlock during the day. R. 813, 2225-2231. These traffic reports were
9 subsequently subjected to peer review and concurrence by Greenlight Engineering, another
10 licensed traffic engineering firm. R. 2232-2241.

11 After the Wilkerson comments were submitted, the Partnership responded further by
12 committing to additional mitigation providing additional access signage for businesses impacted
13 by construction and developing and implementing a Shop Local marketing campaign for local
14 West Linn businesses. R. 310-315. Neither STOP, nor any other party objected to these
15 independent transportation or construction plan reviews or asserted that the additional mitigation
16 proposals were in any way inadequate.

17 2. Respondent's Findings.

18 Given this factual background, Respondent interpreted CDC 60.070(A)(1)⁷ as requiring:
19 the City to take the significant impacts associated with installation into account
20 when determining whether the site size and dimensions provide adequate area to
21 mitigate "any possible adverse effect[s] from the use on surrounding properties
22 and uses." ... Thus, to approve the project the Council must determine that there

22 ⁷ CDC 60.070(A) requires:

23 The Planning Commission shall approve, approve with conditions, or deny an application for a
24 conditional use, except for a manufactured home subdivision in which case the approval standards
25 and conditions shall be those specified in CDC 36.030, or to enlarge or alter a conditional use
26 based on findings of fact with respect to each of the following criteria:

1. The site size and dimensions provide:

- a. Adequate area for the needs of the proposed use; and
- b. Adequate area for aesthetic design treatment to mitigate any possible adverse effect from the use on surrounding properties and uses.

1 is: (1) adequate area to mitigate any possible adverse effect from the post-
2 construction use on surrounding properties and uses, and (2) there are adequate
3 measures taken to mitigate for the possible adverse effects of the installation of
4 the utility on surrounding properties and uses.⁸ R. 192.

5 Respondent's findings then proceed with addressing particular impacts identified
6 during the proceeding and measures required as part of imposing the CMP as mitigation. A
7 number of these mitigation measures respond to concerns raised regarding economic and
8 transportation impacts to neighboring businesses, including (1) limiting the Highway 43 work
9 hours to between 8:00 pm and 5:00 am and requiring that the road be re-opened to allow for a
10 fully functioning street during the daytime hours; (2) limiting the length of the construction
11 zone to 200 feet; and (3) maintaining at least one driveway or access for vehicles to every
12 business that is operating during hours which overlap with nighttime construction hours. R.
13 193-194. The findings go on to state:

14 The City Council finds that the mitigation strategies listed above, if enforced
15 through the imposition of conditions of approval, are an effective means of
16 minimizing negative impacts to surrounding residents and businesses.

17 Respondent then went on to find that additional mitigation measures were necessary to
18 address particular concerns, and as it relates to impacts to businesses, Respondent found:

19 In addition, the applicant has proposed a business promotion plan to help keep
20 the Robinwood Business district "Open for Business" during construction.
21 This includes not only keeping all lanes of traffic and all accesses onto
22 Highway 43 open during the business hours of 5 am to 8 pm, but also custom
23 signage will be provided to help guide customers for those businesses that are
24 open during construction hours. Although the City Council finds that this
25 plan is a good start, retaining consistency with the overall business community
26 requires an enhanced "Shop Local" Marketing Plan that must be approved by
the Economic Development Director and distributed to the Robinwood
Neighborhood Association, all businesses located along Highway 43 within
the Robinwood neighborhood boundaries and the City Manager. Condition
18 is imposed to accomplish this objective. R. 196.

23 3. Legal Analysis

24 Petitioners do not object to these findings; in fact they make almost no mention of

25 _____
26 ⁸ No party to the LUBA appeal challenges this interpretation. Rather, the question is whether the findings are adequate.

1 them. Rather, Petitioners fault Respondent for failing to address the Wilkerson Report in
2 particular. STOP asserts that Dr. Wilkerson was an expert and Respondent failed to make
3 “Norvell findings” addressing Dr. Wilkerson or “any of the specific challenges” made by the
4 West Linn business community. But, as noted above, other than possibly Dr. Wilkerson, the
5 challenges raised by the business community and summarized above, were anything but
6 “specific.” More argues that rather than being a question of which expert to accept, Dr.
7 Wilkerson’s conclusions regarding net impacts on sales were ignored.⁹

8 The obligation to make detailed findings is imposed when a particular criterion
9 requires such a detailed evaluation. For example, in *Hillcrest Vineyards v. Board of Comm,*
10 *Douglas County*, 45 Or App 285, 293, 608 P2d 201 (1980), the court, relying on *Norvell*,
11 found that the county could not conclude that land cannot practicably be farmed with a single
12 finding that the land is not suitable for grazing without considering other farm activities.
13 Similarly, in *Eckis v. Linn County*, 22 Or LUBA 27, 57 (1991), LUBA required *Norvell*
14 findings to respond to evidentiary challenges responding to a criterion that set particular noise
15 standards. The criteria at issue in these cases were specific and objective.

16 In contrast, the criteria identified by Petitioners involve judgment in the interpretation
17 and the application of broadly worded standards. On a number of occasions LUBA has found
18 that in cases of highly subjective criteria, including more particularly a finding of “greater
19 public benefit,” general concerns raised by opponents about possible interference with existing
20 operations need not be addressed with any particularity within the findings. *Hines v. Marion*
21 *County*, 56 Or LUBA 333 (2008) and *Olson v. City of Springfield*, 56 Or LUBA 229 (2008).

22 Respondent interpreted the CDC 60.070(A)(1) to require mitigation to offset impacts
23 thereby implicitly allowing for some loss of business to result from construction. Unlike the
24 applicable criteria in *Hillcrest Vineyards* or *Eckis*, CDC 60.070(A)(1) does not contain terms

25 _____
26 ⁹ As noted above, no study of the impacts of the pipeline construction on Highway 43 business sales was
conducted.

1 such as “prohibit” or “eliminate” impacts; rather they must be “mitigated,” through no
2 particular quantifiable standard. Respondent found that some amount of business impact was
3 acceptable and would occur; therefore, it identified necessary mitigation and imposed
4 conditions.

5 Although More’s challenge to the findings refers to CDC 60.070(A)(3) with respect to
6 “consistency with the overall needs for the community,” there is no assertion that the criterion
7 imposes any limit to the amount of economic impact to businesses on Highway 43, nor
8 requires elimination of any such impact. In fact, there is none.

9 Therefore, the difference between destination businesses and impulse businesses,
10 quantifying their numbers as they exist on Highway 43, or speculating what effect pipeline
11 construction will have on one business type over the other are all largely academic when no
12 criteria impose such obligations. Rather, Respondent interpreted the criteria to allow impacts
13 only insofar as is “consistent with the overall needs of the community” and required mitigation
14 where adverse impacts were identified. The findings identify the overall needs and the
15 required mitigation and are therefore adequate.

16 Consider a comparable case, *Gould v. Deschutes County*, 59 Or LUBA 435 (2009). In
17 *Gould*, a state agency letter stated that a cold groundwater spring would provide replacement
18 water necessary for salmon habitat responding to a ‘no net loss’ criterion to address water
19 habitat quality. The opponents’ expert expressed concerns that the proposed mitigation would
20 not be adequate. In response, the applicant disagreed with the opponents’ expert but also
21 offered an additional mitigation measure to provide additional stream flows. Opponents
22 asserted that the proposed mitigation was insufficient because it would replace cold flows with
23 warm water and would not compensate for withdrawals of cold groundwater. The hearings
24 officer adopted findings that the additional water from the irrigation district was necessary as
25 mitigation. However, because the hearings officer failed to respond to the opponent’s
26 contention that mitigation water would replace cool water with warmer water and without that

1 analysis, the issue was remanded.

2 In the present case, just as in *Gould*, the record is replete with evidence from licensed
3 transportation experts testifying that impacts to businesses on Highway 43 will be mitigated.
4 R. 2225-2229, 2232-2236, 2244. STOP and others disagreed with this evidence, but the only
5 particular evidence they provided was loss of business generally, not specifically, as described
6 within the Wilkerson Report. The Partnership responded to the Wilkerson Report explaining
7 why it was not reliable, and when the Respondent expressed additional concerns, the
8 Partnership offered additional mitigation including a "Shop Local" plan. R. 279, 310-315. The
9 additional mitigation including the "Shop Local" plan was never the subject of further
10 challenge either by Dr. Wilkerson or anyone else. Respondent implicitly agreed that the
11 Wilkerson Report was insufficient to find that the criterion was not satisfied, but nonetheless,
12 included additional findings and conditions addressing mitigation.

13 Further, two key elements distinguish these two cases with regard to the level of
14 findings required. In *Gould*, the criterion was specific and required little in the way of
15 interpretative judgment; a 'no net loss' standard required findings of no net loss. The
16 obligation to mitigate, the applicable criterion in this case, is general, broadly worded and
17 entirely subject to interpretive discretion. Second, it was the questioning of the additional
18 mitigation measures as insufficient that gave rise to a remand in *Gould*. In this case, neither
19 Wilkerson, nor any others, challenged the additional mitigation measures. Respondent had no
20 obligation to make detailed findings regarding any conflict in the evidence because it believed
21 that it was resolved with further mitigation as identified.

22 Finally, should LUBA find that Respondent had an obligation to make findings that
23 respond expressly to the Wilkerson Report, LUBA should affirm the decision because the
24 evidence in the record clearly supports the decision. ORS 197.835(11)(b). As quoted above,
25 the Partnership provided substantial evidence that impacts to Highway 43 businesses would be
26 negligible, discrediting the Wilkerson Report and explaining how impacts to businesses from

1 the pipeline and construction traffic will be mitigated. The Partnership's evidence also points
2 out that although the Wilkerson Report was prepared by Dr. Wilkerson who is an economist
3 holding a PhD, Dr. Wilkerson is not an expert in transportation or business market analysis,
4 and his analysis was based on transportation circumstances that were not comparable to the
5 qualified, detailed evidence presented by the Partnership. Therefore, the Report does not
6 qualify as "expert" testimony requiring any form of detailed response. *Foland v. Jackson*
7 *County*, 61 Or LUBA 264, 288 (2010).

8 Based on the foregoing, Respondent identified the mitigation measures necessary to
9 offset the impacts provided as required by CDC 60.070(A)(3). STOP failed to challenge the
10 proposed mitigation as it related to business impacts in any particular way. STOP's purported
11 expert, Dr. Wilkerson, was discredited in terms of his qualifications to opine on the contested
12 issued and resulting conclusions by the Partnership. That said, the Wilkerson Report did have
13 some impact because it resulted in Respondent imposing additional conditions of approval,
14 which were not challenged further. Respondent's decision should be affirmed.

15 **VII. RESPONSE TO MORE'S FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR – Respondent's**
16 **interpretation of "overall needs of the community," set out in CDC 60.070(A)(3) is**
17 **plausible and therefore, is entitled to deference under ORS 197.829.**

18 **A. Scope of Review**

19 LUBA applies the standard of review described in *Siporen*. If the governing body's
20 interpretation is "plausible," the interpretation must be upheld. Simply because another party
21 or LUBA disagrees or believes that it is not the most correct interpretation, if it is "plausible,"
22 it must be affirmed.

23 **B. Response to Assignment of Error**

24 A criterion for granting a conditional use, CDC 60.070(A)(3), requires a finding that
25 "the granting of the proposal will provide for a facility that is consistent with the overall needs
26 of the community." More argues that the City's interpretation of "community" to "provide

1 primary benefits to the jurisdictions of Lake Oswego and Tigard and substantially burdens the
2 community of West Linn” is inconsistent with the plain language, the plan policies and
3 regulations under ORS 197.829(1). More Pet. p. 37, Ins. 5-6. The root of the error, according
4 to More, is that Respondent relied too heavily on the term “overall” as modifying the term
5 “community” rather than the express language where the term “overall” modifies the term
6 “need.” More Pet. p. 37, Ins. 13-16.¹⁰

7 The findings interpreting CDC 60.070(A)(3) solely with regard to the term
8 “community” state:

9 The Planning Commission interpreted the term “community” to include the
10 City of West Linn and a facility that is consistent with the community needs is
11 one that “is designed and sized to serve the needs of the residents and land
12 uses within the city.” The primary purpose of the proposed pipeline is to
13 serve Lake Oswego and Tigard rather than the overall needs of West Linn and
14 this regional scale of the proposal indicates that the pipelines are not “of a
15 scale to serve the community of West Linn.” A number of opponents made
16 similar claims.

17 Although the City Council agrees with the Planning Commission in part, it
18 interprets the term “community” more broadly. When words are not defined
19 within the CDC, they are to be given the meaning set forth in Webster’s Third
20 New International Dictionary, which includes the following definition of
21 “community”

- 22 1. A unified body of individuals: as
 - 23 a. State, Commonwealth
 - 24 b. The people with common interests living in a particular area
 - 25 c. An interacting population of various kinds of individuals
 - 26 d. A group of people with a common characteristic or interest
living together within a larger society – the region itself
 - e. A group linked by a common policy

27 This includes consideration of the region, neighboring cities, West Linn as a
28 whole and the neighborhoods and business community within West Linn. The
29 “overall” needs of the community must look at what is the in the best interest
30 of the community as a whole. Considering the term “community” in the
31 context with “overall,” this term does not suggest any exclusivity of necessity
32 such that a use cannot serve the needs of West Linn while also serving the
33 needs of Lake Oswego and Tigard, in addition to those of West Linn.

34 ¹⁰ At p. 38, Ins. 7-14, More argues that the Partnership has not met its burden to show that the project is
35 consistent with the “overall needs of the community” which appears to be an attack on the evidence presented
36 and is therefore dealt with in the Response to More’s Fifth Assignment of Error.

1 In order to identify which "overall needs" require protection, the Council
2 considers the goals and values protected within the Comprehensive Plan.
3 Thus, the "overall needs of the community" includes providing a clean and
4 safe water supply that will benefit the City of West Linn as a whole as
5 outlined in the Water System Master Plan. Protections for the Robinwood
6 residents' and their need for quiet enjoyment is identified as a value in the
7 Comprehensive Plan, Goal 2, Section 1, Policy 8, Council Goals 1, 2, 6, and
8 11 and the Robinwood Neighborhood Plan policy 3.9. The business owners'
9 need to protect their businesses is identified in the Comprehensive Plan also as
10 identified in the above-reference plan goals and policies. The Council finds
11 that "consistency with the overall needs of the community" requires that no
12 group or community within the City of West Linn is made to suffer to such an
13 extent that these other needs, as identified in the Comprehensive Plan, are
14 unduly compromised. R 198-200.

15 By way of introduction, rather than direct objections to the findings explaining
16 Respondent's interpretation, More focuses instead on the Planning Commission's findings that
17 the term "community" referred solely to the City of West Linn. However, a planning
18 commission's code interpretation is not entitled to any deference and has no relevance to
19 whether the *City Council's* interpretation is plausible. *Derry v. Douglas County*, 132 Or App
20 386, 390, 888 P2d 588 (1995).

21 The Respondent's findings make clear that the City Council did not reject the Planning
22 Commission's interpretation; it expanded it based on: (1) the dictionary definition which
23 suggests many different types of community without exclusivity, including one that would be
24 so broad as to include everyone within the entire State; and (2) the term "overall" provides
25 *context* for a concept that "community" need not be exclusive and that the "overall needs of a
26 community" could benefit the City of West Linn as well as the communities of Lake Oswego
and Tigard. In other words, there is no expression in the standard itself to suggest any
exclusivity or primacy of benefits is necessary in order to satisfy the overall needs standard.

More seizes on Respondent's reliance on the dictionary definition of "community"
when CDC 2.010(D) states that words that are not otherwise defined in the Code are to have
the meaning ascribed by *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language, Unabridged*. More claims that Respondent's deviated from the dictionary

1 definition to “rearrange words” that allows for a more broad definition of “community” than
2 solely considering the residents of West Linn.

3 First, although there is dispute about whether the dictionary definition is very helpful, it
4 does contemplate a wide variety of communities giving Respondent broad discretion to apply
5 the standard. In *Hill v. City of Portland*, ___ Or LUBA ___ (LUBA No. 2012-036, 2012),
6 where a term is not clear and the dictionary definition is also not particularly helpful, LUBA
7 must affirm a plausible interpretation, even where a petitioner presents reasonably strong
8 textual or contextual arguments. The same is true in this case except that More’s arguments
9 lack any textual or contextual support.

10 Second, Respondent did not rely entirely on the term “overall” as the sole basis for
11 expanding its interpretation to find that there are benefits to West Linn while still benefiting
12 other cities. Rather, Respondent noted that the Dictionary definition included many different
13 types of “community” with no suggestion of exclusivity. Respondent further found nothing in
14 the language of CDC 60.070(A)(3) requiring a finding that West Linn must be the primary or
15 sole beneficiary of any use with any service to another jurisdiction being secondary. Under
16 More’s interpretation in order to locate a highly prestigious dance studio or a regional art
17 museum, the applicant would have to show that a majority of the dance protégés or art
18 connoisseurs would come from West Linn.¹¹ That is simply preposterous, and there is
19 certainly nothing in the language of the CDC to support such an absurd result.

20 Finally, implicit in the Respondents interpretation is a consideration that utilities, by
21 their nature, are connective. They work best when they link communities with other
22 communities to provide necessary services at the lowest possible cost. Respondent
23 understands that West Linn cannot exist in a bubble, as much as the Petitioners may wish that
24

25 ¹¹ The Partnership researched City Council precedent interpreting the “overall needs of the community” for
26 previous conditional use approvals. The new Fire Station 58 and Trillium Creek Elementary School were both
constructed pursuant to conditional use approvals requiring consideration of CDC 60.070(A) when their service
areas extend beyond the existing City boundaries. R. 2265-2267. City staff concurred with this analysis. R. 839.

1 to be the case. More's argument is little more than the expression of a desire that Respondent
2 had interpreted CDC 60.070(A)(3) differently, the way that the Planning Commission did, and
3 as such, is not a basis for remand.

4 As discussed in greater detail in response to More's Fifth Assignment of Error below,
5 the findings contain a long list of community needs, particular only to West Linn, that would
6 be satisfied by approving the WTP and pipelines including: (1) providing a new, seismically
7 secure, emergency water system as specified in the West Linn Water System Mater Plan; (2)
8 paying a \$5 million user fee that can be used to make additional West Linn water system
9 improvements; (3) conveying existing abandoned pipes; and (4) installing a third water pump
10 so that the intertie of the Partnership's new water system to West Linn's water system can be
11 used to its maximum capacity. R. 199-200. These findings say nothing about the needs of
12 Lake Oswego or Tigard. Therefore, to suggest that Respondent interpreted "community need"
13 to not require that it serve the needs of West Linn is simply not true. Pet. p. 42 lns 11-12.

14 More points to nothing that makes Respondent's decision implausible. Statements by
15 More that the interpretation is contrary to "the guidelines, requirements and spirit of West
16 Linn's Comprehensive Plan" are not followed up with any particular references to what those
17 guidelines or that spirit might be. Pet. p. 42, lns. 5-7. There are, in fact, no plan policies that
18 West Linn must be the exclusive or primary beneficiary for a conditional use, and to find
19 otherwise would be to insert language that does not appear in the regulation or the plan.
20 Instead West Linn's Comprehensive Plan contains policies favoring multi-jurisdictional
21 collaboration.¹²

22 In sum, CDC 60.070(A)(3) is sufficiently ambiguous and subject to the *Siporen*
23 standard that allows for a determination that Respondent's interpretation of the "community
24

25 ¹² Goal 11, Policy 6 provides:

26 Encourage cooperation and coordination between all public service agencies to maximize the
orderly and efficient development and provision of all services.

1 need” is plausible, and that determination should be affirmed.

2 **VIII. RESPONSE TO MORE’S FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR, IN PART –**
3 **Respondent’s finding that the pipeline is “consistent with the overall needs for the**
4 **community” is plausible and supported by substantial evidence.**

5 For their Fifth Assignment of Error, More argues that Respondent’s findings
6 addressing the “overall needs” standard of CDC 60.070(A)(3) are inadequate and not
7 supported by substantial evidence. More’s allegations regarding inadequate findings are
8 directed to the Wilkerson Report discussed in greater detail in the Response to STOP’s Third
9 Assignment of Error above. More’s objection goes on to allege that the benefits identified by
10 Respondent as a basis for finding that the proposal furthered the overall community need were
11 not supported by substantial evidence.

12 **A. Scope of Review**

13 Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable person would rely on in reaching a
14 decision. *Younger v. City of Portland*, 305 Or 346, 360, 752 P2d 262 (1988); *Dodd v. Hood*
15 *River County*, 317 Or 172, 179, 855 P2d 608 (1993). Where LUBA concludes that a
16 reasonable person could reach the decision made by the local government, in view of all the
17 evidence in the record, the choice between conflicting evidence belongs to the local
18 government. *1000 Friends of Oregon v. Marion County*, 116 Or App 584, 588, 842 P2d 441
19 (1992). That a petitioner may disagree with the local government’s conclusions provides no
20 basis for reversal or remand. *McGowan v. City of Eugene*, 24 Or LUBA 540, 546 (1993).

21 **B. Response to Assignment of Error**

22 Respondent’s findings identify a number of “overall needs” with regard to its existing
23 water system that are furthered by approving the Partnership’s WTP and pipeline applications.
24 These benefits include:

25 With regard to the water system, the Planning Commission interpreted the
26 term “overall needs” to mean that the conferred benefit must remain in
perpetuity, for the life of the project. New pipelines and a plant enhance the

1 existing interconnectivity that is seismically secure when, as the Water Master
2 Plan explains, the City of West Linn has a deficiency in its emergency supply
3 capability. If it were possible for West Linn to obtain the necessary
4 development permits, the cost for West Linn to install a new parallel
5 transmission main across the river, the next best Water System Master Plan
6 option, would be about \$11.6 million which would provide far less
7 redundancy and reliability. The Council finds that the provision of 4 mgd
8 available until at least 2041 is a benefit that will last for 25 years or more, and
9 it should be considered as an asset that helps to meet a need of the West Linn
10 community for emergency water and it gives West Linn access to water from
11 a system designed to be much more reliable than the system in place today.
12 Condition of approval 17 requires execution of an intergovernmental
13 agreement to ensure compliance with these findings.

14 Further, the imposition of the community right-of-way use fee of \$5 million
15 dollars that the Planning Commission did not consider is a concrete benefit
16 that the City of West Linn, its residents and its businesses, will enjoy in
17 perpetuity. R-199-200.

18 More claims that Respondent's finding that approving the applications will result in a
19 savings of \$11.6 million dollars through the construction of a transmission line across the
20 Willamette River is not contained within the Water System Master Plan (WSMP) and thus, is
21 not supported by substantial evidence.

22 As More correctly states the WSMP identifies four approaches for addressing
23 Respondent's water system capacity; but what More conveniently omits is that it also
24 discusses the need for a reliable and redundant system. Only two of these options are relevant
25 to the issue on appeal:

- 26 • Solution Approach B: Build back-up supply transmission from SFWB. At
a cost of \$8.0 million.
- Solution Approach C: Improve the emergency supply capacity and
reliability of the Lake Oswego Emergency Supply Connection. At a cost
of \$2.2 million.

The WSMP goes on to recommend "Solution Approach C be pursued."

In an October 16, 2012 letter from an engineer with Murray, Smith & Associates
(MSA), the company responsible for drafting the Respondent's WSMP, the cost savings are
explained as follows:

- The City's next best alternative to meeting backup supply reliability needs is to construct a new finished water transmission main at a cost of \$11.6 M, not included in the WSMP CIP budget, and the reliability of this alternative is substantially less than offered by the full redundancy of LOTWP's new intake, pipeline and water treatment plant (WTP.) R. 317.

The MSA letter goes on to revise its initial \$8 million estimate for building a backup supply transmission line over the Willamette River and states:

The total cost of needed improvements associated with the parallel river crossing option, not recommended in the WSMP, to improve transmission system reliability (if IGAs for emergency supply are not secured) is summarized below.

<u>Project</u>	<u>Estimated Project Cost (2012 Dollars)</u>
Parallel Transmission Main – Division Street Pump Station to Willamette River	\$ 2,140,000
Willamette River Crossing	\$ 9,000,000
Parallel Transmission Main – Willamette River to CIP 65	\$ 440,000
TOTAL	\$ 11,580,000

Rec. 321. See also the explanation in response to City Council questions at R. 838.

More misreads both the Master Plan as well as the MSA letter that supports it. First, the discussion of \$11.6 million is the cost of constructing Solution Approach B, a back-up transmission line from the South Fork Water Board, located across the Willamette River from Oregon City, revised to reflect current construction costs. It is Solution Approach B. Thus, More's statement that "none of the other proposed Solution Approaches mentions the installation of a new parallel transmission main across the [Willamette] River" is demonstratively false. Pet. p. 45, lns. 15-17.

The entire thrust of the explanation set forth above is that Respondent does not have to expend \$11.6 million to build its own back-up supply transmission line across the Willamette River, when the Partnership is going to do it and the Partnership's project will provide the emergency water Respondent needs to proceed with Solution Approach C. Because Solution Approach C is possible, Respondent is able to realize the savings of not proceeding with Solution Approach B.

1 If the intergovernmental agreements with Lake Oswego and Tigard could not be
2 secured, as MSA states, the next best solution would be the expenditure of \$11.6 million.
3 MSA explains that the Respondent-built Willamette River crossing "is not recommended in
4 the WSMP" because IGAs could be secured allowing West Linn to improve their emergency
5 supply, capacity, and reliability through the City of Lake Oswego connection, Solution
6 Approach C.

7 More supports a misreading of the MSA letter with further selective quoting from the
8 WSMP suggesting that West Linn's water system retains sufficient line capacity and thus,
9 there is no need for secondary Willamette River crossing. Pet. p. 46, lns 1-9. More entirely
10 misses the difference between pipeline capacity and reliability. It is the latter condition that
11 maligns West Linn. The WSMP explains this on page 5-7 where it states:

12 The key elements of the City's supply source with the greatest vulnerability to
13 complete loss of service are the SFWB's raw water transmission main and the
14 City's finished water transmission main, especially the Willamette River
15 crossing. Of these two (2) facilities, the finished water transmission main has
the greatest vulnerability because of the risk and exposure of the I-205 bridge
crossing. App. 18-19.

16 The evidence in the record is that Respondent has an unreliable and deficient water
17 system. The options for fixing the well-documented deficiencies, as set out in the WSMP, are
18 prioritized to either upgrade the intertie and execute agreements to obtaining emergency back-
19 up water from Lake Oswego, or expend \$11.6 million on constructing a Willamette River
20 crossing along with necessary connective pipelines. Respondent's decision not to pursue the
21 \$11.6 million river crossing solution, which is the second option, according to the WSMP and
22 the MSA letter, provides substantial evidence that a reasonable person would rely on to
23 support its decision.

24 More goes on to challenge the evidence in the record supporting Respondent's finding
25 that a new intergovernmental agreement (IGA) will confer any "new" benefit to the City of
26 West Linn. Pet. p. 47, lns. 14-15, 23-24. More makes much of the ability of a party to

1 unilaterally terminate or amend the IGA. More apparently overlooked the evidence that the
2 Partnership agreed and the conditions of approval require the provision of a specified quantity
3 of water, 4 mgd, be made available, and that the supply can be terminated only with mutual
4 agreement by all of the parties as a benefit.

5 The pre-existing 2003 IGA made no mention for the provision of any particular amount
6 of water to be supplied and allowed any party to unilaterally terminate. It states:

7 8. Quantity of Water to be Supplied. Upon agreement between the
8 parties to make use of the intertie pursuant to Paragraph 3 of this Agreement,
9 the Party supplying water shall endeavor to supply the maximum feasible
10 quantity of water to the other Party, and take all reasonable actions necessary
11 to accomplish the same, so long as such actions are not detrimental to the
12 operation of the supplying Party's own water system.

13 ***

14 16. Termination of Agreement. This agreement shall continue in effect
15 until terminated by the parties with written notice of such intent to terminate
16 provided to the other parties.... R. 9708.

17 As a comparator, More relies on a draft IGA that was submitted when this matter was pending
18 before the Planning Commission which was not executed as part of this approval. Rather, it is
19 condition of approval number 17 that requires the execution of a new IGA to be modified that
20 is relevant here. The condition provides:

21 17. Intertie Agreement. The intergovernmental agreement between the
22 applicant and the City of West Linn regarding the intertie shall be modified to
23 provide that:

- 24 a. the agreement shall not be terminated without the written consent of all
25 parties.
26 b. the agreement shall require written consent of all parties to amend paragraph
8 of the agreement relates to the quantity of water to be supplied.
c. the intertie may be used for the benefit of all parties in perpetuity. R. 249.

More utterly fails to acknowledge Condition 17(b) requiring a particular quantity of
water to be provided to West Linn, when none is currently provided nor why this IGA is not

1 substantial evidence of a benefit.¹³ The condition goes on to require the written consent of all
2 parties to either terminate the agreement or to amend the agreement with respect to the amount
3 of water to be provided. These conditions, when compared against the existing 2003 IGA pro-
4 vide substantial evidence of a benefit of increased water security for the residents of West Linn.

5 More continues relentlessly attacking the IGA by raising an entirely new issue relating
6 to the validity of condition 17 because it does not include the consent of the South Fork Water
7 Board. Aside from the fact that this challenge was not raised in the proceedings below, the
8 condition does not amend the agreement, it requires the execution of a new agreement
9 including the terms as identified. Further, it is the Partnership who must complete the
10 conditions of approval, including amending the IGA to include South Fork Water Board, in
11 order to proceed with its project. Where a proposed development requires authorization from
12 a private property owner, no finding is generally required that it is feasible to obtain the permit
13 or authorization, as long as such a permit or authorization is not precluded as a matter of law,
14 and the local government imposes a condition of approval assuring that the required permit or
15 authorization is obtained prior to final development approval. *Holbrook v. City of Rockaway*
16 *Beach*, 58 Or LUBA 179, 182-183 (2009). Therefore, consent to the execution of a
17 subsequently amended IGA by the South Fork Water Board is not necessary to include in a
18 condition of approval.

19 Finally, More challenges the evidence underlying the imposition of a \$5 million fee
20 and claims that “the payment actually only benefits LOT and constitutes a great loss of future
21 gross revenue to the City of West Linn.” Pet. p. 48, Ins 17-19. More proceeds to support this
22 statement by identifying how other utility franchise fees are calculated within the City,

23 ¹³ In addition, the draft IGA submitted for consideration before the Planning Commission and quoted in More’s
24 brief includes the following addition to paragraph 8:

25 Provided that Lake Oswego’s supply facilities are expanded to a treatment capacity of 38 million
26 gallons per day, Lake Oswego and Tigard can provide West Linn and Board with redundant water
supply facilities and a reliable source of emergency water supply sufficient to meet West Linn’s
average day demand of 4 mgd through at least 2041. R. 5825.

1 suggesting that \$5 million is nothing more than chump change. More's challenge is not to the
2 substantial evidence supporting the imposition of a \$5 million fee as a benefit, but merely a
3 disagreement that the fee imposed should have been a greater amount. More may view \$5
4 million as pocket money, but Respondent found the fee reasonable and adequate.

5 Presumably More and STOP would prefer to take the approach conferred by Ben
6 Franklin by "waiting until the well is dry, to learn the worth of water." However, the record
7 shows that approving the Partnership's applications allows for the long-term provision of 4
8 mgd and emergency back-up water that Respondent does not currently enjoy, without
9 requiring it to expend \$11.6 million to build its own reliable and redundant supply across the
10 Willamette River. The evidence further supports a finding that the installation of a new,
11 seismically secure raw water pipeline confers a benefit to the community because the existing
12 pipe "is highly vulnerable and has experienced multiple disruptions in service." R. 322. More
13 does not object to these or other benefits which are evident throughout the record and include:
14 upgrading the seismically vulnerable WTP, providing environmentally sustainable building
15 amenities, supplying a public pedestrian trail connecting Kenthorpe Way and Mapleton Drive,
16 as well as contributing \$90,000 for improvements to Mary S. Young Park. R. 87, 278-280,
17 4478-4507. All of these represent evidence that Respondent reasonably relied upon to find
18 that the proposals are "consistent with the overall needs of the community."


19 **IX. CONCLUSION**

20 For the reasons set out above, Respondent's decision should be affirmed.

21 DATED: August 6, 2013.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 GARVEY SCHUBERT BARER

24 By: 
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City of Lake Oswego

BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STOP TIGARD OSWEGO PROJECT, LLC
("STOP"), NORMAN KING, PETE BEDDARD,
MICHAEL MONICAL, CAROL ELSWORTH,
MARK ELSWORTH, SHANNON VROMAN,
JENNE HENDERSON, LAMONT KING, THOMAS
J. SIEBEN, GWEN SIEBEN, SCOTT GERBER, JAN
GERBER, JACK NORBY, THOM HOLDER, GARY
HITESMAN, REBECCA WALTERS, DARRYL
WALTERS,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF WEST LINN,

Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-
TIGARD WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF
TIGARD,

Intervenor-Respondents.

WILLIAM J. MORE, CARL L. EDWARDS, LINDA
S. EDWARDS, CURT SOMMER, AND ROBERT
STOWELL,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF WEST LINN,

Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-
TIGARD WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF
TIGARD,

Intervenor-Respondents.

LUBA Nos. 2013-021 and 2013-022

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LUBA No 2013-023

INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT CITY OF TIGARD'S RESPONSE BRIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STANDING 1

A. The Board Should Apply Federal Standing Requirements. 1

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5

A. Nature of the Land Use Decision and the Relief Sought5

B. Summary of Response. 5

C. Summary of Material Facts.6

III. JURISDICTION 7

IV. RESPONSE TO STOP’S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 7

A. Waiver7

B. Scope of Review. 9

C. Response to Assignment of Error.12

V. CONCLUSION. 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc v. City of Eugene</i> , 177 Or App 379, 388-89, 35 P3d 1029 (2001)	12
<i>Baker v Carr</i> , 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S Ct 691, 703, 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962)	2
<i>Barcik v. Kubiaczyk</i> , 321 Or 174, 200, 895 P2d 675 (1995)	2,4
<i>Bowlus v. Multnomah County</i> , 23 OR LUBA 599, 602, FN3 (1992)	14
<i>Bruce Packing Company v City of Silverton</i> , 45 Or LUBA 334 (2003)	7,9
<i>Bruce Packing, supra</i> ; see also <i>Olstedt v Clatsop County</i> , 62 Or LUBA 131 (2010)	11
<i>Bundy v City of West Linn</i> , 63 Or LUBA 113 (2011)	8
<i>Carlsen v City of Portland</i> , 39 Or LUBA 93, 100 (2000)	11
<i>City of S Lake Tahoe v California Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency</i> , 625 F 2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1980)	2
<i>Just v City of Lebanon</i> , 193 Or App 132, 144, 88 P3d 312 (2004)	3,4
<i>Kellas v Department of Corrections</i> , 341 Or 471, 145 P3d 139 (2006)	3
<i>Koontz v St Johns River Water Management Dist</i> , 133 S Ct 2586, 2596 (2013)	15
<i>LaGrande/Astoria v PERB</i> , 281 Or 137, 148, 576 P2d 1204 (1978)	17
<i>Larson v Multnomah County</i> , 24 Or LUBA 629 (1993)	8
<i>Linda R S v Richard D.</i> , 410 U.S. 614, 617, 93 S Ct. 1146, 1148, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973)	2
<i>Marbury v Madison</i> , 5 U S 137, 173-180 (1803)	4
<i>McKinney v Watson</i> , 74 Or 220, 221, 145 P 266 (1915)	3
<i>Nollan v California Coastal Commission</i> , 483 U S 825, 107 S. Ct 3141 (1987)	14,15,16
<i>Siporen v City of Medford</i> , 349 Or 247, 259, 243 P3d 776 (2010)	11,23
<i>State v Gaines</i> , 346 Or 160, 171-173, 206 P3d 1042 (2009)	23
<i>Tonquin Holdings, LLC v Clackamas County</i> , 247 Or App 719, 722-23, 270 P3d 397 (2012)	11
<i>Whitbeck v Funk</i> , 140 Or 70, 74, 12 P2d 1019 (1932)	19

Statutes

ORS 162 015	10, 20
ORS 174.010	24
ORS 190 010.	13
ORS Chapter 197	1
ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A)	10
ORS 197 763(1)	9
ORS 197 805(1)	3
ORS 197 830(2) and (3)	2
ORS 197.835(2)(a)	10
ORS 197 835(9)(a)(D)	9, 10,12
ORS 197 835(9)(a)(E)	2
ORS 197 850(1)	4, 5
ORS 221 240	18

ORS 221 410(1)	18, 19
ORS 221.410-490	8
ORS 221.420(2)(a)	8
ORS 221 460	6,7,12,18,19
ORS 221 470	19
ORS 223 297	6, 8,16, 17, 18
ORS 223 299(2), (4)	18
ORS 223.299(4)	17
ORS 223 229(4)(b)	18
ORS 241 460	12, 16
ORS Chapter 271	8,20
ORS 271 310	6,16, 20

Rules

OAR 661-010-030(4)(a)	1
-----------------------	---

Other Authorities

Article III	2, 3, 4
Article III §2	2, 4
Fifth Amendment	2,3,6,14,15
1 Annals of Congress 457 (1789), 5 Writings of James Madison 385 (G. Hunt ed., 1904)	4

City of West Linn Community Development Code

CDC 60.070	24
CDC 60.070(A)(3)	6,8,11,12,22,23,24
CDC 60 090 and 100	24

City of West Linn Charter

Charter	12,13,18,21
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City of West Linn Municipal Code

WLMC 9.030	6, 8, 21, 22
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1 I. STANDING

2 Intervenor-Respondent City of Tigard accepts the statement of standing to bring this
3 appeal by Petitioners Stop Lake Oswego Tigard Water Project, LLC, *et al.* (hereinafter
4 “SIOP” or “Petitioners”), with the exception of the constitutional takings claim alleged in
5 SIOP’s Petition for Review LUBA No. 2013-021 & 2013-022 (hereinafter “*Petition*”).

6 SIOP lacks the requisite standing under federal standards to bring a claim to enforce
7 the federal constitutional rights of the City of Tigard and the City of Lake Oswego
8 (collectively hereinafter “Applicants” or “Project Partners”) At page 17, lines 19-25 of the
9 *Petition*, SIOP alleges that condition 16 exacts property inconsistent with Takings Clause of
10 the U S Constitution. Oregon courts apply federal standing principles when adjudicating
11 federal law issues, and consistent with these principles of judicial review the Land Use Board
12 of Appeals (hereinafter “Board”) should decline to extend standing beyond that allowed
13 under federal standards to review Petitioners’ federal constitutional issue. Such an extension
14 of standing beyond that allowed to the state and federal courts would impair the parties’
15 ability to obtain judicial review of the Board’s decision on federal constitutional issues. Such
16 a deprivation of the opportunity to appeal is inconsistent with the intent of the Oregon
17 legislature when it granted the right to judicial review to “any party to a proceeding before
18 the [Board].”

?
just
have

19 The *Petition* does not allege any facts which demonstrate SIOP’s standing to enforce
20 the constitutional rights of the Project Partners, as is required under the Board’s rules OAR
21 661-010-030(4)(a). Accordingly, the Board should dismiss Petitioners’ takings claim for
22 lack of standing.

23 A. The Board Should Apply Federal Standing Requirements.

24 In ORS Chapter 197, the Oregon Legislature has established a very inclusive standing
25 threshold for appealing the final land use decisions of local governments in Oregon. Under

1 ORS 197.830(2) and (3), the prerequisite to standing before the Board is for a party to
2 participate in the local proceedings, be adversely affected by the local land use decision, and
3 to timely file a notice of intent to appeal. The legislature has also made it clear that the
4 Board has the authority to consider constitutional questions. See ORS 197.835(9)(a)(E).

5 In contrast, Article III §2 of the U.S. Constitution establishes more significant limits
6 on standing for the federal courts to hear constitutional issues, as only issues that involve
7 “cases” and “controversies,” are considered justiciable. The 9th Circuit describes the Article
8 III “case and controversies” standing requirement to necessitate that a party bringing an
9 action have a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy, or has suffered some threatened
10 or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action. *City of S. Lake Tahoe v*
11 *California Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency*, 625 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1980).¹ The Article III
12 standing requirements are applied by Oregon courts when reviewing matters of federal law.
13 See *Barcik v Kubiaczyk*, 321 Or. 174, 200, 895 P.2d 675 (1995) (Oregon Supreme Court
14 reverses the Court of Appeals because it erred in applying state law to determine justiciability
15 of a federal law claim).

16 Here, Petitioners, who are application opponents, argue that West Linn violated the
17 Fifth Amendment rights of the applicants by imposition of condition 16 (*Petition*, p. 17, ll.
18 20-25). The Project Partners have taken no action to raise such an issue or to bring any claim
19 or appeal to enforce their constitutional protections. Moreover, they do not agree that any
20 taking of property is implicated by condition 16. The Petitioners have no stake in whether
21 the challenged decision unlawfully “takes” property from Project Partners and Petitioners.

22 _____
23 ¹ Article III standing requires, “such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy” as to warrant [plaintiff’s]
24 invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers. *Baker v Carr*,
25 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or
otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s judgment may benefit
others collaterally. A federal court’s jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has
suffered “some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.” *Linda R. S. v*
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). See also *Data Processing Service*
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-154, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829-830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). *City of S. Lake Tahoe v*
California Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1980).

1 would themselves suffer no Fifth Amendment injury if the constitutional rights of the Project
2 Partners are infringed upon. Even if Petitioners allege some sort of taxpayer standing –and
3 they do not – Petitioners are residents of West Linn, not the Project Partner cities, and would
4 not even be indirectly impacted by West Linn’s “taking” the property of the Project Partners
5 without any compensation. As they have no interest in the purported constitutional taking,
6 Petitioners lack Article III standing to bring a takings claim on behalf of the Project Partners
7 *Id*, see also *McKinney v Watson*, 74 Or 220, 221, 145 P 266 (1915) (“It is of no concern to
8 the plaintiff that corporations or business concerns with which he has no apparent connection
9 may suffer illegal exactions under an unconstitutional statute. Under such circumstances
10 sound public policy and due respect to the legislative and executive departments restrain the
11 courts from interference with the operation of a statute at the instance of a private suitor,
12 unless it appears that his personal interests are at stake ”)

13 The Board should decline to allow Petitioners to bring a federal constitutional claim
14 without establishing federal standing. The Board is not strictly bound by federal standing
15 requirements because it is not part of the executive branch, but the Board has the discretion
16 to apply judicial principles in a manner consistent with the statutes governing Board review
17 *Just v City of Lebanon*, 193 Or App 132, 144, 88 P3d 312 (2004)²; ORS 197.805(1). As
18 noted above, that a party must have Article III standing to bring a constitutional claim is a
19 fundamental principle of judicial review. Petitioners lack Article III standing, yet they seek
20 to jeopardize the interest of the Applicants in the Approval by using the Applicants’ Fifth
21 Amendment protections to Applicants’ disadvantage. Such an inverted application of

22 _____
23 ² Certain principles enumerated in *Just* are applicable this appeal, but due to the factual distinctions between the
24 circumstance in *Just* and the current case, the holding of *Just* is not controlling here. In *Just*, the court affirmed
25 LUBA’s decision to decline to require a showing of compliance with state standing requirements. *Id* at 147.
However, *Just* did not turn on federal issues that are as fundamental as the adjudication of rights under the U.S.
Constitution. Other differences that should be noted are that the holding in *Just* was in large part dependent on
the court’s analysis of precedent that has since been repealed. See *Kellas v Department of Corrections*, 341 Or
471, 145 P3d 139 (2006) (expressly abrogating *Utsey v Coos County*, 176 Or App 524, 32 P 3d 933 (2001),
solely on state law grounds). Finally, *Just* was a challenge to the standing of the party to bring an appeal to the
Board, here the standing issue is only applicable to the specific constitutional claim.

1 constitutional rights is the very sort of situation against which Article III guards³ In this
2 situation, the Board should apply Article III standing requirements to dismiss the
3 constitutional claim

4 The application of Article III standing in this instance also allows the Board to review
5 this appeal in a manner that is consistent its guiding statutes and the constitutional rights of
6 the parties ORS 197 850(1) provides for “any party to a proceeding of the [Board]” to
7 invoke judicial review. Any party invoking judicial review as to a question under the U S
8 Constitution must demonstrate Article III standing. *Barcik*, 321 Or at 200, *Just* 143 Or App
9 at 147. Therefore, if the Board extends standing to make federal constitutional claims
10 without a showing of consistency with Article III requirements, a party could be left without
11 the remedy of judicial review as prescribed in ORS 197 850(1) due to the inability to
12 demonstrate the requisite Article III standing before the Oregon Court of Appeals. Such a
13 deprivation of access to judicial review is also inconsistent with the federal constitutional
14 right to judicial review of the actions of other branches of government. *See Marbury v*
15 *Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 173-180 (1803); *see also* 1 Annals of Congress 457 (1789), 5 Writings
16 of James Madison 385 (G Hunt ed., 1904) (arguing for the adoption of the Bill of Rights
17 before Congress, “If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of
18 justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will
19 be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislature or
20 Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
21 stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights”) The right to judicial review
22 of Board opinions is just such a constitutionally required check on legislative and executive
23 authority, and must not be overlooked

24 ////

25

³ The legislature was wise enough to forestall such occurrences in the operation of ORS 197 796, which limits the right to challenge accepted conditions of approval to the party upon which the condition is imposed.

1 The Board has the discretion to apply federal standing requirements, and not to do so
2 is inconsistent with sound principles of judicial review, including the very fundamental right
3 to judicial review, embodied in federal constitutional doctrine and more specifically, ORS
4 197 850(1). To avoid allowing parties to use other parties' constitutional rights unfavorably,
5 and to avoid the potential derogation of the right to judicial review, the Board should apply
6 Article III standing requirements with regards to Petitioners' constitutional takings claim

7 Due to Petitioners' lack of Article III standing, the Board should dismiss the takings
8 claim.

What takings claim

9 **II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

10 **A. Nature of the Land Use Decision and the Relief Sought**

11 Respondent City of West Linn (hereinafter "Respondent" or "City") approved two
12 permit packages: one allowing for the construction of an expanded water treatment plant
13 (WTP) and the second, for raw water and finished water pipelines conveying water to and
14 from that plant Petitioners Stop Tigard Oswego Project, LLC et al (hereinafter referred to as
15 "STOP") and William J More et al (hereinafter referred to as "More") seek reversal or
16 remand of these two decisions LUBA should reject these requests and affirm the two
17 decisions

18 **B. Summary of Response.**

19 This brief responds solely to STOP's first assignment of error. The responsive
20 arguments include the following.

- 21 • The majority of issues raised in STOP's first assignment of error are not
22 adequately preserved for appeal, are not yet ripe for review, or are otherwise
23 beyond the scope of review.
- 24 • The City's Home Rule Charter provides the requisite authority to agree to the
25 IGA anticipated by condition of approval 16.

- 1 • Condition of approval 16 is consistent with the U S Constitution because it is
- 2 accepted by the Applicants and does not implicate a Fifth Amendment taking.
- 3 • Condition of approval 16 is consistent with and not preempted by state law,
- 4 specifically the statutory requirements applicable to system development
- 5 charges (ORS 223 297, *et seq*), to franchise fees (ORS 221 460), and to leases
- 6 (ORS 271 310, *et seq*)
- 7 • Condition of approval 16 is not a bribe
- 8 • Condition of approval 16 is consistent with West Linn Municipal Code
- 9 (“WLMC”) 9 030, as it does not regulate the use of City streets.
- 10 • The City plausibly interpreted the West Linn Community Development Code
- 11 (“CDC”) to consider the community impact fee as evidence of compliance
- 12 with CDC 60.070(A)(3)

13 **C. Summary of Material Facts.**

14 The summary of material facts presented in the Response Brief for Intervenor-
15 Respondent Lake Oswego is hereby included and incorporated herein, with the following
16 facts specific to SIOP’s first assignment of error

17 The West Linn City Council adopted Final Order No AP-12-03 (hereinafter, the
18 “Approval”), which approves the joint application by the City of Tigard and the City of Lake
19 Oswego (hereinafter “Applicants” or “Project Partners”) for conditional use, design review,
20 and water resource area approval to install a water transmission line. Rec 180-253 The
21 Approval contains conditions of approval and is supported by findings of fact

22 One of the standards applicable to the Approval is CDC 60 070(A)(3), that requires
23 the City to make findings that “The granting of the proposal will provide for a facility that is
24 consistent with the overall needs of the community” The Approval includes thorough
25 findings of compliance with this standard Rec 198-200.

1 Condition of Approval 16 describes an IGA that the Applicants must enter into with
2 the City. The only terms of that IGA that are included in the condition are that the
3 Applicants will pay a community impact fee to the City and the City will agree not impose
4 future fees for the use of City right of way. No such IGA has been entered into at this time.

5 Condition of approval 16 was not objected to by the Applicants during the lower
6 proceeding. Condition of Approval 16 is found at page 249 of the Record and states,

7 “Community Impact Fee. The applicant shall enter into an
8 intergovernmental agreement with West Linn in lieu of a
9 franchise or other licensing agreement for the use of public
10 streets in West Linn. That agreement shall require a one-time
11 payment of \$5 million to be used for West Linn water system
12 improvements to meet the overall needs of the community.”

13 III. JURISDICTION

14 Intervenor-Respondent City of Tigard accepts Petitioners’ statement of jurisdiction.

15 **IV. RESPONSE TO STOP’S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR – Respondent has**
16 **the authority to enter into the IGA referenced in condition of approval 16, and**
17 **requiring such an IGA as a condition of approval is not illegal**

18 A. Waiver

19 In this assignment of error, Petitioners proffer multiple arguments that were not raised
20 during the local proceedings; these issues should not be considered by the Board. To
21 preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised while the record is open during the local
22 proceedings, and must be raised with sufficient specificity to afford the parties to the hearing
23 and the local decision maker an opportunity to respond. ORS 197.763(1); *Bruce Packing*
24 *Company v City of Silverton*, 45 Or LUBA 334 (2003). A review of the record indicates that
25 none of the issues raised in this assignment were preserved, with two exceptions. First, the
statement was made that the community impact fee was a bribe and second, that the
community impact fee is inconsistent with ORS 221.460. However, the balance of the

*Insufficient
time for
COA!*

1 arguments made in STOP's first assignment of error are not adequately preserved, and are
2 therefore beyond the scope of this appeal

3 The following arguments in the *Petition* are not adequately preserved for appeal

- 4 • CDC 60.070(A)(3) only considers whether "the facility" meets the needs of
5 the community, and cannot consider the impact of the community
6 development fee on the needs of the community. *Petition*, p. 16-17, ll 21-5
- 7 • Condition 16 is preempted by state system development charge statutes at
8 ORS 223 297 *et seq* *Petition*, p 17, ll. 6-19
- 9 • Condition 16 is an exaction that affects an unconstitutional taking *Petition*, p
10 17, ll 20-25.⁴
- 11 • Condition 16 is inconsistent with WLMC 9 030 *Petition*, p 17-18, ll. 26-5;
12 p. 19, ll 6-15
- 13 • Condition 16 requires a lease of public real property and is inconsistent with
14 ORS 271. *Petition*, p 19-20, ll 16-3; p. 24-25, ll 3-23.
- 15 • If condition 16 requires a lease of public real property, the amount of the
16 community impact fee is too low to meet the City's duty as trustee to the
17 public for City streets *Petition*, p. 26-27, ll 5-17
- 18 • City authority to regulate its right-of-way can only come from the following
19 sources, WLMC 9 030, ORS 221 410-490, and the community impact fee is
20 inconsistent with those provisions *Petition*, p 20-22, ll 4-19
- 21 • City authority to regulate its right-of-way is limited by ORS 221 420(2)(a) to
22 regulation of public utilities, electric cooperatives, people's utility districts,
23

24 ⁴ The Board applies additional scrutiny to whether a constitutional takings claim has been adequately preserved
25 for appeal. *See Bundy v City of West Linn*, 63 Or LUBA 113 (2011); *Larson v Multnomah County*, 24 Or
LUBA 629 (1993). Also, ORS 197 796(3) further requires a party to raise a challenge to a condition of
approval prior to appeal

1 heating companies, or Oregon Community Power, but does not include
2 municipally owned and operated utilities, such as the Water Project *Petition*,
3 p 22, ll 7-19

- 4 • Because the City does not have authority to agree to the community impact
5 fee, it cannot enter into an IGA that includes the community impact fee as a
6 term *Petition*, p. 23-24, ll 1-2

7 It is the burden of the party advancing an argument to demonstrate that an issue was
8 in the local proceedings with the specificity required by ORS 197 763(1) *Bruce Packing*,
9 *supra*; see also *Olstedt v Clatsop County*, 62 Or LUBA 131 (2010). The *Petition* cites no
10 evidence in the record that the above listed arguments and issues raised in this assignment of
11 error were ever raised in the local proceeding, let alone with the requisite specificity to allow
12 the City and Applicants to respond. Accordingly, the Board should disregard these
13 arguments and issues as beyond the proper scope of the current appeal.

14 **B. Scope of Review.**

15 In addition to the above arguments that are defective due to waiver and lack of
16 standing, Petitioners make another category of arguments that are not within the scope of this
17 review because the arguments are either not ripe for consideration, or they exceed the scope
18 of the Board's review of "applicable law" under ORS 197 835(9)(a)(D)

19 **1. Ripeness.**

20 The Board should disregard all of Petitioners' arguments that assert the
21 illegality of the community impact fee or an IGA, including the community impact fee,
22 because such arguments are not yet ripe Condition 16 sets forth the general framework for
23 two terms to be included in an IGA, but does not specify additional terms and obligations
24 that could be included in the anticipated IGA To date, the City and the applicants have not
25 entered into any such IGA

1 Because the actual terms and existence of the IGA mentioned in condition 16 are all
2 speculative, there are no grounds for the Board to find that such an IGA is illegal. Most
3 telling on this issue are the lengths to which the Petitioners go to try and characterize the
4 community impact fee and what it is being exchanged for. Such attempts are futile because
5 the nature of the community impact fee (SDC, franchise fee, lease, or other) is dependent on
6 the terms of the IGA adopting the fee, such as the consideration exchanged for the fee and
7 the manner in which the City can spend the proceeds from the fee.⁵

8 Furthermore, even if the terms of such an IGA were known, no IGA was adopted by
9 the City's land use decision that is the subject of this appeal. ORS 197.835(2)(a) confines the
10 Board's scope of review to the record. Since the community impact fee is a potential term of
11 a future IGA which is not included in the record, the future IGA and community impact fee
12 are not properly included within the scope of this proceeding.

13 Of course, the nature of the community impact fee and all of the other terms of the
14 future IGA will be known at the time of its adoption, if it is ever adopted. At such time,
15 challenge to such a future IGA can be made through the appropriate channels. Accordingly,
16 Respondents request that the Board dismiss all claims as to the legality of the future IGA or
17 the community impact fee.

18 **2. Applicable Law.**

19 The first assignment of error alleges that condition 16 is inconsistent with
20 local, state, and federal law, and requests remand under ORS 197.835(9)(a)(D) for improper
21 construction of applicable law. *Petition*, p. 16; ll. 16-17. However, one of Petitioners'
22 theories is that condition 16 is a bribe. Bribe giving in Oregon is a criminal matter and not a
23 matter of land use. *See* ORS 162.015. Accordingly, the issue of bribery is so unrelated to the
24 land use standards that are identified in ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A), that it does not constitute

25 _____

⁵See definitions of SDC, franchise fee, and lease, at sections IV C 3 b,c and FN 14

1 “applicable law” reviewable by the Board under ORS 197.835(9)(a)(D). See *Carlson v City*
2 *of Portland*, 39 Or LUBA 93, 100 (2000). Accordingly, the Board must decline to review
3 Petitioners’ bribery argument because it is not within the scope of this proceeding.

4 3. *Siporen* Deference.

5 As part of this assignment of error, Petitioners challenge the City’s
6 interpretation of its own development code to consider the community impact as evidence of
7 compliance with CDC 60.070(A)(3). This provision of the CDC was specifically interpreted
8 by the West Linn City Council, which adopted findings in support of that interpretation. Rec.
9 198-200. The West Linn City Council’s interpretation of its own Municipal Code is given
10 deference by the Board and such an interpretation shall be upheld if it is plausible. *Siporen v*
11 *City of Medford*, 349 Or 247, 259, 243 P3d 776 (2010). When reviewing an interpretation
12 under the highly differential *Siporen* standard, the Board does not review for whether an
13 interpretation is correct or better or worse than a different interpretation, but only if an
14 interpretation is plausible. *Tonquin Holdings, LLC v Clackamas County*, 247 Or App 719,
15 722-23, 270 P3d 397 (2012).

16 Petitioners incorrectly argue an exception to *Siporen*, that deference does not extend
17 to interpretations that are found to be inconsistent with state law. To the contrary, if
18 plausible, the local interpretation must receive deference in all cases. However, if an
19 interpretation results in the local code being applied inconsistently with state law, the Board
20 can remand based on that inconsistency. As a practical matter, remand follows based on
21 inconsistency with state law, but it is worth noting that the exception to *Siporen* deference
22 that Petitioners attempt to carve out, does not exist.

23 To summarize the scope of review issues raised above, the Board should discard the
24 following arguments as outside the scope of this review.

25 ////

1 (1) The federal constitution based takings claim made by Petitioners, for which they
2 lack standing (see section I)

3 (2) All arguments in the *Petition* that were not raised with sufficient specificity in the
4 local proceedings. A list of such arguments is found in the preceding section IV A of this
5 response brief.

6 (3) All arguments in the *Petition* that require the Board to determine the legality of
7 an IGA that does not exist, and was not adopted as part of the Approval. This includes all
8 arguments alleging inconsistency of the community impact fee with state and federal laws,
9 with the exception of ORS 221.460.

10 (4) The bribery argument made by Petitioners.

11 STOP's first assignment of error is thereby left with two claims that are properly
12 within the Board's scope of review;

13 (1) consistency of condition 16 with ORS 241.460, and

14 (2) plausibility of the City's interpretation of CDC 60.070(A)(3)

15 However, in an abundance of caution Respondents will respond as is best possible to
16 Petitioners' defective arguments, but reiterate that such arguments are not properly before the
17 Board, and are not grounds for remand or reversal of the Approval.

18 **C. Response to Assignment of Error**

19 **1. The City's Home Rule Charter is the source of requisite authority**
20 **to agree to the IGA anticipated by condition of approval 16.**

21 In the absence of any specific constitutional or statutory limitation, the West Linn City
22 Charter ("Charter") empowers the city council to enter into an IGA that includes the
23 community impact fee. As with most Oregon cities, West Linn has a general powers
24 provision in its Charter which vests in the city council all powers not otherwise restricted by
25 law. The Charter also contains provisions specifying that its terms be liberally construed in

1 allowing the City to have all of the powers needed to perform its local affairs. Charter §§ 4-
2 6.⁶ These general powers provisions of the Charter establish that no statutory authority is
3 required to allow the City to perform affairs of local importance, as the Charter itself confers
4 the authority, and the Oregon Constitution allows such grants of authority. See e.g., *AT&T*
5 *Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc v City of Eugene*, 177 Or App 379, 388-89,
6 35 P3d 1029 (2001)

7 Petitioners have not demonstrated any constitutional or statutory limitation on the
8 authority of the City to enter into an IGA that includes the community impact fee.
9 Petitioners attempt to shoehorn the fee into various statutory contexts, alternatively defining
10 the fee as an SDC, a franchise, and a lease. The following sections demonstrate that the
11 community impact fee does not meet the statutory definitions of any of the Petitioners'
12 preferred definitions and as such, is not subject to or expressly preempted by the associated
13 statutory provisions. Because the fee is not inconsistent with the state law provisions
14 identified by the Petitioners, it falls within the broad set of powers relegated to the City by its
15 Charter. And since it is within the authority of the City to adopt the community impact fee
16 the City may enter into an IGA that includes the community impact fee. ORS 190.010⁷
17 ////

18 ⁶ West Linn Charter, Chapter II Powers, reads as follows:

19 **"Section 4. Powers of the City.**

20 The City shall have all powers which the Constitution, statutes and common law of the United States and of this
21 State now or hereafter expressly or implied grant or allow the City, as fully as though this Charter specifically
22 enumerated each of those powers

23 **Section 5. Construction of the Charter.**

24 In this Charter the mention of a particular power shall not be construed to be exclusive or to restrict the scope of
25 the powers which the City would have if the particular power were not mentioned. The Charter shall be liberally
26 construed to the end that the City may have all powers necessary or convenient for the conduct of its municipal
27 affairs, including all powers that cities may assume pursuant to the State laws and to the municipal home rule
28 provisions of the State Constitution

29 **Section 6. Distribution of Powers.**

30 Except as this Charter prescribes otherwise and as the Oregon Constitution reserves municipal legislative power
31 to the voters of the City, all powers of the City are vested in the Council "

32 ⁷ ORS 190.010 "Authority of local governments to make intergovernmental agreement. A unit of local
33 government may enter into a written agreement with any other unit or units of local government for the
34 performance of any or all functions and activities that a party to the agreement, its officers or agencies, have
35 authority to perform."

1 2. **Condition of Approval 16 is Consistent with the United States**
2 **Constitution.**⁸

3 Condition 16 does not impose an exaction that is subject to the constitutional
4 standards expressed in *Nollan*,⁹ and is consistent with the Fifth Amendment of the U S
5 Constitution. Condition 16 does not implicate any constitutional issues because the condition
6 is not contested by the Applicants and anticipates an exchange for valuable consideration, not
7 a taking of property. In any event, the Board should decline to review this issue because it is
8 presented in the *Petition* without any supporting legal argument and analysis.

9 a. **The Board should not consider the constitutional takings**
10 **issue because Petitioners provide no supporting legal argument.**

11 The Board should decline to consider Petitioners' constitutional takings claim
12 because it is not supported by legal argument. Numerous cases establish that "LUBA will
13 not consider claims of constitutional violations which are unsupported by legal argument."
14 *See Bowhus v Multnomah County*, 23 OR LUBA 599, 602, FN3 (1992) and cases cited
15 therein. Here, the Petitioners' constitutional claim is afforded a mere five lines and consists
16 of a case citation to *Nollan*, a conclusory assertion that a violation exists, and no
17 accompanying legal argument or analysis.¹⁰ Since Petitioners' constitutional claim consists
18 of a conclusory assertion unsupported by legal argument, it should not be considered by the
19 Board.

20 /////

21 /////

22 _____
23 ⁸ The Board need only consider this issue in the event that Petitioners demonstrate that it is adequately
preserved for appeal.

24 ⁹ *Nollan v California Coastal Commission*, 483 U S 825, 107 S Ct 3141 (1987)

25 ¹⁰ Petitioners' constitutional claim reads in its entirety:

 "If the 'Community Impact Fee' is considered to be some sort of *ad-hoc* development fee, then it violates the
nexus requirement set forth in *Nollan v Coastal Comm'n*, 483 U S 825, 107 S Ct 3141, 97 L Ed 2d 677
(1987). The City cannot simply demand that a developer pay a one-time 5 million dollar fee to help pay for
water system improvements in change for the right to use city streets for water utilities, because there is no
nexus between the impact and the exaction."

1 b. Project Partners have accepted Condition 16, therefore by
2 definition it cannot be a taking.

3 The basic flaw in Petitioners' takings argument is that the Fifth Amendment does not
4 prohibit or limit government from receiving or accepting property of a consenting property
5 owner. The City is free to purchase or be granted any amount of property, and so long as the
6 property owner consents to the terms, no Fifth Amendment taking can occur. The
7 fundamental policy behind *Nollan* and the entire line of exaction cases is to prevent
8 extortionate or coercive government acquisition of property through imposition of conditions
9 of approval in the development permitting process. *Koontz v. St. Johns River Water*
10 *Management Dist.*, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013)¹¹ But, where property owners accept the
11 terms of a condition of approval, the potential for coercion and the associated need for
12 constitutional protections are eliminated and no taking can occur. Here, the Project Parties
13 are the property owners and consent to condition 16. Accordingly, no constitutional taking is
14 implicated.

15 c. Condition 16 does not impose an exaction, but instead
16 anticipates an exchange for valuable consideration

17 Even if the Board finds that a the Fifth Amendment protections are applicable to
18 consenting property owners, the City still has not imposed an exaction, and therefore *Nollan*
19 remains inapplicable. *Nollan* requires that an exaction must serve a legislative purpose that
20 has a nexus to the purpose of the criteria imposing the exaction. *Id.* An exaction is a
21 condition of approval requiring the transfer of private property or money to the government
22 without compensation. *Id.*; *Koontz, supra* (establishing that monetary exactions are also

23 _____
24 ¹¹ "Extortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not
25 because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without
just compensation. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede a
constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a
constitutionally cognizable injury." *Koontz, supra* at 2596.

1 subject to *Nollan*). Here, condition 16 exacts nothing because it requires no transfer of any
2 interest in land to public ownership, nor payment in lieu of a transfer of interest in land to
3 public ownership. Rather, condition 16 establishes the baseline terms for an exchange
4 between the Applicants and the City whereby the Applicants pay the community impact fee
5 for the City's agreement not to impose franchise or other license fees, and directs that the
6 exchange be memorialized in an IGA between the Applicants and City. Rec 249. As such,
7 condition 16 clearly anticipates an exchange for valuable consideration, the type of which a
8 local government and applicant are free to engage in, and any future IGA based on such an
9 exchange will be bargained for by all parties. Bargained for agreements are well removed
10 from the scope of exactions and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as it has been
11 applied by courts.

12 To summarize, condition 16 does not exact or take anything because it is part of a
13 mutually accepted exchange for valuable consideration. Petitioners have no stake in that
14 exchange, but seek to impose the rights of the Project Parties to undermine that exchange.
15 This very disconnect is the source of the challenge to Petitioners' standing to raise this
16 constitutional claim.

17 **3. Condition of Approval 16 is Consistent with State Law.¹²**

18 The City's authority to enter into an IGA that includes the community impact fee,
19 consistent with condition 16, is not preempted by nor inconsistent with state law. Petitioners
20 point to multiple statutory frameworks and assert that they limit the City's authority, but at
21 no point demonstrate the intent of the state legislature to preempt the City's authority in this
22 instance.

23 Specifically, the statutory requirements applicable to system development charges
24 (ORS 223.297, *et seq.*), to franchise fees (ORS 221.460), and to leases (ORS 271.310, *et*

25 _____
¹² With the exception of consistency with ORS 241.460, the Board only need consider these issues if Petitioners establish that they were adequately preserved for appeal.

1 *seq*), do not preempt the City's authority to enter into an IGA that includes the community
2 impact fee. In analyzing whether the action of a local government is preempted by state law,
3 both local and state law should be construed to be consistent if possible, and clear intention
4 to preempt is not expressed in state statute *See, LaGrande/Astoria v PERB*, 281 Or 137,
5 148, 576 P2d 1204 (1978)¹³ When actually examined in the context of a preemption
6 analysis, Petitioners' claims falls short

7 a. **Condition 16 does not impose a system development charge**
8 **and is not preempted by ORS 223.297 et seq.**

9 Petitioners' first claim that the system development charge statute "is preemptive on
10 the subject of impact fees to offset development impacts" *Petition*, p 17, ll 9-10. However,
11 the system development charge statutes at ORS 223 297, *et seq*, belie Petitioners' argument
12 The statute expressly defines the term "system development charges," and limits the
13 application of the statute to charges that fit within that definition *See* ORS 223 299(4)¹⁴; *see*
14 *also* ORS 223 297 (purpose of the statute is to "provide a uniform framework for imposition
15 of system development charges") As such, it is clear that the intent of the legislature was to

16
17 _____
18 ¹³ "Outside the context of laws prescribing the modes of local government, both municipalities and the state
19 legislature in many cases have enacted laws in pursuit of substantive objectives, each well within its respective
20 authority, that were arguably inconsistent with one another. In such cases, the first inquiry must be whether the
21 local rule in truth is incompatible with the legislative policy, either because both cannot operate concurrently or
22 because the legislature meant its law to be exclusive. It is reasonable to interpret local enactments, if possible, to
23 be intended to function consistently with state laws, and equally reasonable to assume that the legislature does
24 not mean to displace local civil or administrative regulation of local conditions by a statewide law unless that
25 intention is apparent." *LaGrande/Astoria v PERB*, 281 Or 137, 148, 576 P2d 1204 (1978)

22 ¹⁴ ORS 223 299(4)(a) "System development charge" means a reimbursement fee, an improvement fee or a
23 combination thereof assessed or collected at the time of increased usage of a capital improvement or issuance of
24 a development permit, building permit or connection to the capital improvement "System development charge"
25 includes that portion of a sewer or water system connection charge that is greater than the amount necessary to
reimburse the local government for its average cost of inspecting and installing connections with water and
sewer facilities

(b) "System development charge" does not include any fees assessed or collected as part of a local improvement
district or a charge in lieu of a local improvement district assessment, or the cost of complying with
requirements or conditions imposed upon a land use decision, expedited land division or limited land use
decision

1 establish an exclusive means for imposing system development charges, and not to preempt
2 all local authority on the subject of impact fees to offset development impacts.

3 The community impact fee is not a system development charge. The statutory
4 definition of system development charge specifically excludes the “cost of complying with
5 requirements or conditions imposed upon a land use decision” ORS 223.299(4) and (b)
6 Condition 16 is the source of the requirement to enter into the IGA including the community
7 impact fee. Also, assuming *arguendo* that the community impact fee did not fall within this
8 statutory exemption, the final use of the community impact fee is not yet established, as is
9 necessary to determine if the fee is a system development charge. *See* ORS 223.299(2), (4)
10 Condition 16 indicates that the fee be used for the water system improvements, which could
11 easily include expenditures other than capital improvements and thereby not within the
12 definition of system development charges.

13 As such, the community impact fee is not a system development charge, and
14 ORS 223.297, *et seq* does not have any preemptive effect beyond system development
15 charges. Therefore, the community impact fee is not preempted by ORS 223.297.

16 **b. Condition 16 does not impose a franchise fee and is not**
17 **preempted by ORS 221.240.**

18 Petitioners go to great lengths asserting that the community impact fee is, in fact, a
19 franchise fee and subject to ORS 221.460. *See Petition*, pp 17-19; II 26-5. At the outset of
20 this analysis, it should be noted that the Oregon legislature has indicated a clear intent not to
21 preempt local authority, stating at ORS 221.410(1) that “except as limited by express
22 provision or necessary implication of general law, a city may take all action necessary or
23 convenient for the government of its local affairs.” This statement is consistent with the
24 authority granted the City by the Charter, and given that Petitioners fail to identify any
25 express statutory provisions that would clearly indicate the intent to limit the City’s authority

1 to enter in to an IGA that includes the community impact fee, the authority of the City is not
2 preempted

3 Petitioners' arguments seem to infer that the IGA anticipated by condition 16 will
4 grant a franchise for the applicants to use streets within the City. Petitioners then assume that
5 such a franchise will be indefinite in duration, and therefore would violate the 20-year
6 limitation on franchises found at ORS 221.460.¹⁵

7 There is no indication that granting a franchise, license, or permit to the applicants is
8 a requisite term to be included in the future IGA anticipated by condition 16. All that is
9 required by Condition 16 is the payment of a community impact fee in exchange for forgoing
10 future City fees, and the nature of the community impact fee is not dictated by condition 16.
11 In support of the supposition that condition 16 requires a franchise Petitioners rely on
12 *Whitbeck v Funk*, 140 Or 70, 74, 12 P2d 1019 (1932), which defines a franchise as
13 conferring "the right to exercise powers or to do and perform acts which, without such grant,
14 the person to whom it is granted could not do or perform." However, condition 16 requires
15 no such grant be made, and there are already existing Lake Oswego pipes located under West
16 Linn's streets, so no new authority need be extended. Finally, Petitioners' assumption that
17 the duration of any terms of the IGA anticipated by condition 16 are known at this time, is
18 without base as there is no evidence in the record of such duration of terms.

19 Based on the statutory intent not to limit local authority expressed at ORS 221.410(1),
20 and the lack of any express term in condition 16 requiring a perpetual franchise, it is clear
21 that the City can enter into an IGA that includes the community impact fee consistent with
22 state franchise laws

23 ////

24 ////

25 ¹⁵ ORS 221.460 states, "Duration of franchises, privileges and permits. All franchises, privileges or permits
for the use of the public highways, streets or alleys granted after June 5, 1931, by any municipal corporation
shall not be granted for a longer term than 20 years, and shall be subject to the provision of ORS 221.470."

1 c **Condition 16 does not involve a real property lease and is**
2 **not preempted by ORS Chapter 271.**

3 Petitioners go on to assert that “the only lawful avenue” for an IGA including the
4 community impact fee is to couch the fee in terms of a real property lease under ORS
5 271.310. *Petition*, p. 24-27; ll. 6-16. Petitioners expend significant ink explaining how the
6 community impact fee is not consistent with the lease-related requirements of ORS Chapter
7 271, while failing to ever substantiate how state law dictates that the lease is the only
8 available vehicle in which to comply with condition 16, and while overlooking that condition
9 16 does not foreclose a lease consistent with ORS Chapter 271 as an option for compliance
10 with condition 16. Petitioners’ premise that a lease is the only allowable method of
11 complying with condition 16 relies upon the success of its other state law preemption
12 arguments, which are demonstrated to be flawed by the above sections. Therefore,
13 Petitioners’ argument that condition 16 is inconsistent with ORS Chapter 271 fails because a
14 lease is not required by condition 16 nor does the condition prevent the City and applicant
15 from complying with ORS Chapter 271 in the event that a lease is pursued.

16 Petitioners’ go on to make arguments about the role of the City as trustee over streets
17 and the market value of a lease of such streets, all of which are based on the premise that the
18 only available means by which condition 16 is legal is if it is a lease. Such arguments need
19 not be reviewed by the Board because they are only applicable if the Board finds that the
20 IGA considered by condition 16 must contain a lease. And even if the Board so finds, the
21 terms of such a lease will be determined at the time of its execution.

22 d. **Condition 16 is not a bribe.**

23 The exchange for valuable consideration outlined in condition 16 is not a bribe and
24 STOP’s assertions to the contrary are unsupported and baseless. ORS 162.015 defines the
25 crime of bribery in the State of Oregon as follows: “A person commits the crime of bribe

1 giving if the person offers, confers or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a public
2 servant with the intent to influence the public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, action,
3 decision, or exercise of discretion in an official capacity." None of the elements of the crime
4 of bribe giving are found in condition 16, and Petitioners cite no evidence supporting their
5 accusation of bribery.

6 First, no public servant receives and pecuniary benefit from condition 16 The
7 community impact fee that is described therein is clearly intended to be paid into the City
8 treasury and not towards the personal benefit of any elected official or City officer or
9 employee. Second, the only intent established by condition 16 is to engage in the agreed
10 upon exchange of the community impact fee for the City's agreement not to impose future
11 fees. As described in the condition, the agreed upon exchange would be formalized through
12 future adoption of an IGA by the respective governing bodies of the Cities of Tigard, Lake
13 Oswego, and West Linn. Each of the respective city councils will separately and
14 independently decide to adopt or not adopt the IGA based on their own weighing of the
15 benefits associated therewith, and there is no evidence that any member of any of the
16 councils stands to gain any pecuniary benefit from that decision. For these reasons, condition
17 16 is not a bribe

18 **4. Condition of Approval 16 is Consistent with the WLMC 9.030.¹⁶**

19 The City Charter and Municipal Code do not prohibit the City from entering into an
20 IGA that includes the community impact fee. Petitioners assert that condition 16 is
21 inconsistent with WLMC Section 9.030, which states as follows:

22 "9.030 Restriction on Use of Rights of Way The City has
23 jurisdiction to control public rights of way within the City and
24 may regulate the use of rights of way by ordinance, franchise,
license, permit or any combination thereof"

25 _____
¹⁶ The Board only need consider this issue in the event that Petitioners demonstrate that it is adequately preserved for appeal.

1 Petitioners' arguments assert that WLMC 9 030 limits the manner in which the City
2 can regulate right of way. In contrast to Petitioners' various arguments, WLMC 9 030
3 specifically calls out the City's authority and jurisdiction over its streets. However, the
4 debate about the extent of the City's authority is academic, as there are no terms in condition
5 16 that actually regulate the use of City right-of-way. As such, condition 16 is not subject to
6 WLMC 9 030, and no inconsistency exists.

7 Even if the Board were to somehow find that condition 16 regulates City right-of-
8 way, there still is no actual conflict between condition 16 and WLMC 9 030. Any regulation
9 would have to be achieved by the terms of the anticipated IGA, and the parties can simply
10 craft terms that are consistent with WLMC 9 030. Alternatively, the City could amend
11 WLMC 9 030 prior to adoption of the anticipated IGA to alleviate any inconsistency. Under
12 either scenario, there is no current inconsistency with WLMC 9 030.

13 **5. The City Plausibly Interpreted the CDC to Consider the**
14 **Community Impact Fee as Evidence of Compliance with CDC**
15 **60.070(A)(3)**

16 The preceding arguments demonstrate that the City is authorized to enter into an IGA
17 that includes the community impact fee, and that a requirement to do so is properly included
18 as a condition of approval. As such, condition 16 allows the City to rely on the community
19 impact fee as evidence in determining compliance with CDC 60.070(A)(3).

20 CDC 60 070 allows condition use review based on various criteria, including
21 CDC 60 070(A)(3), which reads as follows: "the granting of the proposal will provide for a
22 facility that is consistent with the overall needs of the community." In finding no 10 of the
23 Approval, the City has interpreted CDC 60 070(A)(3) to consider how the community impact
24 fee affects the overall needs of the community, when determining compliance with that
25 provision. Rec. 199. In contrast, Petitioners argue that City erred in its interpretation of

1 CDC 60 070(A)(3), as that provision should only consider whether the physical facility is
2 consistent with the overall needs of the community, and does not consider any non-structural
3 aspects of the application such as the community impact fee

4 The interpretation of CDC 60 070(A)(3) by the West Linn City Council is entitled to
5 deference under *Siporen*, and must be upheld if it is found to be plausible. In determining
6 whether the City's interpretation is plausible, the Board first examines the text and context of
7 the provision and then legislative history, to determine if there is an ambiguity. If an
8 ambiguity exists, the next step is to apply maxims of interpretation. *State v Gaines*, 346 Or
9 160, 171–173, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Here, the text and context demonstrate that it is
10 plausible for the City to interpret CDC 60 070(A)(3) to include the community impact fee as
11 evidence of compliance with that provision.

12 The text of CDC 60 070(A)(3) supports a plausible interpretation that the City can
13 consider the community impact fee when determining consistency of the overall needs of the
14 community. The first clause of CDC 60 070(A)(3), begins with the phrase “The granting of
15 the proposal will . . .” The phrase embodies the applied for development “proposal,” of which
16 the facility is just one part. The City plausibly reads this criterion to consider more than just
17 the “facility” in the structural sense, when determining consistency with the overall
18 community needs. By discussing the granting of the proposal, the code anticipates a more
19 comprehensive weighing of the *proposal* as a whole, inclusive of the facility, along with any
20 associated physical improvements such as mitigation, buffering, and other provisions of the
21 proposal such as fees, charges, and conditions of approval. Council has – and indeed should –
22 weigh all parts of the proposal against the community needs.

23 Petitioners' assertion that only the physical facility, and not the balance of the
24 proposal, can be considered renders the first clause of CDC 60 070(A)(3) without meaning.
25 Had the City Council intended to enact an ordinance embodying the Petitioners' favored

1 interpretation, the text could easily have been drafted to read that, “the proposed physical
2 facility shall be consistent with the overall needs of the community ” However, the City
3 Council saw fit to include the first clause and the reference to approval of the entire proposal,
4 and not just the physical facility. Petitioners ask the Board to overlook and omit the specific
5 language that has been inserted in CDC 60.070(A)(3) Such a reading is inconsistent with
6 ORS 174 010 (courts are “not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been
7 inserted”) Petitioners’ flawed reading of the code does not undermine the plausibility of the
8 City’s interpretation

9 The context of CDC 60 070(A)(3) also supports the City’s plausible interpretation
10 The provision is one of many conditional use criteria that are uniformly applied to the
11 permitting, altering, or enlarging of all conditional uses in the City Other provisions provide
12 criteria specific to certain conditional uses, such as CDC 60 090 and 100 which contain
13 additional criteria for transportation facilities and other government facilities However,
14 CDC 60 070 is unspecific in that it applies to all conditional uses that are proposed for
15 development in West Linn Such an expansive potential set of circumstances under which
16 CDC 60.070 is applied supports a broader reading of its provisions, and it would be arbitrary
17 to consider only part of the development proposal to determine such a comprehensive
18 concept as consistency with overall community need The City has adopted such a broad
19 interpretation as is supported by the code context and plausibly considers entire proposal,
20 including the community impact fee, when considering consistency with the overall needs of
21 the community

22 ////

23 ////

24 ////

25 ////

1 V. CONCLUSION.

2 For the above stated reasons, Intervenor-Respondent City of Tigard requests that the
3 Board deny STOP's first assignment of error

4 Dated this 10th day of August, 2013

JORDAN RAMIS PC
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City of Tigard

By: 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

2 I hereby certify that on the date shown below, I filed the original and four (4) copies
3 of the foregoing INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT CITY OF TIGARD'S RESPONSE BRIEF
4 by first class mail, postage prepaid, on:

5 Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals
6 DSL Building
7 775 Summer Street NE, Suite 330
8 Salem OR 97301-1283

9 I further hereby certify that on the date shown below, I served a true and correct copy
10 of the foregoing INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT CITY OF TIGARD'S RESPONSE BRIEF
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
19 by first class mail, postage prepaid.

20 by hand delivery

21 by facsimile transmission

22 DATED: August 6, 2013

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23 
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**BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF OREGON**

STOP TIGARD OSWEGO PROJECT, LLC ("STOP"),
NORMAN KING, PETE BEDDARD,
MICHAEL MONICAL, CAROL ELSWORTH,
MARK ELSWORTH, SHANNON VROMAN,
JENNE HENDERSON, LAMONT KING,
THOMAS J. SIEBEN, GWEN SIEBEN,
SCOTT GERBER, JAN GERBER, JACK NORBY,
THOM HOLDER, GARY HITESMAN,
REBECCA WALTERS, DARRYL WALTERS,
Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF WEST LINN,
Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-TIGARD
WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF TIGARD
Intervenor-Respondents.

LUBA Nos. 2013-021 and 2013-022

WILLIAM J. MORE, CARL L. EDWARDS, LINA S. EDWARDS,
CURT SOMMER and ROBERT STOWELL,
Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF WEST LINN
Respondent,

CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, LAKE OSWEGO-TIGARD
WATER PARTNERSHIP, and CITY OF TIGARD,
Intervenor-Respondents.

LUBA No. 2013-023

**PETITION FOR REVIEW
LUBA NO. 2013-021 & 2013-022**

JULY 16, 2013

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1 **CERTIFICATE OF FILING**

2 I hereby certify that I filed the original of the **PETITION FOR REVIEW**, together with
3 four copies thereof, with the Land Use Board of Appeals, DSL Building, 775 Summer Street NE,
4 Suite 330, Salem OR 97301-1283, on July 16, 2013, by mailing to them by certified, return
5 receipt mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the Board at the above address.

6
7 By: _____
8 Andrew H. Stamp, OSB No. 974050
9 *Attorney for Petitioners*

10 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

11 I hereby certify that on July 16, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of this **PETITION**
12 **FOR REVIEW** on all persons listed below by first class mail:

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19 DATED: July 16, 2013

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Statement of the Case.	1
	A. Nature of Land Use Decision and Relief Sought by Petitioners	1
	B. Summary of the Arguments	1
	C. Summary of Material Facts.	
	1. Brief History of the Relationship of Lake Oswego and West Linn	3
	2. The Emergency Water System Intertie Between West Linn and Lake Oswego	3
	3. Brief History of Lake Oswego and Tigard Water Partnership (“LOT”).....	4
	4. AP-03-12: LOT’s Application for Raw Water and Finished Water Pipelines.	5
	5. Installation of the Raw Water Pipeline by Horizontal Directional Drilling.....	6
	6. Installation of the Finished Water Pipeline and the Adverse Effects to Businesses On Highway 43.....	9
	7. The Basis for the City Council’s Approval of AP-12-02 & 12-03	13
II.	Petitioners’ Standing	14
III.	Jurisdiction of the Board	14
IV.	Assignments of Error	14
	A. First Assignment of Error	14
West Linn City Council Erred by Finding Compliance with CDC §60.070(A)(3) on the Basis of a Condition of Approval that Requires the Applicant to Pay a One-Time Ad Hoc Impact Fee in the Amount of \$5 Million for the use of West Linn’s Public Right-of-Way, Because this Type of Ad Hoc Impact Fee is Prohibited as a Matter of Law.		
	1. Issue.....	14
	2. Standard of Review.....	16
	3. Argument.....	16

B. Second Assignment of Error.....27

The West Linn City Council erred in adopting LOT’s assertions that the installation of the RWP beneath MSY Park and adjacent OPRD lots, by the use of horizontal direction drilling does not “impact” or “disturb” those properties and therefore does not trigger the restrictive construction conditions imposed by CDC §32.010 *et seq.*

A. Issue.....27

B. Standard of Review.....29

C. Argument..... 30

C. Third Assignment of Error.....41

Respondent Erred by Not Requiring a Mitigation Plan pursuant to CDC §32.050 and CDC §32.070. Respondent’s Error Results from its Failure to Properly Interpret the Phrases “any Portion” and “Permanent Disturbance.”

A. Issue.....41

B. Standard of Review.42

C. Argument..... 42

D. Fourth Assignment of Error.....43

Respondent failed to adopt adequate findings on the issue of traffic mitigation measures, because the findings do not address, let alone acknowledge the conflicting expert testimony and evidence raised by Petitioners.

E. Fifth Assignment of Error.....46

Councilor Jones Violated Applicable Law by Engaging in Undisclosed *Ex Parte* Contacts with the Applicant by Using Staff as a Messenger to Shop A Proposed Set of Conditions of Approval to the Applicant In Order to Gain their Acknowledgement and Acceptance of the Conditions Prior to the Final City Council Public Meeting on the Topic of these Two Land Use Decisions.

F. Sixth Assignment of Error.....50

V. Conclusion50

1 **I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

2 **A. Nature of the Decision and Relief Sought**

3 Respondent's Final Order dated February 18, 2013 granted an appeal, in its entirety, of the
4 Planning Commission's December 11, 2012 denial of LOT's land-use application. The
5 Applicant sought both a conditional use permit and a class II design review to enable LOT to
6 accomplish a considerable expansion to its existing WTP as well as installing miles of pipeline
7 within and through the City of West Linn. LOT's proposed pipeline will take 38 million gallons
8 of water daily ("mgd") from the Clackamas River, and transport the water to LOT's water
9 treatment plant located within a residential neighborhood of West Linn. Thereafter, the treated
10 water is proposed to be transported from the WTP through both residential and commercial zones
11 within West Linn until the water reaches its final destination in the Cities of Lake Oswego and
12 Tigard. The February 18, 2013, Final Decision in AP 12-02 and AP-12-03 is provided at App
13 2-193.

14 Petitioners seek the remand of AP-12-02 / AP-12-03 for modifications necessary to meet
15 the requirements of the Community Development Code ("CDC") and Comprehensive Plan.

16 **B. Summary of Argument**

17 Petitioners raise Six assignments of error ("AE"):

18 1. In the First AE, Petitioners argue that Respondent misapplied CDC §60.070(A)(3),
19 which requires the decision-maker to make a finding that "[t]he granting of the proposal will
20 provide for a facility that is consistent with the overall needs of the community." Respondent
21 determined that this criterion requires the applicant to show that the facility will provide a list of
22 "benefits" to the City of West Linn. Respondent proceeded to find that the standard was met, in
23 large part because the applicant offered to pay \$5 million dollars to the City of West Linn.
24 Respondent couched this payment as a "Community Impact Fee" and imposed a condition of
25 approval imposing the fee, even though the City has no Ordinance establishing for the payment
26 such a "fee" upon land use applicants. Petitioners argue that the fee is nothing more than an

1 unlawful System development charge or franchise fee, which cannot be imposed on LOT. As a
2 result, a remand is needed to determine if the City Council will find sufficient community benefit
3 to satisfy CDC §60.070(A)(3) in the absence of the \$5 million dollar payment.

4 2. In the Second AE, Petitioners argue that Respondent misapplied CDC Chapter 32
5 by not requiring the applicant to mitigate for permanent disturbances it was making into the water
6 resource areas (“WRAs”) located in Mary S. Young Park and in certain adjacent land owned by the
7 Oregon Parks and Recreation Dept. Respondent incorrectly interpreted its code such that an
8 “alteration” or “disturbance” of a WRA only occurs if there is an impact *to the ground surface* of
9 the WRA. Respondent finds that water pipes installed using horizontal directional drilling
10 (“HDD”) does not cause disturbance to the resource, and therefore otherwise applicable mitigation
11 requirements are not triggered. Petitioners argue that the WRA is not limited to the surface of the
12 WRA, and that the pipe itself, is, by its very nature, a permanent disturbance causing the need for
13 mitigation. As a result, Petitioner argues that Respondent failed to invoke the mitigation
14 requirements set forth in CDC Chapter 32.

15 3. The Third AE mirrors the Second AE, except that it addresses intrusions in the
16 WRAs located on Heron Creek and Trillium Creek. Petitioners again argue that Respondent
17 erred by failing to invoke the mitigation requirements set forth in CDC Chapter 32.

18 4. In the Fourth AE, Petitioners argue that the findings addressing CDC
19 §60.070(A)(1) are inadequate as a matter of law, because Respondent failed to adopted so-called
20 “Norvell findings” addressing any of the specific challenges to AP-12-03 made by the business
21 community.

22 5. In the Fifth AE, Petitioners argue that the decision must be remanded because City
23 Councilor Jones engaged in improper *ex parte* contacts that with the applicant. Jones admitted to
24 Petitioner Scott Gerber that he had used staff as a messenger to “shop” proposed conditions of
25 approval to the applicant for consent prior to adoption – all on an “off-the-record” basis. City
26 Manager Chris Jordan admitted to the City newspaper that he had been in contact with both Jones

1 and LOT officials in regard to the new conditions, and that other city staff, such as attorneys, dealt
2 with drafting the new conditions.

3 6. In the Sixth AE, Petitioners incorporate by reference the assignments of error raised
4 by the Petitioners in LUBA Case No. 2013-023.

5 **C. Summary of Material Facts**

6 **1. Brief History of the Relationship of Lake Oswego and West Linn**

7 Lake Oswego (“LO”) holds senior water rights for the Clackamas River which allows it to
8 withdraw 32 mgd. LO also has junior rights which allow it to withdraw another 6 mgd. Rec.
9 9331. To utilize these water rights, LO constructed a water treatment plant (“WTP”) in 1967 in
10 what is now the City of West Linn. In 1968, LO installed a 27-inch raw water pipeline (“RWP”)
11 from the Clackamas River, under the Willamette River to the WTP Rec. 9331; 9376. From the
12 WTP, the treated water travels in a finished water transmission main (“FWP”) ranging in size from
13 16 to 24 inches in diameter from the WTP down Mapleton Drive to Highway 43. The FWP then
14 travels beneath Highway 43 until it reaches LO. Rec. 9437.

15 The existing WTP is located within the Robinwood neighborhood of West Linn and
16 occupies approximately six (6) acres. LO expanded the WTP in 1980 to increase the plant’s
17 production to its current capacity of 16 mgd. Rec. 9331. As of 2007, the facility was in overall
18 good condition, but because it’s maximum capacity is only 16 mgd, LO determined that its WTP
19 should be expanded to meet the ultimate demand of LO’s water service area, as well as the
20 subsequent combined demand of the Tigard water service area. Rec. 9331.

21 **2. The Emergency Water System Intertie Between West Linn**
22 **and Lake Oswego.**

23 In 1984, LO, the City of West Linn and the South Fork Water Board¹ (“Board”) contracted
24 through an intergovernmental cooperative agreement (“Intertie IGA”) for the construction,

25 _____
26 ¹ The South Fork Water Board is a water supply agency jointly owned and operated by the cities of
Oregon City and West Linn. [Rec. Doc. 5822].

1 operation and maintenance of an emergency water system intertie (“Intertie”) between the water
2 supply system of the Board, West Linn, and the water supply system of LO. This Intertie was
3 subsequently constructed in WL in 1984 near the intersection of Old River Road and Kenthorpe
4 Way. Rec. 9705.

5 In accordance with the Intertie IGA, WL also constructed a pumping station near the
6 Intertie, the cost of which was shared by all parties. WL, however, is the owner of the Intertie
7 facilities which includes the piping, valves, vaults, metering, instrumentation, control systems and
8 appurtenant facilities. Rec. 9705.

9 The purpose of the pump station is to supply emergency water from the Lake Oswego
10 distribution system into WL. The pumps station also provides emergency water to both LO and
11 the Board. An emergency condition under which the supply can be used is defined as follows:

12 An occurrence created by a failure of the water supply facilities of the Board, Lake
13 Oswego or West Linn, or the occurrence of an event which jeopardizes the Parties'
14 water quality, whereby insufficient supply to any of the water customers of the
15 Parties could threaten the health or safety of those customers. Such failure includes
16 failure or interruption in the operation of river intakes, raw and finished water
17 pumping facilities, water treatment facilities, raw and finished water pipelines,
18 reservoirs, and appurtenant facilities. Emergency conditions shall not include
19 situations involving loss of water pressure or diminution in water volume in a water
20 distribution system during periods of high demand if the system remains in a
21 normal operational mode, and shall not include scheduled repairs or maintenance.
22 Rec. 9706.

23 The existing terms between these parties to the Intertie IGA provide, in pertinent part, that
24 the parties shall be able to amend all the provisions of the IGA, including the provision regarding
25 the quantity of water to be supplied. Additionally, there is no expiration term for the use of the
26 Intertie by any party. These terms specifically state the following:

- 8) Quantity of Water to be Supplied. Upon agreement between the parties to
make use of the intertie pursuant to Paragraph 3 (which explains how water
can be utilized) of this Agreement, the Party supplying water shall endeavor
to supply the maximum feasible quantity of water to the other Party, and
take all reasonable actions necessary to accomplish the same, so long as
such actions are not detrimental to the operation of the supplying Party's

own water system. Rec. 9708.

15) Amendment Provisions. The terms of this agreement may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Any amendments shall be in writing, shall refer specifically to this agreement, and shall be executed by the Parties.

16) Termination of Agreement. This agreement shall continue in effect until terminated by the parties with written notice of such intent to terminate provided to the other parties. Notice to terminate must be provided at least 36 months prior to the effective date of termination. Termination of this agreement shall not affect the ownership status of the water system and its facilities herein above described. Rec. 9709.

3. Brief History of Lake Oswego and Tigard Water Partnership ("LOT")

Lake Oswego ("LO") asserts that as of July 2007 demands for the existing water supply system for its residents were over 15 mgd and its capacity was only 16 mgd. In an effort to resolve this, LO contacted the neighboring City of Tigard ("Tigard") and together they retained an engineering company to develop and evaluate a Joint Water Supply System Analysis from which four (4) scenarios were developed. Rec. 9316.

These scenarios were developed to support alleged projected population growth and corresponding demands of the service areas of both LO and Tigard. The cities agreed that Scenario 4², which allowed LO to access 38 mgd with its junior and senior water rights from the Clackamas River, was best for both LO and Tigard. This reasoning was based solely on the considerable financial benefits Scenario 4 would provide to both LO and Tigard, which included the following:

- 1) An alleged savings to LO of \$63 million in annual costs over the next 25 years and \$23 million in one-time capital savings.
- 2) A rate increase to LO of 56% over the next 25 years instead of 148% increase that LO would face without a partner.
- 3) A rate increase for Tigard of only 113% over 25 years as opposed to not partnering with LO which would cause the rates to increase by 128%

² The parties were also provided with an alternate site upon which to build a new WTP that would be located in unincorporated Clackamas County. The noted advantages to that site included its remoteness and its distance from residential communities. Further the partnership could construct a new WTP without disrupting the existing WTP facility and the City of West Linn. Rec. 9384. The disadvantages however, included a maximum capacity of 36 mgd as opposed to 38 mgd that the West Linn WTP could provide with the projected expansion. Rec. 9384 (Table 2.7).

1 -269%.

- 2 4) Securing more water rights for LO;
- 3 5) Constructing of an intertie between Tigard and the Washington County
4 Supply that would save Tigard approximately \$300,000.00 in annual
5 operating costs; and
- 6 6) Alleged benefits to Tigard, LO and other water suppliers, including the city
7 of West Linn who would all benefit from a regional system for emergency
8 backup water. Rec. 9325-9327.

9 Subsequently, in 2008 the Cities of Lake Oswego and Tigard created a water partnership
10 (“LOT”) by entering into an intergovernmental agreement. Together they set out to implement
11 Scenario 4, which is presently reflected in Respondent’s approvals AP-12-02 and AP-12-03. Both
12 of which erroneously allow LOT to dramatically enlarge the WTP and increase the size and
13 capacity of both the RWP and FWP to the detriment of City of West Linn. Rec. 9316.

14 **4. AP-03-12: LOT’s Application for Raw Water and Finished Water**
15 **Pipelines**

16 In June of 2012, LOT submitted a land use application seeking to construct and install
17 1,500 linear feet of a below ground, 42" diameter, raw water pipeline (“RWP”), which would
18 supply water to the WTP already located in West Linn. The installation of the RWP would begin at
19 the Clackamas River, Rec. 180, located on the Southern boundary of the City of Gladstone. The
20 portion of the pipe traversing under the Willamette River would be installed through the
21 implementation of a horizontal directional drill method (HDD).³ The pipe would continue under
22 Mary S. Young Park, using the HDD technique, until it reaches the south end of Mapleton Drive in
23 West Linn. From there, the pipeline would run along Mapleton Drive until it reaches the WTP
24 which is located at 4260 Kenthorpe Way in West Linn. Rec. 8277-85.

25 From the WTP, 1,850 linear feet of finished water pipeline (“FWP”), now 48-inches in
26 diameter, would follow the Mapleton Drive right of way below ground, westward to Oregon
Highway 43 (“Highway 43”). The FWP would continue to run northerly, below ground along the
right-of-way of Highway 43 to Lake Oswego. Rec. 8281. All of the pipeline running along

³ Horizontal Directional Drilling is explained in detail below in No. 7.

1 Mapleton Drive and Highway 43 would be installed via an open-cut trench. Rec. 8282.

2 The approval of both pipelines is subject to West Linn's Community Development Code
3 Chapters No.: 56 (Parks Design Review); 27 (Flood Management Areas); 28 (Willamette River
4 Greenway); and 32 (Water Resource Area). Additionally, the raw and finished pipelines must
5 also comply with Chapter 60 of the Community Development Code ("CDC") and lastly all must
6 also conform with West Linn's Comprehensive Plan and West Linn's Master Water System Plan.

7 **5. Installation of the Raw Water Pipeline by Horizontal Directional Drilling**

8 AP-12-03 will utilize the horizontal directional drilling ("HDD") method to install a RWP
9 under two (2) lots owned by Oregon Parks and Recreation Department ("OPRD lots") and under
10 Mary S. Young State Park ("MSY Park"), which is adjacent to and just south of the OPRD lots.
11 There are a combination of six (6) water resources within MSY Park and the adjacent OPRD lots,
12 all of which are protected and highly regulated by West Linn's Community Development, Code
13 Chapter 32 ("C.32") Rec. 8534, 8397, 8411 & 8219.

14 LOT retained alleged ecological experts, David Evans and Associates, Inc., who prepared
15 two technical memoranda ("DEA memos")⁴ which explain when, where, and how the HDD
16 process is to be implemented and what impacts and disturbances are, or are not, expected to be
17 caused in terms of the C.32. Rec. 8392-8419. The DEA memos explain that the pipeline to be
18 installed is 42-inches in diameter and 3,800 feet long. It will enter the ground at a hole drilled on
19 the north OPRD lot which is located at the southeast end of Mapleton Drive, adjacent to the City of
20 West Linn's Mapleton Pump Station and just north of MSY Park. From this hole, a tunnel will
21 extend approximately 30 to 60 feet deep and commence at the OPRD property, through MSY Park
22 and continue underneath the bed of the Willamette River to its east side where the tunnel will exit
23 above ground at Meldrum Bar Park in Gladstone, outside of West Linn. Rec. 8534.

24 _____
25 ⁴ The DEA memos identified all of the WRAs within LOT's pipeline site plan. In addition to MSY Park and OPRD
26 lots, the memos included the Mapleton Drive and Highway 43 areas. The DEA memos also identify habitat
conservation areas. This section of this Petition for Review, however, only discusses LOT's use of HDD within MSY
Park and the OPRD lots with respect to WRAs and the standards imposed under §32.010 *et seq.*

1 The HDD process begins with “mobilization” which occurs upon the OPRD property.
2 Mobilization activities include tree removal, installation of tree protection fencing, installation of a
3 temporary construction sound mitigation wall, implementation of erosion control measures, setup
4 and positioning of the HDD construction equipment, and installation of the HDD conductor
5 casing. These activities are estimated to take approximately 2 weeks and are to occur between
6 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. Monday through Friday and 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on Saturday. Rec. 8534-36.

7 After mobilization, the first phase of HDD begins with a pilot bore drilled with a steerable
8 bit which will travel the length of the entire installation area. The second phase of construction
9 inserts a reamer through the pilot bore hole multiple times to increase the bore diameter to a size
10 suitable to accept the designate pipeline. Bentonite drilling mud (also referred to as “drilling
11 fluid”) is then circulated and pumped into the bore hole throughout the pilot bore and reaming
12 processes, which is intended to keep the bore hole open, allows the excavated material to be
13 removed. Rec. 8537.

14 Once the bore hole operation is complete, LOT will commence the third phase of the HDD
15 process known as the “pullback” phase. Here, the 42-inch RWP is pulled from the bore hole on
16 the east side of the Willamette River with equipment located at the HDD entry staging area on the
17 OPRD property near Mapleton Driver. The pipe will be pulled into the bore hole over a single
18 24-to 48-hour period, during which construction activities must occur around-the-clock to
19 minimize the risk of the pipe becoming stuck within the bore hole. A special work-hour variance is
20 required for this and LOT promises to notify local residents that they will be working 48 straight
21 hours, at least 2 weeks prior to commencing the pullback operation. Rec. 8537.

22 After the pipe is installed for the complete length of the tunnel, the pipe will then be
23 grouted in place. The entry and exit sites will then vacuumed, cleaned and restored. The heavy
24 equipment will be disassembled and removed. These demobilization activities are anticipated to
25 take approximately 1 week, and will mark the end of the HDD process. LOT has determined that
26 the HDD process is so loud, it has volunteered to build a sound barrier wall to reduce the noise

1 impact on the Robinwood Neighborhood. Rec. 8537.

2 DEA's technical memoranda promises that there is only a small risk associated with the
3 HDD process, known as hydrofracture. This can occur when the drilling fluid pressure exceeds
4 the strength and confining stress of the soil surrounding the bore hole. The excess pressure
5 fractures the soil around the bore hole, allowing drilling fluid (a slurry of water and bentonite clay)
6 to escape. The DEA memos further assert that this risk is limited to the first several hundred feet
7 of the HDD alignment, from the entry location on the OPRD property near Mapleton Drive where
8 the depth of the bore hole in relation to the ground surface could result in drilling fluid pressure
9 exceeding the soil pressure. However, because the remaining distance of the HDD will be drilled
10 through high-strength rock at a significant depth, the DEA memos state this creates a very low risk
11 of hydrofracture. LOT further states that mitigation measures will be employed to ensure that
12 hydrofracture does not occur. Rec. 8538.

13 Lastly, the DEA memos examine the HDD process in light of the approval standards and
14 restrictive mandates of C.32. C.32's restrictions are triggered by construction, including the
15 installation of utility corridors, within properties which contain protected water resources.
16 Because C.32 seeks to prevent and/or reduce disturbances caused by construction, the DEA
17 memos define the term "disturbance," and explain how the HDD process limits disturbance. The
18 DEA firm quotes West Linn's Planning Director who opined the following in a memo he wrote in
19 2010:

20 "Disturb: man-made changes to the existing physical status of the land, which are
21 made in connection with development that would result in the destruction, damage,
22 or removal of vegetation; or the compaction or contamination of the soil, not
23 including stormwater run-off or the routine maintenance of the property consistent
24 with CDC Chapter 32." Rec. 8411.

24 Using this definition as guidance as to what constitutes a disturbance, the DEA memos
25 address the impact of the HDD process on vegetation, soil compaction, contamination and impact
26 to wetlands. While the memos acknowledge that Chapter 32 of the West Linn's CDC applies, the

1 memos fail to quote the express language of C.32. Ultimately the DEA memos determined that
2 there is minimal environmental impact to MSY Park and the OPRD lots and further that the HDD
3 process does not constitute a disturbance under C. 32, because the depth of the RWP allegedly
4 avoids all water resources within both properties.

5 **6. Installation of the Finished Water Pipeline and the Adverse Effects to**
6 **Businesses On Highway 43.**

7 Beginning from the WTP the Finished Water Pipeline ("FWP"), travels again down
8 Mapleton Driver to Highway 43 and ends at the intersection of Mapleton and Highway 43 ("OR
9 43"). This FWP is 1,850 linear feet and 48-inches in diameter. Construction for these portions of
10 pipeline will be performed by one contractor and will occur during work hours which are 7:00 a.m.
11 to 7:00 p.m., Monday through Friday and 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Saturdays. The method of
12 installation is "open-cut construction." Rec. 8535.

13 Open-cut construction will not exceed 150 feet on any given day. It will begin by the
14 contractor bringing all the needed construction equipment and materials to the work area and saw
15 cutting the pavement to a width of about 5-7 feet. A track mounted excavator will excavate the
16 trench and the material created will be placed in a dump truck and hauled offsite for disposal. The
17 trench will then be prepared to install the pipe which will be delivered and installed by the joints of
18 each section being welded together and subsequently inspected and tested. The trench will then
19 be backfilled up to the pavement section and a temporary asphalt will be installed until enough
20 exists to replace with permanent asphalt pavement. Rec. 8538-39.

21 The duration of this construction is anticipated to last four (4) months during which 50
22 linear feet of pipeline will be installed per day. Final street restoration will be a separate
23 construction activity which will follow several weeks after the daily pipeline activities are
24 finalized. The contractor must abide by all public and emergency access required by Conditions
25 2, 4, 12, 13 and 15, Rec. 185-6; 195, which are in part also provided in LOT's Construction
26 Management Plan. Rec. 8539.

1 Construction upon Hwy 43 includes the construction of approximately 5,200 linear feet of
2 48-inch-diameter open-cut pipeline which will begin at the intersection of Mapleton Drive and
3 Hwy 43 and will continue on Hwy 43 to the West Linn city limits immediately north of Arbor
4 Drive. This construction will only occur during the nighttime hours of 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. allegedly
5 to decrease traffic-related impacts and keep the construction duration to a minimum, Rec. 8535.
6 This construction is anticipated to occur between June 2014 and August 2015 and last for
7 approximately 5 months. Construction activities include mobilization, pipe installation, site
8 restoration, and demobilization Rec. 8540.

9 The amount of construction-truck trip volume was calculated by LOT to be as follows:

- 10 1) Dump truck and large truck trip volume for the HDD process, explained
11 above, will last approximately six (6) months and two (2) weeks and is
12 estimated at twelve (12) average daily truck trips (ADTs) which includes
the potential ten (10) ADTs for typical contractor activity. Rec. 8541.
- 13 2) However, during the pull-back period approximately 144 ADTs will occur
14 over a continuous 24 to 48-hour period handle excess drilling mud. Rec.
15 8541.
- 16 3) The Mapleton Drive installation will cause approximately thirty six (36)
ADTs of dump trucks. Rec. 8541.
- 17 4) On OR 43 there will be approximately 76 ADTs per day or eight (8) truck
18 trips per hour during a typical 9-hour construction work period (8 p.m. to 5
a.m.). Rec. 8541-8542.

19 These construction phases are not cumulative. Traffic to the construction site will be
20 routed from Interstate 205 (I-205) to Hwy 43 northbound to the construction area on Hwy 43 or
21 Mapleton Drive. Construction traffic from the site will be routed from the construction area on
22 Hwy 43 or Mapleton Drive via Hwy 43 southbound to I-205. Additional construction traffic will
23 be routed from I-205 to OR 43 northbound to the construction area on OR 43 or Mapleton Drive.
24 Construction traffic from the site will be routed from the construction area on OR43 or Mapleton
25 Drive via OR43 northbound to McVey Avenue and then via Stafford Road to I-205. Rec. 8543.

26 LOT asserted below that there are 24 commercial driveways along the pipeline alignment

1 on OR 43 in West Linn. Businesses or shopping centers with multiple access driveways, or an
2 access driveway from a side street will not require additional coordination, because the
3 construction zone will impact only one driveway at a time and side street access will be maintained
4 at all times. Of the businesses that have only one access driveway on Highway 43, only two
5 businesses may be impacted by the pipeline construction as a result of the 8 p.m. to 5 a.m.
6 construction hours. These two businesses are Burgerville and Philadelphia's Steaks and Hoagies,
7 which close at 11 p.m. and 9 p.m., respectively. LOT must maintain constant access to these two
8 driveways during the period that construction work hours overlap with business hours outside of
9 construction hours, full access to all commercial driveways will be restored. Rec. 8544-8545.

10 In addition to LOT's mitigation plans, the Robinwood Neighborhood Association
11 ("RHA") prepared a mitigation plan, Rec. 473, and the Robinwood Shopping Center, LLC,
12 submitted a financial impact report from Dr. Michael Wilkerson Rec. 1308-32, which explains and
13 addresses destination business, impulse business, and the adverse economic impact with respect to
14 impulse business that will stem from LOT's pipeline installation along OR43 under AP-03-12. Dr.
15 Michael Wilkerson's report also explained the flaws in the methodology implemented by DKS
16 analysis used when approving AP-03-12. Rec. 476-77.

17 Respondent found that LOT allegedly had taken "adequate measures * * * to mitigate for
18 the possible adverse effects of the installation of the utility on surrounding properties and uses."
19 Rec. 192. Respondent found that the following mitigation measures promised by LOT with its
20 Construction Management Plan ("CMP") were, in part, adequate to address the adverse impacts
21 and justify approval of AP-03-12:

- 22 1) Use of only two haul routes to and from the WTP and pipeline
23 construction areas.
- 24 2) The haul routes are Hwy 43 and McVey/Stafford Rd to and from 1-205.
- 25 3) Provide a 5-foot wide pedestrian and bicycle access way around the
26 work zone.
- 4) Re-open and maintain fully functional streets (i.e., no road closures or

equipment on the roadway) outside of work hours.

5) Maintain at least one driveway or access for vehicles to every business that has operating hours which overlap with nighttime construction hours.

6) Work with Tri-Met to provide continued public transportation service on Highway 43 and to maintain or relocate bus stops as required to maintain service.

7) Bus all craft-level workers to and from all construction work areas on Mapleton Drive, Kenthorpe Way, and Highway 43 to minimize traffic impacts.

8) Construction vehicle traffic to be approximately evenly split between Mapleton Drive and Kenthorpe Way to decrease the traffic impact on any single street.

Respondent also found that LOT's proposed business promotion plan to help keep the Robinwood Business district "Open for Business" during construction was a valid and sufficient mitigation measure. This plan will keep all lanes of traffic and all accesses onto Hwy 43 open during the business hours of 5 am to 8 pm. and provide custom signage to help guide customers to businesses that are open during construction hours. Further, Respondent also imposed the "Shop Local" Marketing Plan to be distributed by LOT to the Chair of the Robinwood Neighborhood Association, all businesses located along Highway 43 within the Robinwood neighborhood boundaries, and the City Manager. Rec. 196.

7. **The Basis for the City Council's Approval of AP-12-02 and AP-12-03.**

Respondent addresses some general concerns raised by West Linn residents and businesses about the impacts the construction would have on the community. The Council found that any impacts were temporary and sufficiently mitigated by LOT's series of details plans. Rec. 185.

Respondent went on to examine each construction stage and found that LOT's plan and methods met each and every approval criteria imposed by the CDC which included Chapters 60, 56 27, 28; and 32.

Respondent also identified the specific ways in which LOT's project benefits West Linn. Respondent recited the following to explain that AP-12-02 and AP-12-03 are consistent with the "overall needs of the community." Critical to the analysis of whether there was sufficient benefit to

1 West Linn to overcome the extreme hardship that construction would impose on the City was a \$5
2 million dollar cash payment that the applicant offered to the City to “sweeten the deal.”

3 Respondent asserted the following with regard to this \$5 million dollar “fee” that it has imposed
4 upon LOT:

5 Further, the \$5 million dollar fee for use of right-of-way within the city was
6 not part of the proposal that the Planning Commission considered. This fee
7 can be used for water system improvements to meet needs identified in the
8 Water System Master Plan. These water system improvements will benefit
9 the entire City of West Linn, including both residents and businesses.

10 * * *

11 Condition of Approval 16 is imposed to ensure the City and the Partnership
12 execute an intergovernmental agreement securing this fee. To aid in
13 meeting the needs of the Water System Master Plan, the applicant is also
14 conveying its 24-inch transmission line along Highway 43, and other
15 abandoned lines as required by Conditions of Approval 5 and 19. For the
16 reasons stated above, the City Council finds that with additional conditions,
17 the pipelines will be consistent with the "overall needs of the community."

18 Rec. 199-200. The City found that AP-12-02 and AP-12-03 provide benefits to the City of West
19 Linn and the Robinwood neighborhood. Rec. 7311-3; 8283-5. Most of these items constitute
20 mitigation, not benefits. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the City Council found that it was only
21 with additional conditions (including the \$5,000,000 cash payment) that the pipeline would be
22 consistent with the overall needs of the community.

23 **II. PETITIONERS’ STANDING.**

24 Petitioners appeared and participated, by way of written and oral testimony, in the
25 proceedings regarding AP-12-03 before both Respondent and the West Linn Planning
26 Commission (“PC”). Based on the foregoing, Petitioners have standing to appeal to LUBA.

27 **III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION**

28 The City Council’s final decision to approve a major utility is a statutory land use decision
29 subject to LUBA’s jurisdiction. ORS 197.015(10).

1 **IV. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR**

2 **A. First Assignment of Error**

3 **West Linn City Council Erred by Finding Compliance with CDC §60.070(A)(3) on the Basis**
4 **of a Condition of Approval that Requires the Applicant to Pay a One-Time Ad Hoc Impact**
5 **Fee in the Amount of \$5 Million for the use of West Linn’s Public Right-of-Way, Because**
6 **this Type of Ad Hoc Impact Fee is Prohibited as a Matter of Law.**

7 **1. Issue.**

8 CDC §60.070(A)(3) requires the decision-maker to make a finding that “[t]he granting of
9 the proposal will provide for a facility that is consistent with the overall needs of the community.”
10 Although the concept of “benefits” is not directly used within Chapter 60, the concept nevertheless
11 became a benchmark in the determination as to whether these two applications met the “overall
12 needs of the community.”

13 The Planning Commission discussed the term “benefit,” and found it to be an appropriate
14 standard to use to determine whether AP-12-02 and AP-120-3 complied with the approval criteria
15 of Chapter 60. The City Council, in turn, also relied on the concept of “benefits” when evaluating
16 CDC §60.070(A)(3). The City Council, however, determined that the application meet the overall
17 needs of the community in part because the applicant agreed – at the last minute - to sweeten the
18 deal by offering a one-time payment to the City in the amount of \$5 million dollars. Cleverly
19 labeled a “Community Impact Fee,” the payment is imposed within Condition No. 16, which reads
20 as follows:

21 16. Community Impact Fee. The applicant shall enter into an
22 intergovernmental agreement with West Linn *in lieu of a franchise fee or*
23 *other licensing fee* for the use of public streets in West Linn. That
24 agreement shall require a one-time payment of \$5 million to be used for
25 West Linn water system improvements to the meet the overall needs of the
26 community.⁵ (Emphasis Added).

27 Rec. 249.

28 Respondent asserts in its findings that the fee constitutes a “benefit” to the citizens of West

29 _____
30 ⁵ Note that the city returns to the proper interpretation of “overall needs” as opposed to “needs of overall
31 community” to attempt to justify the imposition of this purported impact fee.

1 Linn under CDC §60.070(A)(3). The findings state:

2 Further, the 5 million dollar fee for use of the right-of-way within the City
3 was not part of the proposal that the Planning Commission considered.
4 The fee can be used for water system improvements to meet the needs
5 identified in the Water System Master Plan. These water system
6 improvements benefit the entire City of West Linn, including both residents
7 and businesses.

8 * * * * *

9 For the reasons stated above the City Council finds that with additional
10 conditions, the pipeline will be consistent with the overall needs of the
11 community.

12 However, for reasons discussed below, the one-time fee is unlawful, and cannot be
13 lawfully collected, let alone considered a “public benefit” that “meets the overall needs of the
14 community” as that phrase is used in CDC §60.070(A)(3). Moreover, the city sets bad precedent
15 by encouraging developers to agree to pay cash payments to the city general fund as an additional
16 incentive to help get projects approved.

17 **2. Standard of Review.**

18 This assignment of error presents a question of state law and of ordinance interpretation.
19 Petitioner alleges an error of law, and LUBA reviews for errors of law. ORS 197.835(9)(a)(D).
20 The City is not entitled to deference to interpretations of its ordinance because its interpretation is
21 inconsistent with both state law and the express wording of the City Charter and land use
22 ordinances. ORS 197.829(1).

23 **3. Argument.**

24 As an initial matter, the implicit interpretation made by Respondent, that a 5 million dollar
25 “impact fee” can constitute evidence that the overall needs of the community is met by the facility,
26 is wrong as a matter of law. By the plain wording of CDC 60.070(A)(3), it is the *facility itself* that
has to meet the overall needs of the community, not any associated bribe that might accompany the
land use application. In a related context, LUBA recognized that the phrase “public need for a use”

1 is a difficult matter to define. *Ruef v. City of Stayton*, 7 Or LUBA 219 (1983). Nonetheless, LUBA
2 stated in *Ruef* that the focus is on the need for that *use*, not a need for the incidental benefits or
3 mitigation (such as landscaping and buffering) that a proposed use may provide. For this reason,
4 the City errs for considering the 5 million dollar fee to be a community benefit supporting a finding
5 of overall need of the community.

6 Secondly, there is no legal authority for the City to charge an *ad hoc* impact fee to a
7 developer. The very notion that a city can charge developers an *ad hoc* monetary “fee” in
8 exchange for a development permit seems to be unprecedented in Oregon. Legislatively imposed
9 impact fees are authorized by statute, ORS 223.297 *et seq.*, and this Oregon statute is preemptive on
10 the subject of impact fees to offset development impacts. In this regard, Respondent claims that
11 the \$5 million fee is intended to be used for “West Linn water system improvements.” That falls
12 within the definition an “improvement fee” as that term is used in ORS 223.297 *et seq.* ORS
13 223.299(2) defines an “Improvement fee” as “a fee for costs associated with capital improvements
14 to be constructed.” ORS 223.299(4), in turn, defines a “system development charge” as follows:

15 (4)(a) “System development charge” means a reimbursement fee, an
16 improvement fee or a combination thereof assessed or collected at
17 the time of increased usage of a capital improvement or issuance of
18 a development permit, building permit or connection to the capital
improvement. * * * * *

19 For this reason, the \$5 million fee is an unlawful system development charge.

20 If the “Community Impact Fee” is considered to be some sort of *ad-hoc* development fee,
21 then it violates the nexus requirement set forth in *Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n*, 483 U.S.
22 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987). The City cannot simply demand that a developer
23 pay a one-time 5 million dollar fee to help pay for water system improvements in change for the
24 right to use city streets for water utilities, because there is no nexus between the impact and the
25 exaction.

26 In this case, Respondent seems to be justifying the “impact fee” on the basis that it

1 constitutes compensation “for the use of right of way within the city.” Rec. 200. However, the
2 City has limited authority to regulate and grant the use of its public right-of-ways (“ROW”) in
3 exchange for a fee. The permitted methods include the use of a (1) a franchise, (2) a permit /
4 license, or (3) an intergovernmental agreement by way of local ordinance and state statute. West
5 Linn Charter. 9.030.

6 Viewed in this light, the so-called “Community Impact Fee” is really nothing more than a
7 franchise fee, despite any effort by the City to label it as something else. *Whitback v. Funk*, 140 Or
8 70, 73-4, 12 P2d 1019 (1932). In this regard, the label that the City places on the “fee” is of no
9 consequence; the legality of the fee is determined by its nature, scope, and effect - not by any label
10 attached to it. *Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. Washington County*, 181 Or. App. 369, 45 P.3d 966
11 (2002), *rev den.*, 334 Or. 492, 52 P.3d 1057 (2002), *cert den*, 538 U.S. 906 (2003) (Court ignored
12 attempt by County to label a fee as a “tax.”). The proposed fee meets the definition of a franchise
13 fee as that term is understood in Oregon law. The West Linn Code even defines the term “franchise”
14 in a manner that is directly on point:

15 **9.010 Definition.** Franchise. A grant of authority by agreement and
16 contract and ordinance allowing the use of public rights of way
17 within the City for utility, solid waste and recycling collection, and
similar purposes.

18 To make matters worse, the decision grants LOT the right to use streets in West Linn in
19 perpetuity. However, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that a grant of a franchise in perpetuity
20 is against public policy and is therefore void. *City of Joseph v. Joseph Water Works Co.*, 57 Or.
21 586, 111 P. 864 (1910), 112 P. 1083 (1911); *Newsom v. City of Rainier*, 94 Or 199, 185 P 296
22 (1919). Recognizing the holdings in *Joseph* and *Newsom*, the Oregon legislature has limited
23 franchise fees and related permits and “privileges” to a 20-year duration. ORS 221.460. For this
24 reason, both the condition of approval and the fee are void. *Compare Skydive Oregon, Inc. v.*
25 *Clackamas County*, 25 Or LUBA 294, 308 (1993), *affirmed in part, remanded in part*, 122 Or App
26 342, 857 P2d 879 (1993) (discussion of impermissible conditions); *Wheeler v. Marion County*, 20

1 Or LUBA 379, 385 (1990) (condition of approval must have some reasonable connection with the
2 proposed project).

3 As a result, a substantial basis for the finding that the “overall need of the community” is
4 met is also without legal merit. LUBA must remand the case to determine if the overall needs of
5 the community are met without the illegal 5 million dollar fee.

6 The “Community Impact Fee” can also not be considered a “permit” or “license.” By
7 charter, the City of West Linn has the authority “to regulate the use of rights of way by ordinance,
8 franchise, license, permit, or combination thereof.” However, the City has not adopted any
9 ordinance which we are aware that requires a permit or license accompanying a one-time “impact
10 fee” on persons seeking to use right of way for public utilities. The City seems to think it can
11 create and/or impose a fee out of thin air, but its power is limited by both the Charter and state law.
12 At the very least, the City would need to first adopt an ordinance setting forth a licensing or
13 permitting scheme. Any such scheme would need to contain standards that constrain the
14 discretion of the official who issues the license of permit. *City of Portland v. Traymor*, 94 Or 418,
15 183 P 933 (1919).

16 Furthermore, as explained in detailed below, LOT is a municipally-owned utility which is
17 expressly exempt by state statute from the type of regulation imposed by Respondent. Accordingly,
18 the only lawful method under which the Respondent could receive \$5 million from LOT in
19 exchange for LOT’s use of West Linn’s public streets would be by a conveyance or lease under
20 ORS 271.310.⁶

21 However, ORS 271.310 limits LOT’s use of West Linn’s ROWs to 99 years. For this
22

23 ⁶ **ORS 271.310 Transfer or lease of real property owned or controlled by political subdivision;**
24 **procedure in case of qualified title; notice; rules.** (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section and subject
25 to subsection (3) of this section, whenever any political subdivision possesses or controls real property not needed for
26 public use, or whenever the public interest may be furthered, a political subdivision may sell, exchange, convey or
lease for any period not exceeding 99 years all or any part of the political subdivision’s interest in the property to a
governmental body or private individual or corporation. The consideration for the transfer or lease may be cash or real
property, or both.

1 reasons, the grant of use of the ROWs in perpetuity in exchange for a one-time \$5 million payment
2 cannot qualify as a sale or lease. In any event, Respondent never followed the proper procedure
3 for the sale or lease of West Linn’s public property required under ORS § 271.310.

4 As mentioned above, Respondent’s only legal authority to regulate the City’s public
5 ROWs comes from the West Linn Municipal Code (“WLMC”) Chapter 9, entitled *Franchises* and
6 from Oregon Revised Statutes §221.410-§221-490, entitled *Authority To Regulate Local Matters;*
7 *Licensing And Taxation.*

8 In addition to defining what constitutes a franchise, Chapter 9 also provides the following:

9 **9.020 Authority.** The City has the authority pursuant to Section 6 of the
10 Charter⁷ and ORS Chapters 221, 459 and 459A to issue franchises allowing
11 the use of public rights of way for utility and other purposes. The City
12 Council may grant exclusive or non-exclusive franchises for [lists services]
13 and other services. Franchises shall be granted by a franchise agreement
14 approved by ordinance.

13 **9.030 Restriction on Use of Rights of Way.** The City has jurisdiction to
14 control public rights of way within the City and may regulate the use of
15 rights of way by ordinance, franchise, license, permit or any combination
16 thereof.

15 WLMC 9.020 & .030.

16 WLMC 9.020 derives its authority from the Oregon Revised Statutes and the City Charter.
17 However, the only grant of power that expressly addresses municipal power to regulate utilities
18 within ROWs is found at ORS 221.410-221-470. Within these sections, the only applicable grant
19 of authority pertinent to this matter is within ORS 221.415, ORS 221.420. These statutes provide
20 the following:

21 **ORS 221.415: Municipal rights of way: use by electric utilities; power of**
22 **city to regulate and impose charges.**

23 ⁷ The City of West Linn’s Charter, Section 6., entitled *Distribution of Powers*, is a generalized grant of
24 power to the City Council, but as explained herein, this power is confined and restricted as per the Municipal Code and
the Revised Statutes. Section 6 provides the following:

25 Except as this Charter prescribes otherwise and as the Oregon
26 Constitution reserves municipal legislative power to the voters of the
City, all powers of the City are vested in the Council.

1 Recognizing the independent basis of legislative authority granted to
2 cities in this state by municipal charters, the Legislative Assembly
3 intends by ORS 221.415 (Municipal rights of way), 221.420
4 (Municipal regulation of public utilities), 221.450 (Privilege tax on
5 public utilities operating without franchise) and 261.305 (General
6 powers of district) to reaffirm the authority of cities to regulate use of
7 municipally owned rights of way and to impose charges upon
8 publicly owned suppliers of electrical energy, as well as privately
9 owned suppliers for the use of such rights of way.

6 ORS 221.415. *See also* ORS 221.420(1)(a)(c)&(d).⁸ Of important note in ORS 221.420(1)(a) is

7
8 ⁸ **ORS 221.420: Municipal regulation of public utilities.**

9 (1) As used in this section:

10 (a) *Public utility* has the meaning for that term provided in ORS§757.005 (Definitions).

11 * * *

12 (c) Council means the common council, city council, commission or any other
13 governing body of any municipality wherein the property of the public utility is
14 located.

15 (d) Municipality means any town, city or other municipal government wherein
16 property of the public utility is located.

17 * * *

18 (2) Subject to ORS 758.025 (Relocation of utilities in highway right of way), a city
19 may:

20 (a) Determine by contract or prescribe by ordinance or otherwise, the terms and
21 conditions, including payment of charges and fees, upon which any *public utility*,
22 electric cooperative, peoples utility district or heating company, or Oregon
23 Community Power, may be permitted to occupy the streets, highways or other
24 public property within such city and exclude or eject any public utility or heating
25 company therefrom.

26 (b) Require any public utility, by ordinance or otherwise, to make such modifications,
additions and extensions to its physical equipment, facilities or plant or service
within such city as shall be reasonable or necessary in the interest of the public, and
designate the location and nature of all additions and extensions, the time within
which they must be completed, and all conditions under which they must be
constructed.

(c) Fix by contract, prescribe by ordinance, or in any other lawful manner, the rates,
charges or tolls to be paid to, or that may be collected by, any *public utility* or the
quality and character of each kind of product or service to be furnished or
rendered by any public utility furnishing any product or service within such city.
No schedule of rates, charges or tolls, fixed in the manner provided in this

1 its reference to ORS 757.005 for the definition of “public utility.” ORS 757.005 provides in
2 pertinent part the following:

3 **757.005: Definitions**

* * *

4 (1)(b) As used in this chapter, public utility does not include:

5 (A) *Any plant owned or operated by a municipality.* (Emphasis added).

6 ORS 757.005((1)(b)(A).

7 Respondent’s power to regulate West Linn’s ROWs is expressly limited under ORS
8 221.420(2)(a) to the regulation of public utilities, electric cooperatives, people’s utility districts or
9 heating companies, or Oregon Community Power. LOT clearly is neither an electric cooperative,
10 people’s utility district, heating company or part of Oregon Community Power. LOT, by
11 definition, is not a “public utility.” LOT is owned by the municipalities of Lake Oswego and
12 Tigard, therefore in accordance with ORS 221.420 (1)(a), by reference to ORS 757.005, LOT is
13 not a “public utility.”

14 Notwithstanding the actions of the Respondent, the clear intent of the Oregon legislature is
15 to empower City Councils to control how public utilities may be permitted to occupy their city’s
16 streets, highways or other public property and to also fix the rates, charges or tolls to be paid, or
17 collected. However, this power does not extend to those utilities, like LOT’s water pipeline
18 approved by AP-12-02 and 03, which are *municipally owned and operated.*⁹

19 paragraph, shall be so fixed for a longer period than five years. (emphasis added).

20 ⁹ The Oregon legislature enacted yet another statute that specifies a difference between municipally owned
21 and privately owned water utilities. ORS 758.300 *et seq.*, addresses utility regulation, primarily by county and state
owned utilities and provides in part, the following:

22 As used in ORS 758.300 to 758.320:

- 23 (1) “Commission” means the Public Utility Commission.
- 24 (2) “Community water supply system” means a water source and distribution system, whether
25 publicly or privately owned, that serves more than three residences or other users to whom
26 water is provided for public consumption, including but not limited to schools, farm labor
camps, industrial establishments, recreational facilities, restaurants, motels, mobile home
parks or group care homes.

1 Moreover, while the Respondent asserted that it can impose the \$5 million impact fee upon
2 LOT through an IGA, parties to an IGA can only contract with respect to those matters which they
3 *have authority to perform*. ORS §190.003; *see also Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland*, 352 Or.
4 648, 658-59; 290 P.3d 803, 809 (2012) (holding that although the OR CONST Art. XI Sec. 2
5 empowers municipalities with authority to enact substantive policies in areas also regulated by state
6 law, this does not permit a municipality to act in a manner "incompatible" with state law."); Or.
7 Op. Atty. Gen. OP-6444, 1992 WL 526788 (citing *Harrison v. Port of Cascade Locks*, 27 Or. App.
8 377, 556 P.2d 160 (1976) finding that a government lawfully cannot have "interests" that exceed
9 the authority and powers conferred and duties imposed on it by law).

10 ORS 190.003 *et seq.*, regulates intergovernmental agreements.¹⁰ While ORS 190.003 *et*
11 *seq.*, grants Respondent vast authority to contract, neither this statute nor any other grant of power,
12 enables Respondent to create terms or engage in obligations, via a contract, which it is otherwise
13 precluded from doing under state and federal law. *Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland, supra*. As
14 explained in detail above ORS §221.420(2)(a)&(b) preclude the Respondent from regulating LOT
15 because LOT does not fall into the exclusive list of entities subject to these regulations.

16
17 (3) "Water utility" means any corporation, company, individual or association of individuals,
18 or its lessees, trustees or receivers, that owns, operates, manages or controls all or a part of
19 any plant or equipment in this state for the production, transmission, delivery or furnishing
of water, directly or indirectly to or for the public, whether or not such plant or equipment
or part thereof is wholly within any town or city. "Water utility" does not include a
municipal corporation.

20 ¹⁰ ORS 190.003 provides:

21 **Definitions for ORS 190.003 to 190.130**As used in ORS 190.003 to 190.130, unit of local
22 government includes a county, city, district or other public corporation, commission,
authority or entity organized and existing under statute or city or county charter.

23 ORS 190.010 provides:

24 **Local government Authority; Intergovernmental Agreements.** A unit of local
25 government may enter into a written agreement with any other unit or units of local
26 government for the performance of any or all functions and activities that a party to the
agreement, its officers or agencies, have authority to perform. The agreement may provide
for the performance of a function or activity. * * *.

1 Accordingly, the Respondent cannot - by terms of an IGA - require LOT to make a one-time
2 impact fee of \$5 million for use of West Linn's ROWs.

3 Oregon's Attorney General has examined issues regarding land use by municipally-owned
4 utilities and determined that these utilities are considered to have the same legal standing as a
5 person or corporation. Or. Op. Atty. Gen. 24 (Or.A.G.), 1962 WL 77397 (addressing questions with
6 respect to municipally-owned utilities under ORS §758.010). Thus, the only lawful avenue
7 available to the Respondent to charge LOT \$5 million dollars for the use of West Linn's ROWs is
8 ORS § 271.310, which provides for the transfer or lease of real property owned or controlled by
9 political subdivision.

10 The definitions applicable to Chapter 271 are contained within ORS 271.005, which
11 provides the following:

12 As used in ORS §271.005 to 271.540:

13 (1) Governing body means the board or body in which the
14 general legislative power of a political subdivision is vested.

15 (2) Governmental body means the State of Oregon, a political
subdivision, the United States of America or an agency thereof.

16 (3) Political subdivision means any local government unit,
17 including, but not limited to, a county, city, town, port, dock
18 commission or district, that exists under the laws of Oregon and has
power to levy and collect taxes.

19 ORS 271.005 (1), (2)&(3).

20 ORS 271.310 provides in pertinent part, the following:

21 (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section and subject to
22 subsection (3) of this section, whenever any political subdivision possesses
23 or controls real property not needed for public use, or whenever the public
24 interest may be furthered, a political subdivision may sell, exchange,
convey or lease for any period not exceeding 99 years all or any part of the
political subdivision's interest in the property to a governmental body or
private individual or corporation. The consideration for the transfer or
lease may be cash or real property, or both.

25 * * *

26 (4) Unless the governing body of a political subdivision determines under

1 subsection (1) of this section that the public interest may be furthered, real
2 property needed for public use by any political subdivision owning or
3 controlling the property may not be sold, exchanged, conveyed or leased
4 under the authority of ORS 271.300 (Application and administration of
5 ORS 271.300 to 271.360) to 271.360 (Lease requirements), except that it
6 may be exchanged for property that is of equal or superior useful value for
7 public use. Any such property not immediately needed for public use may
8 be leased if, in the discretion of the governing body having control of the
9 property, the property will not be needed for public use within the period
10 of the lease. * * *.

11 ORS 271.310(1)&(4). Lastly, ORS 271.360 dictates all lease requirements under ORS 271.310, to
12 require the following with respect to the payment of ad valorem taxes:

13 Every lease entered into pursuant to ORS 271.310 shall be authorized
14 by ordinance or order of the body executing the same and shall provide
15 terms and conditions as may be fixed and determined by the governing
16 body executing the lease. The lease may provide that the lessee shall
17 pay ad valorem taxes assessable against the leased property, or that the
18 political subdivision shall pay these taxes, in which latter event the
19 anticipated amount of taxes shall be taken into consideration in fixing
20 the rental charge.

21 ORS 271.360.

22 Respondent has not followed the requirements under ORS 271.310(1) because it has
23 conveyed to LOT a perpetual interest in West Linn's ROWs when the statute expressly limits the
24 time period under which LOT may maintain that interest is limited to 99 years. Accordingly, if
25 LUBA agrees with Petitioners, then under ORS 271.310(4), the property should not have been sold,
26 exchanged, conveyed or leased under the authority of ORS 271.300.

Moreover, the record is void of the requirements imposed under ORS 271.360, for clear
terms and conditions between West Linn and LOT for LOT's use of West Linn's ROWs. The
record is also void of any determination of how the ad valorem taxes will be assessed, another
requirement under ORS 271.360. The only term that exist in the record is that LOT will pay \$5
million for (the impermissible) perpetual use of the ROWs.

Thus, the terms of use under Condition No. 16 violate ORS 221.420(2)(a) (by regulating a
public utility when there is no authority under Oregon Law to do so); ORS 190.010 (by contracting
under an IGA for terms that the Respondent has no authority to do); ORS 271.310 (by conveying

1 West Linn's ROWs in perpetuity when the time period is restricts to 99 years); and ORS 271.360
2 (by failing to impose terms a condition of the lease/conveyance terms including the specifics
3 regarding payment of the ad valorem tax). Accordingly, Petitioners respectfully requests that
4 LUBA remand Respondent's land use decision.

5 Lastly, Petitioners assert that under common law principals, public rights-of-way belong to
6 the community. *Anderson v. Thomas*, 144 Or 572; 26 P2d 60 (1933); *Parker v. City of Silverton*,
7 109 Or. 298; 220 P. 139 (1923) (The public streets within the limits of an incorporated city or town
8 are a part of the public highways of the state and belong to the whole people of the state.”).

9 Accordingly, the City serves in the role of a trustee when it manages the City's ROWs. A “Trustee”
10 is defined as “[o]ne who, having legal title to the property, holds it in trust for the benefit of another
11 and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (7th ed. 1999)

12 The duties of trustees have been said, in general terms, to be: ‘to protect and preserve the trust
13 property, and to see that it is employed solely for the benefit of the *cestui que* trust [beneficiary].”

14 II BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3336 (3d ed. 1914). While the trustees possess general power to
15 lease trust property, the lease is for the advantage and protection of the beneficiary. 90 C.J.S. Trusts
16 § 472 (2002).

17 Furthermore, free-market compensation for the use of property is not only based on the
18 cost of that property, but also on the value of the property to the user and the price of the nearest
19 available substitute. Therefore, LOT's gross revenues are one acceptable way of measuring the
20 value of the use of the ROWs. Thus, what should also be calculated when determining the value of
21 the property, is the costs savings that LOT enjoys by using West Linn's ROWs. By LOT's own
22 admission, in choosing to use the City of West Linn as its water treatment infrastructure, LOT
23 enjoys the following:

- 24 1) An alleged savings to LO of \$63 million in annual costs over the next
25 25 years and \$23 million in one-time capital savings.
- 26 2) A rate increase to LO of 56% over the next 25 years instead of 148%

1 increase that LO would face without a partner.

- 2 3) A rate increase for Tigard of only 113% over 25 years as opposed to not
3 partnering with LO which would cause the rates to increase by
4 128% -269%.
- 4 4) Securing more water rights for LO;
- 5 5) Constructing of an intertie between Tigard and the Washington County
6 Supply that would save Tigard approximately \$300,000.00 in annual
7 operating costs. Rec. 9325-9327.

8 Based on the foregoing and in the alternative, if LUBA finds that Condition No. 16
9 imposed by West Linn is not contrary to established law and therefore does not require reversal,
10 then Petitioners respectfully request the LUBA remand this matter for the proper calculation of the
11 true fair market value of the use of West Linn's ROWs (for 99 years). For such calculation
12 Petitioners request that LUBA instruct the Respondent to take into consideration the
13 self-proclaimed cost benefits gained by the Cities of Lake Oswego and Tigard, by using West Linn
14 as their water treatment and transmission infrastructure. Petitioners also assert that the decrease in
15 aesthetic changes that West Linn will suffer from both the permanent structures and the excessive
16 disturbance from construction -will not be suffered by either (lessee) City and this too should be
17 calculated into the cost or value of leasing and occupying West Linn's ROWs.

18 **B. Second Assignment of Error.**

19 **The West Linn City Council erred in adopting LOT's assertions that the installation of the**
20 **RWP beneath MSY Park and adjacent OPRD lots, by the use of horizontal direction drilling**
21 **does not "impact" or "disturb" those properties and therefore does not trigger the**
22 **restrictive construction conditions imposed by CDC §32.010 et seq.**

23 **1. Issue.**

24 Respondent accepted LOT's explanation and conclusion, as set forth in the Facts
25 section, *supra*, that the installation of approximately 900 linear feet of RWP by horizontal
26 directional drilling ("HDD") within Mary S. Young State Park ("MSY Park") and adjacent Oregon

1 Parks and Recreation lots (“OPRD lots”),¹¹ has no impact on and does not disturb the water
2 resource areas (“WRA”) located within those properties. Respondent further found that the HDD
3 process avoids the need to conduct a mitigation plan under CDC §32.010 *et seq.*, Respondent
4 specifically found the following:

5 The applicant's proposal avoids impacts to the Willamette River and WRAs
6 in Mary S. Young Park by tunneling beneath these areas. The record
7 contains a technical memorandum prepared by ecologists which
8 demonstrates that the HDD that will occur 65 feet below grade when it
9 travels under the ordinary high watermark of the Willamette River and
10 approximately 7 feet below grade, the shallowest depth of the bore, when it
11 approaches the HDD staging area in the northern OPRD property-outside of
12 all WRAs. Therefore, the HDD boring phase of the project will not disturb
13 the soils, wetlands, and vegetation associated with nearby WRAs.

14 Rec. 187. Respondent further addresses the findings of LOT’s technical memorandum with
15 respect to the requirements under C.32 and ultimately, but incorrectly, conclude the following:

16 WRA Disturbance -Chapter 32 limits the amount of disturbance allowed in a
17 WRA. The evidence in the record establishes that using HDD construction
18 methods well below (34 to roughly 60 feet) a WRA will have no effect on the
19 resources protected by the WRA. Protected WRA's include the drainage
20 channel, creek, wetlands, and the required setback and transition areas that
21 exist above ground while the wetland component of a WRA can extend
22 below-ground to a depth that is, "inundated or saturated by surface or ground
23 water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
24 circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for
25 life in saturated soil conditions,"¹² This definition provides a limit upon
26 which to measure the below-ground extent of wetlands and therefore, WRAs.

18 ¹¹ LOT asserts that it “temporarily disturbs” the OPRD lots, but only with respect to vegetation. Accordingly,
19 LOT provides a mitigation plan for re-vegetation of the lots. However, as explained below, LUBA has previously
20 found that the construction process for the installation of pipeline is not a “temporary disturbance,” but instead
21 permanent in nature. Therefore, the length and width restrictions under §32.050(F) apply to LOT’s HDD project to
22 install the RWP within the OPRD lots (as well as MSY Park) *See Horsey v City of West Linn*, 59 Or LUBA 185 (2009).

23 ¹² Here, Respondent provided Footnote. 4 which states:

24 CDC 2.030, Wetlands: "Those areas inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
25 frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
26 prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas. Wetlands are those areas identified and
delineated by a qualified wetland specialist as set forth in the 1987 Corps of Engineers Wetland
Delineation Manual. Wetlands do not include those artificial wetlands intentionally created from
non-wetland sites, including but not limited to irrigation and drainage ditches, grass-lined swales,
detention facilities, wastewater treatment facilities, farm ponds, and landscape amenities."

1 The applicant's plans demonstrate that their RWP alignment avoids WRAs by
2 going around (beneath) them and containing impacts to WRAs in Mapleton
3 Drive and Highway 43 to already disturbed areas of the right-of-way.
4 Therefore, the maximum disturbance limitations contained in Chapter 32 do
5 not apply.

6 Rec. 188. As discussed below, Respondent erred as a matter of law.

7 **2. Standard of Review.**

8 This assignment of error presents a question of ordinance interpretation. Petitioners allege
9 an error of law, and LUBA reviews for errors of law. ORS 197.835(9)(a)(D). ORS 197.829(1)
10 states a rule of deference owed by LUBA to certain local government's interpretation of its land
11 use policies. ORS 197.829(1) provides:

12 "The Land Use Board of Appeals shall affirm a local government's
13 interpretation of its comprehensive plan and land use regulations,
14 unless the board determines that the local government's
15 interpretation:

16 "(a) Is inconsistent with the express language of the comprehensive
17 plan or land use regulation;

18 "(b) Is inconsistent with the purpose for the comprehensive plan or
19 land use regulation;

20 "(c) Is inconsistent with the underlying policy that provides the
21 basis for the comprehensive plan or land use regulation; or

22 "(d) Is contrary to a state statute, land use goal or rule that the
23 comprehensive plan or land use regulation implements."

24 Pursuant to ORS 197.829, LUBA shall affirm a local government's interpretation of its
25 own land use regulations if it is "inconsistent with the express language of the comprehensive
26 plan or land use regulation[.]" ORS 197.829(1)(a). Whether a local government's interpretation is
"inconsistent with the express language" of its own land use regulations "depends on whether the
interpretation is plausible, given the interpretive principles that ordinarily apply to the construction
of ordinances under the rules of *PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries*, 317 Ore. 606, 610-12, 859
P.2d 1143 (1993), as modified by *State v. Gaines*, 346 Or. 160, 171-72, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009)".

1 *Foland v. Jackson County*, 215 Or. App. 157, 164, 168 P.3d 1238, *rev den*, 343 Or. 690, 174 P.3d
2 1016 (2007).

3 Stated another way, the “consistency with the express language” inquiry looks at the text of
4 the plan provision or the regulation in question, as well as the context of other parts of the plan or
5 regulation that are relevant to the textual meaning of that “express language.” *Western Land &*
6 *Cattle, Inc. v. Umatilla County*, 230 Or App 202, 209-10, 214 P.3d 68 (2009). In *Western Land*,
7 the Court of Appeals stated that “[i]n determining whether a local government's interpretation of
8 its land use plan or regulation is “inconsistent with the express language of the comprehensive plan
9 or land use regulation” under ORS 197.829(1)(a), LUBA must apply the statutory construction
10 principles in ORS 174.01013 and ORS 174.020(2)14 that are based on the “express language” of
11 a provision.”¹⁵ *Id.* at 210. *Western Land* further instructs that LUBA should “also apply other
12 textual canons of construction in evaluating a local government's interpretation of its plan or
13 regulation under ORS 197.829(1)(a).” *Id.* “Those canons include some rules applied in ‘first level’
14 *PGE* analysis, such as giving words of common usage their ‘plain, natural, and ordinary meaning’
15 and recognizing that ‘use of the same term throughout a statute indicates that the term has the same
16 meaning throughout the statute.” *Id.*

17 3. Argument.

18 As explained in detail below, Respondent’s interpretation of CDC §32.010 *et seq* is

19 _____
20 ¹³ ORS 174.010 provides:

21 “In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and
22 declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has
23 been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several
provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all.”

24 ¹⁴ ORS 174.020(2) provides that, in the construction of a statute, “[w]hen a general and particular provision
25 are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is
inconsistent with the particular intent.”

26 ¹⁵ Although ORS 174.010 and 020(2) pertain to “the construction of a statute,” both LUBA and the Courts
use them in the interpretation of local ordinances. *Ramirez v. Hawaii T & S Enterprises, Inc.*, 179 Or.App. 416, 425,
39 P.3d 931 (2002).

1 inconsistent with the express language of Chapter 32. The requirements of CDC §32.010 *et seq.*,
2 is triggered by *any* alterations, including the installation of a pipeline, that occurs within a “water
3 resource area” (“WRA”). *See* CDC §32.025¹⁶ (requiring permits for work in a WRA); *See also*
4 CDC §32.050(F) (allowing utilities in WRAs when no other practical alternatives exists.); in a
5 similar vein, CDC §32.020. Stated even more broadly, CDC §32.020(A) extends all of the
6 requirements of Chapter 32 to “*properties*” upon which the protected water features, natural
7 drainage ways, wetlands, riparian corridors, and/or associated transition and setback areas are
8 located:

9 **32.020 APPLICABILITY** A. This section applies to properties upon
10 which a natural drainageway, wetland, riparian corridor, and/or associated
11 transition and setback area, is located. For example, the subject property may
12 be defined as one property that contains a wetland or creek plus an adjacent
13 property of different ownership that includes the transition area or setback
14 area. (Emphasis added).

15 Additionally, CDC §32.020(B) explains that a permit is always needed if there is any alteration of a
16 water resource area:¹⁷

17 ¹⁶ This is clear from the plain language of CDC §32.025 , which states as follows:

18 **32.025 PERMIT REQUIRED**

19 No person shall be permitted to fill, strip, install pipe, undertake construction, or
20 in any way alter an existing water resource area without first obtaining a permit to
21 do so from the decision-making authority, paying the requisite fee, and otherwise
22 complying with all applicable provisions of this chapter.

23 CDC §32.025.

24 ¹⁷ While there are exceptions to the provisions of Chapter 32, located in subsections “C” and “D,” those
25 exceptions do not apply to the instant matter. The exceptions within Subsection “C” are the following:

26 This chapter shall not apply to designated enclosed storm drains that appear in the most
recently adopted West Linn Surface Water Management Plan, unless the enclosed storm
drain is opened as a result of the proposed development. The provisions shall also not apply
to small manmade open roadside drainage swales in residential areas, even if such roadside
swales are identified as open channels by the most recently adopted West Linn Surface
Water Management Plan. The provisions of this chapter also do not apply to drainage
ditches and open channel improvements created in the interior of individual residential lots
that are not identified on the Surface Water Management Plan Map.

1 B. The provisions of this chapter apply to all zones and uses within
2 the City limits. No person, unless excepted by subsection C or D of
3 this section, may clear, fill, build in, or alter existing water resource
4 areas without having obtained a permit from the decision-making
5 authority.

6 Lastly, subsection (C) explains that C.32 applies to development proposals that have water resource
7 areas within their project boundary.

8 C. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to development proposals
9 that have water resource areas within their project boundary. Therefore,
10 the actual wetland, creek, open channel, or stream does not have to be on
11 the subject property under review. * * *.

12 While there is no definition of a "project boundary," the sentence in subsection (C) which
13 immediately follows the term, "project boundary" states the actual wetland, creek, open channel, or
14 stream does not have to be on the subject property under review" in order to trigger a permit
15 requirement. CDC § 32.020(A)-(C).

16 The term "water resource area" is defined at CDC §32.050(E) and Table 32-1.¹⁸ It includes
17 "the drainage channel, creek, wetlands, and the required setback and transition area." Table 32-1
18 sets forth the amount of the setback and transition area in various situations. Thus, the provisions
19 of C.32 are not just applicable when a construction project proposes to run pipeline directly into or
20

21 CDC § 32.020(C).

22 Subsection "D" of §32.020 lists eleven (11) actions which are excluded from all of the provisions within C.32. None
23 of the exceptions apply to AP-03-12. Accordingly, Petitioners do not address any of the eleven (11) within this
24 Petition for Review.

25 ¹⁸ See also CDC §32010(A), which states that the "water resource area" includes "protected water
26 features" and "associated vegetated corridors." CDC §32.010(A) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

27 **32.010 PURPOSE AND INTENT**

28 This chapter has two primary purposes, which serve to accomplish different public
29 policy objectives, but which have overlapping methods of meeting these purposes:

30 A. Improve water quality and protect the functions and values of
31 water resource areas that consist of protected water features and
32 associated vegetated corridors. * * *.

33 CDC § 32.010(A).

1 upon a water feature, such as a wetland, creek or riparian corridor, but also with the setbacks and
2 transition areas.

3 At the core of Respondent's finding lies the premise that the HDD installation of the RWP
4 "avoids impacts" to WRAs because the HDD "bores beneath" them. Rec. 188. Stated another
5 way, Respondent views the alteration of a WRA as being limited to the impacts *to the surface* of
6 the WRA. In this regard, LOT repeatedly asserted that its proposed plan to install the RWP within
7 MSY Park and the OPRD lots does not directly impact or disturb any vegetation, wetlands, other
8 specific water feature.¹⁹ Respondent used the "no disturbance because of HDD" rationale to
9 conclude that "the maximum disturbance limitations contained in Chapter 32 do not apply." Rec.
10 188.

11 However, the Code does not create an exemption to the mitigation requirements for
12 utilities that happen to avoid surface disturbances by instead disturbing the soils *underneath* the
13 surface. Rather, CDC §32.050(F) requires:

14 F. Roads, driveways, utilities, or passive use recreation facilities
15 may be built in and across water resource areas when no other
16 practical alternative exists. Construction shall minimize impacts.
17 Construction to the minimum dimensional standards for roads is
18 required. Full mitigation and revegetation is required, with the
19 applicant to submit a mitigation plan pursuant to CDC 32.070. and a
revegetation plan pursuant to CDC 32.080. The maximum
disturbance width for utility corridors is as follows: * * *
(Emphasis added).

20 Thus, CDC §32.050(F) states, with qualification, that mitigation plans are required when building
21 a utility in or across a WRA. There are no exceptions for underground utilities using HDD. This
22 is because, as discussed in more detail below, the soils located at a depth of 7, 20 or even 65 feet
23 below the surface is as much a part of the protected resource as is the vegetation on the surface.

24 _____
25 ¹⁹ Respondent and LOT cite to the technical memorandum of its alleged ecological expert, David Evans and
26 Associates, Inc., ("DEA memo") as proof that its HDD plan will not impact or disturb any water resource areas. The
DEA memo asserts that the restrictive conditions of C.32 are not triggered because "[n]o impacts will occur within
MSY Park.... and [n]o impacts will occur in areas mapped as WRA." Rec. 8400-1.

1 In a similar manner, CDC §32.050(C) makes clear that a mitigation plan is required if “any
2 portion” of the WRA is “permanently disturbed.” CDC §32.050(C) provides:

3 C. Development shall be conducted in a manner that will minimize
4 adverse impact on water resource areas. Alternatives which avoid all
5 adverse environmental impacts associated with the proposed action shall be
6 considered first. For unavoidable adverse environmental impacts,
7 alternatives that reduce or minimize these impacts shall be selected. If any
8 portion of the water quality resource area is proposed to be permanently
9 disturbed, the applicant shall prepare a mitigation plan as specified in CDC
10 32.070 designed to restore disturbed areas, either existing prior to
11 development or disturbed as a result of the development project, to a
12 healthy natural state. (Emphasis added).

13 The Code does not define the term “disturbance.” Opponents argued below that placing a
14 permanent pipe in the water resource area constitutes a “permanent” disturbance. Rec. 1015-6.
15 Opponents noted that the concept of disturbance is not limited to impacts that occur on the surface
16 of the resource. *Id.*

17 In *Horsey v. City of West Linn*, 57 Or LUBA 534, 537 (2008), the Board stated in dicta that
18 “[i]t may be that the city could interpret “development disturb[ance],” within the meaning of CDC
19 32.090(A) to include only permanent disturbances to the surface of the water resource area, but the
20 challenged decision does not adopt such an interpretation.” However, in light of the express
21 language of the Code, that would not be an “interpretation” at all. Rather, it would constitute
22 adding what has been omitted, something that Oregon law forbids. ORS 174.010.

23 In this regard, the Code does not say: “If ~~any portion~~ the surface of the water quality
24 resource area is proposed to be permanently disturbed, the applicant shall prepare a mitigation plan
25 * * *. Rather, it says: “If *any portion* of the water quality resource area is proposed to be
26 permanently disturbed, the applicant shall prepare a mitigation plan.” Here, there can be no
argument that “a portion” of the WRA is proposed to be permanently disturbed; the applicant
admits that they are proposing to run two 4-foot diameter pipes *underground through* the WPA.
There is no ambiguity: the ground underlying the surface of land within a WRA is in every sense a

1 “portion” of the WRA. There is a fine line between *interpreting* code language and simply
2 *making up* code language in the guise of an interpretation, and here, Respondent attempts the later.
3 *Goose Hollow Foothills League v. City of Portland*, 117 Or App 211, 843 P2d 992, 995
4 (1992)(“To amend legislation *de facto* or to subvert its meaning in the guise of interpreting it is not
5 a permissible exercise.”).²⁰

6 The notion that the WRA is intended only to protect the “surface” of the WRA is further
7 belied by the purpose statement set forth in CDC 32.010. The purpose statement is “context”
8 which can clarify the legislative intent of the phrase “permanent disturbance” as used in CDC
9 32.050(C). *Warburton v. Harney County*, 174 Or App 322, 25 P3d 978 (2001).²¹

10 In *Warburton*, the issue was whether a “hunting, horseback, and trail ride guide training
11 school” was a “public or private school.” The applicant in that case argued that the Court need
12 look no further than the text, and that they were clearly proposing a “private school.” The Court
13 disagreed with that approach, finding that as used in the EFU zone, the term “school” must be read
14 in a more limited manner. Finding support for this position in the various “intent” sections
15 associated with EFU zones, the court noted:

16 While it is true that a policy statement, such as this one, should not
17 provide an excuse for delineating specific policies not articulated in
18 the statutes, such a general purpose statement may serve as a
19 contextual guide for the meaning of a particular statute. *DLCD v.*
Jackson County, 151 Or App 210, 218, 948 P2d 731 (1997), *rev.*
den. 327 Or 620, 971 P2d 412 (1998).

20 Here, one of the express purposes of Chapter 32 (Water Resources Area Protection) is to
21 improve water quality and the functions and values of water resource areas,” which includes
22 “providing filtration, soil infiltration, and natural water purification, and stabilizing slopes to
23

24 ²⁰ See also *Von Lubken v. Hood River County*, 104 Or App 683, 803 P2d 750 (1990), *on recons.*, 106 Or App 226, *rev*
den., 311 Or 349 (1991); *1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court*, 299 Or 344, 703 P2d 207 (1985) (LCDC
25 interpretation overturned as *de facto* amendment of its own rule).

26 ²¹ See also *State v. Kitzman*, 323 Or 529 920 P2d 134 (1996); *Miller v. Meisel Co., Inc.*, 183 Or App 148, 51 P3d 650
(2002)(statutory terms to be given “a broad construction commensurate with the statute’s purpose.”); *State v. Parker*,
299 Or 534, 704 P2d 1144 (1985).

1 prevent landslides.” CDC §32.010(A). Those are all concepts that involve the *subsurface* of the
2 water resource area. As an example, water purification results from water infiltrating through
3 sand and soil, because impurities and pathogens such as Giardia and E Coli are filtered out because
4 they cannot physically fit through the spaces between individual soil particles. Groundwater is
5 purified by the soil itself, and this process is not limited to waters at the surface of the resource.

6 Of course, it does not take a PhD in hydrology to figure out what will happen to the surface
7 of the WRA if the HDD operation results in hydro-fracking that reaches the surface, or if the 4 foot
8 diameter underground pipe springs a leak at some point in the future. But even if those events
9 never occur, there can be no doubt that a 4-foot diameter pipe will have consequences on the
10 WRA’s ability to provide localized water filtration, soil infiltration, natural water purification, and
11 stabilizing slopes to prevent landslides: the very presence of the pipe will alter the land.

12 Furthermore, mere avoidance of the water resource, itself, is not the intent and purpose of
13 Chapter 32. All of Chapter 32’s provisions expressly apply to *properties* within which water
14 resources exist or flowed. Accordingly, Respondent has impermissibly narrowed Chapter 32’s
15 application and protections from *properties* containing WRAs to just the protected water features,
16 themselves. This misconstrues and misapplies the provisions of Chapter 32 to an application
17 contrary to their express purpose which is to improve and protect water resource areas by restricting
18 the alteration of *properties* which contain protected water resource. Thus, Respondent improperly
19 granted LOT a permit to install its RWP within MSY Park and the OPRD Lots, when the proper
20 application of the express provisions of C.32, would prohibit LOT from installation of the RWP.

21 Respondent continued to misconstrue the application of C.32 throughout its multiple
22 Findings of Fact. In Finding 30, Respondent alleges that LOT has proven that “[t]here are no
23 wetlands in, or adjacent to the HDD work area...” Rec. 237-38. While that could be true, that is not
24 the express intent of the provisions within C.32. As stated, §32.020(A)’s provisions apply to
25 *properties* upon which water resources are located. LOT’s own submission admits that MSY Park
26 and the OPRD lots are properties upon which water resources are located. Rec.8404-05. Thus,

1 contrary to Respondent's findings, the provisions in C.32 directly apply to the installation of the
2 RWP regardless of the implementation of HDD within MSY Park and the OPRD lots.

3 In Finding 32, the Respondent examined the HDD under CDC §32.050(C). Respondent
4 cited to the finding in LOT's Memo prepared by David Evans & Assoc. (*See* n19, *supra*) which
5 stated that the HDD installation is in compliance with subsection (C), for the following reasons:

6 [T]he HDD that will occur between 65-to-34-feet below the park and 7 feet
7 below OPRD lots 100 and 200 and will not disturb the soils, wetlands, and
8 vegetation associated with nearby WRAs. Consistent with CDC 32.050(C),
9 the applicant has selected an alternative that avoids all adverse
10 environmental impacts to the WRAs associated with the park and the two
11 OPRD lots.

12 * * *

13 The mitigation requirements of Section 32.070 do not apply. The criterion
14 is met.

15 Rec. 239-40. Respondent wrongly concluded that because the pipeline will be installed 65-34
16 feet below MSY Park and 7 feet below the OPRD lots, that there are no adverse environmental
17 impacts to the WRAs within those properties. According to the City, the lack of adverse
18 environmental impact justifies an exception to the mitigation requirement. However, "no adverse
19 impact" *is not the standard* with respect to subsection (C). Instead the express standard is
20 whether the water resource is "permanently disturbed." CDC §32.050(C). The pipe itself *is* the
21 permanent disturbance. And, as discussed above, the specific Code provision dealing with utilities
22 requires mitigation without any exception or qualification. CDC §32.050(F).

23 Although Respondent repeatedly asserts that HDD satisfies Chapter 32's criteria because
24 "based on the evidence in the record there is no disturbance to MSY Park." Rec. 187, 188, 197, 213,
25 214, 219, 225, 228, 231, 233, 235, 239, 243. Respondent never defined or analyzed the term
26 "disturbed." Yet, without any explanation of "disturbance" and without any analysis of the HDD
process in relation to the definition of "disturbance," Respondent concluded that the HDD does not
created a disturbance. Therefore, Respondent incorrectly concluded it should not require LOT to
prepare a mitigation plan with respect to the HDD project through MSY Park and the OPRD lots.

1 The meaning of the term “disturbed” as used in Chapter 32 has been examined by LUBA in
2 *Horsey v City of West Linn*, 59 Or LUBA 185 (2009). In *Horsey*, a challenge was made in
3 response to the City of West Linn’s (“the City”) approval of a water resource permit. When
4 granting the permit the City did not consider sewer, water and other utility lines a “development,”
5 that, when installed, would “disturb” the protected water resource areas. The City asserted that it
6 need not consider these utilities’ lines because they constituted only a “temporarily disturbance”
7 which resulted from construction. Thus, the City did not find the term “disturb” to include
8 temporary disturbances of property during construction, so long as those areas would be returned
9 to their pre-construction state. *Id.* at 187.

10 The Petitioners in *Horsey* argued that this definition of “disturbed” was inconsistent with
11 the express language of C.32 as well as its plain and ordinary meaning. Petitioners cited Webster’s
12 New World Dictionary of American English, which defined “disturb” as: “to break up the quiet or
13 serenity of; agitate (what is quiet or still).” *Id.* at 188. The *Horsey* petitioners asserted that the
14 definition of the word “development” includes temporary construction activities such as “grading
15 or site clearing, and grubbing in amounts greater than 10 cubic yards on any lot or excavation.”
16 Thus, the word “disturb” cannot reasonably be interpreted to include only “permanently developed”
17 areas. As relevant to this context, petitioners also pointed to CDC §32.050(C), which requires a
18 mitigation plan for any portion of the water resources area that is proposed to be “permanently
19 disturbed.” This demonstrates that the City does distinguish between temporary and permanent
20 disturbances.

21 LUBA agreed with petitioners and further addressed the installation of an underground
22 pipeline. LUBA noted that the City had previously ruled that “[s]torm water drainage facilities,
23 even if underground, [came] within the definition of ‘development’ and therefore are included in
24 the calculation of disturbed area [under C.32].” *Id.* at 189. However, the record indicated that the
25 development at issue also included permanently installed drainage lines, but no explanation as to
26 why the storm drainage facilities were considered “development” that “disturb[s]” the water

1 resources protection area, but drainage and underground utility lines, similarly installed, and
2 likewise permanent, was not a “development” which constituted a disturbance. *Id.*

3 Like in *Horsey*, where the City wrongly found the installation of sewer and water utility
4 lines within a WRA did not constitute a disturbance, Respondent is also wrong in finding no
5 disturbance from the RWP installation within MSY Park and the OPRD. Presumably, the
6 Respondent found the depth of the RWP installation within MSY Park to be a distinguishing factor
7 between LOT’s HDD installation and the customary water utility installation which existed in
8 *Horsey*.

9 However, as explained above, the conclusion that the HDD process is so deep it will avoid
10 impact and disturbance to wetlands and other water resources is flawed. Again, the purpose of
11 Chapter 32 is not avoidance of the individual water feature itself, but instead Chapter 32 seeks to
12 “improve water quality and protect the functions and values of water resources” by imposing
13 restriction upon the entire *property* upon which a natural drainage way, wetland, riparian corridor,
14 and/or associated transition and setback area, is located.

15 Similar to *Horsey*, where the City erroneously determined that no disturbance existed from
16 the installation of a water utilities pipeline, because that merely constituted a “temporary
17 disturbance” resulting from construction, Respondent is also erroneous in finding the
18 mobilization/staging phase that will occur on OPRD lots is only a temporary disturbance on already
19 disturbed land, and therefore, does not implicate the restrictions of Chapter 32. While Respondent
20 accepts LOT’s plan to re-vegetate, the OPRD lots will be trampled by the excessive tonnage of the
21 HDD machinery. Since the permanent installation of the pipeline constitutes a disturbance under
22 Chapter 32, LOT must also comply with the other restrictions provided by Chapter 32 with respect
23 to the mitigation requirements for OPRD.

24 Furthermore, Respondent dismisses the obvious disturbance created by the violent nature
25 of the HDD process. Explained in detail in the Facts section, *supra*, each of three (3) stages of the
26 HDD process pose the possibility of permanent damage the WRAs in MSY Park and/or the OPRD

1 lots. The first phase, mobilization/staging, will take approximately 2 weeks and includes tree
2 removal, installation of tree protection fencing, installation of a temporary construction sound
3 mitigation wall, setup and positioning of the HDD construction equipment and HDD conductor
4 casing. Rec. 8536. This has the potential to cause the following:

5 Within [the OPRD lots], soil compaction could occur from the use of heavy
6 equipment and/ or the use of inappropriate grading techniques when fill is
7 placed over the RWP to fill the open trench cut. Some soil compaction is
8 likely during construction.

9 Rec. 8414. The second stage involves drilling a pilot bore with a steerable bit which will travel the
10 length of the entire installation area. A reamer will then be inserted through the pilot bore hole
11 multiple times to increase the bore diameter to a size suitable to accept the designated pipeline [42"
12 diameter]. Drilling fluid will then be circulated and pumped into the bore hole throughout the
13 pilot bore and reaming processes which is intended to keep the bore hole open to allow the
14 excavated material to be removed. Rec. 8537.

15 Thus HDD has the great potential to create hydrofracture which occurs when the drilling
16 fluid pressure exceeds the strength and stress of the soil surrounding the bore hole. The excess
17 pressure fractures the surrounding soil and the drilling fluid (said to be only water and bentonite)
18 escapes into the surrounding soil. Rec. 8538. According to LOT this will most likely be
19 minimized because most of the HDD will be through high-strength rock.²²

20 The last stage of the HDD process is the "pullback" phase. Here, the 42-inch RWP will be
21 pulled from the bore hole on the east side of the Willamette River with equipment located at the
22 HDD entry staging area on the OPRD property near Mapleton Drive. The pipe will be "pulled"
23 into the bore hole over a single 24-to 48-hour period, during which these construction activities

24 ²² LOT has further not disclosed the potential impact of the HDD process through this rock in relation to
25 MSY Park's rating as "high earthquake vulnerability." This rating is common knowledge and is also easily accessed
26 within West Linn Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan ("NHMP"), which is public record. In fact, members of the City
Council were on the steering committee for the NHMP and participated in drafting and developing the Plan. Although
the current members may not have been on the committee, certainly the current members of the Council are imputed
with this knowledge.

1 will occur around-the-clock to minimize the risk of the pipe becoming stuck within the bore hole.
2 Rec. 8537.

3 Certainly, since LUBA determined in *Horsey II* that the customary installation of a utility
4 pipeline within a WRA is a “disturbance” under Chapter 32, then the violent, lengthy installation
5 process that will occur through the HDD installation of the RWP within MSY Park and the OPRD
6 lots also constitutes a “disturbance.” As such this process triggers the mitigation requirements.

7 Because the Respondent found otherwise, but did so without correctly interpreting the law
8 and without adequately performing the analysis for findings set out in *Larvik v. City of La Grande*,
9 34 Or LUBA 467 (1998), Petitioners respectfully request that LUBA remand the decision for
10 further findings and analysis on this topic.

11 C. Third Assignment of Error.

12 **Respondent Erred by Not Requiring a Mitigation Plan pursuant to CDC §32.050 and CDC**
13 **§32.070. Respondent’s Error Results from its Failure to Properly Interpret the Phrases**
14 **“any Portion” and “Permanent Disturbance.”**

15 1. Issue.

16 CDC §32.050(C) provides:

17 C. Development shall be conducted in a manner that will minimize
18 adverse impact on water resource areas. Alternatives which avoid all
19 adverse environmental impacts associated with the proposed action shall be
20 considered first. For unavoidable adverse environmental impacts,
21 alternatives that reduce or minimize these impacts shall be selected. If any
22 portion of the water quality resource area is proposed to be permanently
23 disturbed, the applicant shall prepare a mitigation plan as specified in CDC
24 32.070 designed to restore disturbed areas, either existing prior to
25 development or disturbed as a result of the development project, to a
26 healthy natural state.

23 *See also* §32.050(F) (Requiring mitigation plans for utility work in WRAs. Opponents argued that
24 the “60% alignment drawings” submitted by the applicant in September of 2012 show that pipeline
25 would have an impact on two water resource areas. Rec. 6824-5; 8745; 8748. Similarly,
26 opponents argued that the bore under Mary S. Young Park required mitigation. Respondent’s

1 findings state, in relevant part:

2 Testimony was submitted regarding the impact the pipeline would have on
3 two WRA crossings on Mapleton Drive, namely Trillium Creek and Heron
4 Creek. The 60% alignment RWP and FWP drawings in the record show
5 the pipeline alignment through each of these two WRAs, but passing under
6 these areas, there is no disturbance. With regard to Trillium Creek, the
7 applicant proposed that the FWP be tunneled underneath the Trillium Creek
8 culvert in the Mapleton Drive right-of-way to avoid any disturbances to this
9 resource. Entry and exit bores pits for the pipeline tunnel will be located on
10 either side of the creek, at a sufficient distance to ensure that there will be no
11 further surface impacts to the resource. The FWP alignment (as shown on
12 the 60% alignment drawings) and the bore pits for the tunnel will be
13 completely located within areas “already disturbed” (*i.e.* pavement or
14 parking) in the Mapleton Drive right-of-way. There will be no impacts on
15 adjacent storm drainage channels, streamside vegetation, and water quality
or water quantity as a result of the proposed pipeline installation. As for
Heron Creek, the applicant has proposed that the RWP be installed over the
top of the Heron Creek culvert via open-cut construction methods in the
Mapleton Drive right-of-way to avoid any disturbances to this resource.
The RWP alignment (as shown in the 60 percent alignment drawings) is
completely contained within paved or developed areas in the Mapleton
Drive right-of-way. There will be no impacts on adjacent storm drainage
channels, streamside vegetation, and water quality or water quality as a
result of the proposed pipeline installation.

16 The mitigation requirements of Section 32.070 do not apply. The criterion
17 is met.

18 Rec. 239-40.

19 As discussed below, Respondents err by implicitly interpreting the code in two separate
20 manner. First, Respondent implicitly finds that the horizontal directional drilling operation will
21 not result in “permanent disturbance” to the WRA so long as there are no “surface impacts” to the
22 resource. Secondly, Respondent implicitly finds that the Code provides an exception to the
23 mitigation requirement when the applicant proposes to disturb areas in the Water Resource Area
24 “(WRA)” that are “already disturbed” or “developed.” These interpretations are inconsistent with
25 the express wording of the Ordinance.

26 **2. Standard of Review.**

1 This assignment of error raises an issue of ordinance interpretation. Petitioners allege an
2 error of law, and LUBA reviews for errors of law. ORS 197.835(9)(a)(D). The rules pertaining to
3 deference set forth in ORS 197.829(1) apply, unless stated exceptions are triggered.

4 **3. Argument.**

5 Petitioner incorporates the arguments set forth in the Second assignment of error.

6 In addition to the arguments set forth above, Respondent errs by implicitly interpreting the
7 Code as providing an exception to the mitigation requirement when the applicant proposes to
8 disturb areas in the Water Resource Area (“WRA”) that are “already disturbed” or “developed.”
9 There is simply no language in CDC Chapter 32 that supports the notion that areas that “already
10 disturbed” or “developed” provide an exception to the mitigation requirements. CDC §32.050(C)
11 does suggest that options that avoid adverse environmental impacts are preferred, and it does stand
12 to reason that areas that are already disturbed or developed would be preferable locations for
13 additional permanent disturbances when concerned to more pristine natural areas. However, the
14 fact remains that both CDC §32.050(C) & (F) require mitigation if there is a “permanent
15 disturbance.” There is no language in the code to suggest that land within a WRA that is
16 “already disturbed” or “developed” can be used as a location where additional disturbance is
17 inflicted on the WRA without consequence.

18 In light of these concerns, the City erred by not requiring a mitigation plan to restore other
19 disturbed areas on or off site to a “healthy, natural state.” CDC §32.050(C).

20 **D. Fourth Assignment of Error.**

21 **Respondent failed to adopt adequate findings on the issue of traffic mitigation measures,**
22 **because the findings do not address, let alone acknowledge the conflicting expert testimony**
23 **and evidence raised by Petitioners.**

24 The Planning Commission found, among many things, that the pipeline application did not
25 meet CDC§60.070(A)(1) and CDC §60.070(A)(3). CDC§60.070(A)(1) requires a finding that:
26 “The site size and dimensions provide: (a) [a]dequate area for the needs of the proposed use; and
(b) [a]dequate area for aesthetic design treatment to mitigate any possible adverse effect from the

1 use on surrounding properties and uses. CDC §60.070(A)(3) requires a finding that “[t]he
2 granting of the proposal will provide for a facility that is consistent with the overall needs of the
3 community.”

4 Respondent interpreted CDC §60.070(A)(1) in conjunction with the Code’s definition of
5 “major utility,” such that the approval criteria requires consideration of construction-related
6 impacts on the community. Rec. 192. (“Thus, to approve the project, the Council must determine
7 that there * * * are adequate measures taken to mitigate for the possible adverse effects of the
8 installation of the utility on surrounding properties and uses.”)

9 Respondent accepted LOT’s assertion that its traffic mitigation plans are adequate to
10 address the significant adverse economic impact its pipeline installation will have upon those
11 businesses located near and along Hwy 43. Rec. 195. Respondent fashioned a condition of
12 approval, number 21, which requires that LOT agree to the following:

13 21. Shop Local Marketing Plan. Prior to the issuance of any City
14 right-of-way permits for work required in conjunction with the proposed
15 pipeline on Highway 43, the applicant shall receive approval of a "Shop
16 Local" Marketing Plan from the City's Economic Development Director.
17 This Plan shall require implementation of the business retention strategies
18 found on pages 62-70 and 164 of Exhibit 'E' prior to the beginning of
19 construction on Highway 43. The Marketing Plan shall be distributed via
20 regular mail to the Chair of the Robinwood Neighborhood Association, all
21 businesses located along Highway 43 within the Robinwood neighborhood
22 boundaries, and the City Manager.

23 Rec. 249.

24 However, Respondent never addressed the economic impact concerns raised during the
25 public hearings and posed in the West Linn Business Impact Report prepared by Michael
26 Wilkerson, Ph.D. (hereinafter “Wilkerson Report” or “Report”).

The Wilkerson Report provides a general explanation of how businesses are historically
impacted by road construction similar to that which West Linn will endure under AP-03-12. The
explanation is based on studies performed by the Department of Transportation or other
government agencies in Oregon and other states, all of which examined traffic counts, surveyed

1 business owners and reviewed their tax records, before and after the road construction. Those
2 studies found that despite all mitigation efforts, *even those similar to the mitigation plan proposed*
3 *by LOT*, there were net losses to businesses located adjacent to road construction areas. Rec. 1308.

4 The Wilkerson Report further explained that there are two (2) categories of businesses.
5 These are: (1) “destination” businesses such as doctors’ offices and insurance brokers; and (2)
6 “impulse” business, such as markets, restaurants and retail stores. Rec. 1311. Because
7 destination business cannot be easily substituted they typically retain their client/customer bases
8 and construction traffic has a negligible impact on their overall viability and net income during
9 construction periods. Rec. 1311.

10 In contrast impulse businesses are such that they allow a customer to easily change their
11 habits to avoid any inconvenience. Rec. 1311. In one study performed by Oregon DOT, traffic
12 counts were recorded for impulse businesses prior to and during road construction. The
13 construction was performed at night only, just as LOT’s traffic mitigation plan intends. Even with
14 nighttime construction, there was a net decrease in traffic by 63.9% for a fast food restaurant and
15 59.3% for a retail store.²³ Rec. 1317.

16 In addition to traffic counts, the Wilkerson Report explained that the DOT also surveyed
17 business owners and residents to measure the perception of the impact. Of 28 business owners
18 surveyed, 58% of them thought that they lost some business due to the construction. Of the
19 residents surveyed, 59% stated that they experienced difficulty getting into and out of businesses
20 adjacent to the road construction. Rec. 1318.

21 The Wilkerson report went on to discuss the results of multiple other studies that examined
22 sales data and net decreases in gross revenue. Rec. 1318-9. Additionally the Report discusses
23 study results involving traffic mitigation efforts such as prohibiting left turns in certain areas and
24 also ensuring at least one area of egress and ingress were left accessible for a business. All studies

25 ²³ The Wilkerson Report explains that the report relied on was for a smaller community and further that the
26 study did have some technical and measurement errors. Rec. 1317.

1 found that regardless of the mitigation efforts, there was an adverse effect on impulse businesses
2 Rec. 1319-22.

3 LOT's construction plans along OR.43 and its corresponding traffic mitigation plans are
4 detailed above in Section II, C.6. As shown, LOT's Construction Management Plan and its two (2)
5 DKS reports never address issues pertaining to West Linn's destination and impulse businesses
6 along the areas of OR.43 subject to the pipeline installation. Further LOT never addressed the
7 issues of net decrease in sales, decrease in gross revenues, or decrease in traffic counts all of which
8 West Linn's businesses will suffer. Rec. 8539-61; 7708-20.

9 While the Respondent is empowered to choose which evidence in the record is most
10 credible and which it will rely upon when making its final ruling, if there is conflicting, believable
11 evidence in the record and that evidence creates an issue as to whether, or not, there is compliance
12 with applicable approval criteria, then the Respondent is required to address the conflicting issues
13 within its findings. *Norvell v. Metro Area LGBC*, 43 Or App 849, 604 P2d 896 (1979).²⁴
14 Respondent never adopted so-called "Norvell findings" addressing any of the specific challenges
15 to AP-03-12 made by the West Linn business community, where those challenges raised issues as
16 to whether, or not, AP-03-12 meets the applicable approval criteria under the CDC.²⁵ Under
17 *Norvell* and its progeny, a remand is warranted to address these issues.

18 **E. Fifth Assignment of Error.**

19 **Councilor Jones Violated Applicable Law by Engaging in Undisclosed *Ex Parte* Contacts**
20 **with the Applicant by Using Staff as a Messenger to Shop A Proposed Set of Conditions of**
21 **Approval to the Applicant In Order to Gain their Acknowledgement and Acceptance of the**
22 **Conditions Prior to the Final City Council Public Meeting on the Topic of these Two Land**
23 **Use Decisions.**

24 **Note:** This assignment of error is premised on facts that are not in the record. Petitioners will be

25 ²⁴ See also *Eckis v. Linn County*, 22 Or LUBA 27, 57 (1991)(citations omitted). *Hillcrest Vineyards v.*
26 *Board of Commn, Douglas County*, 45 Or App 283, 293, 608 P2d 201 (1980).

²⁵ See such challenges in the record at; Rec. Doc. 476, 845, 1024, 1032, 1124, 1182, 1244, 1904, 2874 3201
and 4352 and 1308-1322.

1 seeking a Motion For Evidentiary Hearing and, as part of that request, will ask to depose the
2 elected officials and staff involved in this matter due to unlawful, undisclosed *ex parte* contacts
3 that the decision-maker and staff have admitted having with the applicant. OAR 661-010-0045(1)
4 provides:

5 Grounds for Motion to Take Evidence Not in the Record: The Board
6 may, upon written motion, take evidence not in the record in the
7 case of disputed factual allegations in the parties' briefs concerning
8 unconstitutionality of the decision, standing, ex parte contacts,
9 actions for the purpose of avoiding the requirements of ORS
10 215.427 or 227.178, or other procedural irregularities not shown in
11 the record and which, if proved, would warrant reversal or remand
of the decision. The Board may also upon motion or at its discretion
take evidence to resolve disputes regarding the content of the
record, requests for stays, attorney fees, or actual damages under
ORS 197.845.

12 LUBA has stated that the Board's practice and preference in most cases is to address motions under
13 OAR 661-010-0045 after the parties have submitted briefs on the merits. *Horizon Construction,*
14 *Inc. v. City of Newberg*, 25 Or LUBA 656, 662 (1993); *Citizens Concerned v. City of Sherwood*, 20
15 Or LUBA 550, 555-56 (1991). Out of respect of those cases, Petitioners will defer filing the
16 Motion for Evidentiary Hearing until after the briefs are filed.

17 Councilor Jones engaged in *ex parte* contacts with LOT on or about Saturday, February 9
18 and Sunday, February 10, 2013. As part of these *ex parte* contacts, the West Linn City Council
19 sought and received concurrence from the applicant on LOT's willingness to accept five proposed
20 conditions of approval. Councilor Jones engaged in these communications for the express
21 purpose of potentially changing his vote.

22 Petitioner Scott Gerber had a phone conversation with Councilor Mike Jones on February
23 19, 2013, one day after the written decision was issued. In that conversation, Councilor Jones
24 admitted to Mr. Gerber that he woke up at 2 am Saturday morning, February 9, 2013, and started
25 working on the five conditions of approval that he eventually presented to the public at the
26 February 11, 2013 public hearing. He further stated that after reducing the proposed conditions to

1 paper, Councilor Jones at some point during the next morning called City of West Linn planning
2 staff and presented the conditions to them. He instructed staff to run the conditions by the
3 applicant, LOT, to make sure they were acceptable to the applicant. Staff then dutifully “worked
4 with LOT staff through the weekend,” and at some point prior to the meeting, LOT agreed to
5 accept the five conditions. Councilor Jones specifically told Scott Gerber that LOT had
6 communicated to the West Linn City Council via City of West Linn staff. The responsive
7 information was transmitted to Mayor Kovash, Councilor Jones and the other City Councilors
8 prior to the meeting. Thus, by the time of the public hearing, the entire West Linn City Council
9 knew that LOT was going to accept the five proposed conditions of approval.

10 In the April 25 2013 on-line edition of the West Linn Tidings revealed more details about
11 the whole sordid affair. App-1. The City Manager, Chris Jordan, *admitted* to the newspaper that
12 he acted as the carrier pigeon or “go –between” between Jones and LOT by relaying messages
13 between the decision-maker and the applicant. All of this was done for the purpose of swaying
14 Councilor Jones’ vote! The Tidings article states:

15 Over the course of the two weeks, Jones worked with city staff to
16 add more conditions of approval to the projects that would sway his
17 vote to approval. City Manager Chris Jordan said he had been in
18 contact with both Jones and LOT officials in regard to the new
19 conditions, and that other city staff, such as attorneys, dealt with
20 drafting the new conditions.

19 By the morning of the [Feb. 11, 2013] city council meeting,
20 councilors had received a copy of Jones’ proposed conditions of
21 approval for their review prior to the meeting.

21 “That’s the way the process works, and that’s the way process
22 should work.” Jordan said, saying he talked with each of the
23 councilors many times over the course of the application process.

22 Legally, councilors can interact with city staff and with each other
23 one on one as long as they are not trying to negotiate votes.²⁶

24 ²⁶ In light of the Circuit Court decision in *Dumdi v. Handy*, it is no longer accurate to suggest that
25 one-on-one meetings between Council members for te purpose of discussing and deliberating towards a decision is
26 acceptable practice. See *Dumdi v. Handy*, Lane County Cir. Ct. Case No. 16-10-02760, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law dated Jan. 18, 2011. Public meetings laws can be violated by serial meetings (aka: “walking
quorums”). A serial meeting occurs when sequential meetings are held, each between less than a quorum of the
public body’s members, that when taken together, would constitute a meeting subject to the Public Meetings Law.

1 App. 1. Incredibly, the City Manager seems to see nothing wrong with subverting *ex parte*
2 contact laws and public meeting laws by acting as the secret squirrel messenger to facilitate
3 off-the-record deliberations between decision-makers and the applicant.

4 Both the statute and LUBA case law make clear that a decision-maker talking to staff
5 outside of the public record is not an *ex parte* contact. ORS 227.180(4); *Richards-Kreitzberg v.*
6 *Marion County*, 31 Or LUBA 540, 541 (1996); *Dickas v. City of Beaverton*, 16 Or LUBA 574,
7 581, *aff'd* 92 Or App 168 (1988). However, the policy underlying that principle only goes so far,
8 and clearly the City has crossed the line in this case. A decision-maker cannot use staff as a
9 *messenger* to communicate back and forth with the applicant. Doing so is no different than
10 sending a direct email or having a phone conversation with one of the parties to the case. What
11 the Councilor Jones and Chris Jordan did in this case is no different than if a LUBA Board Member
12 used LUBA staff to communicate *ex parte* with one of the attorneys of record in the case on
13 matters pertaining to the merits of the legal arguments in that attorney's briefs. This case presents
14 the same kind of serious breach of protocol.

15 This Board has repeatedly held that the burden is on petitioners to demonstrate how they
16 have been prejudiced by procedural errors.²⁷ In this case, Petitioners have a right to an impartial

17 *See Dumdi v. Handy, supra; Blackford v. Sch. Bd. of Orange County*, 375 So.2d 578, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
18 (successive meetings between school superintendent and individual school board members violated Florida's
19 Sunshine Law); *State ex rel. Cincinnati Port v. City of Cincinnati*, 668 N.E.2d 903, 906 Ohio 1996 (a public body
20 cannot circumvent public meeting law by setting up back-to-back meetings consisting of less than a majority of its
21 members with the same topic of public business discussed at each meeting).

22 Other states have held that communications by serial one-on-one telephone and serial emails can violate
23 public meeting law, even when the statute in question did not formally address the issue. *Compare Stockton*
24 *Newspapers Inc. Redevelopment Agency*, 214 Cal. Rptr. 561, 171 Cal App 3d 95 (Cal App 3 Dist 1985) (series of
25 telephone calls between individual members and attorney to develop collective commitment or promise on public
26 business violated Brown Act); *Hitt v. Mabry*, 687 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. App. 1985) (injunction restraining board of
trustees from arriving at a decision affecting the district by way of private, informal telephone polls, or conferences of
the board members.); *Wood v. Battle Ground School Dist.*, 107 Wn App 550, 564, 27 P3d 1208 (2001) (emails sent to
a quorum constituted a violation of the public meeting law); *Del Papa v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. & Cmty. Coll.*
Sys., 114 Nev. 388, 956 P.2d 770, 778 (1998) (use of serial electronic communication by quorum of public body to
deliberate toward or to make a decision violates state open meeting law).

²⁷ As an example, in *Forest Park Estate v. Multnomah County*, 20 Or LUBA 319, 331 (1990), LUBA declined to
sustain petitioner's claim of prejudice because, although petitioner contended that its written and oral responses were
impaired because a staff report was issued late, petitioner failed to "identify any ways in which its written and oral

1 tribunal. A decision-maker seeking out and receiving communications from the applicant
2 undermines the legitimacy of the entire process and is a strong indication of bias. *Tierney v. Duris,*
3 *Pay Less Properties*, 21 Or App 613, 536 P2d 435 (1975). An impartial decision-maker would
4 not seek to secretly communicate outside of the public meeting process, but would instead
5 communicate with the applicant by re-opening the record and holding a new session wherein
6 public testimony is received. Petitioners are prejudiced by the fact that Councilor Jones voted on
7 a matter that he may not have been impartial, as indicated by his actions in communicating in
8 secret with the applicant.

9 In light of these allegations, the proceedings were tainted beyond repair and decision
10 must be remanded.

11 **F. Sixth Assignment of Error**

12 Petitioner hereby Incorporates by Reference all Five of the Assignments of Error Raised
13 by Attorney Peggy Hennessey in the Petition for Review filed on 16 July 2013 in LUBA Case No.
14 2013-023.

15 **VI. CONCLUSION**

16 Based upon the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully request that this Board remand the
17 matter with instruction that the West Linn City Council follow the express language of the code,
18 regulations and state statutes established by the City of West Linn and the State of Oregon.

19 Respectfully submitted this 16th day of July, 2013.

20 **ANDREW H. STAMP, P.C.**

21
22 _____
23 Andrew H. Stamp, OSB No. 974050
24 *Attorney for Petitioners*

25
26 _____
responses would have been different or more complete if the staff report had been available earlier." *See also*
Apalategui v. Washington County, 14 Or LUBA 261, 267, *aff'd in part, rev'd in part* 80 Or App 508 (1986).

Pelz, Zach

From: Thornton, Megan
Sent: Monday, December 16, 2013 8:17 AM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: FW: Ex-parte disclosure related LOT

Zach,

Here is another ex parte communication disclosure.

~Megan

Megan Thornton, Assistant City Attorney
Administration, #1663

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From: Tan, Jennifer
Sent: Saturday, December 14, 2013 9:04 AM
To: Thornton, Megan
Subject: Ex-parte disclosure related LOT

Hi Megan,

Over the past week LOT topic has come up when I was with the following people. LOT discussion was limited. I did not learn anything new about LOT that I did not already know before talking to the following people. I was not biased by anything that was mentioned.

Kerry Sovde
Kelly Larsen
Becky Brody
Todd Jones
Don Kingsborough
Lorie Griffith
Vicki Handy
Bob Martin
Ray Kindley
Kris Olson
Sumi Kim
Beth Rice
Eila Chapel
Lisa Chang
Pam Nicolson
Julie Garcia
Glen Friedman
Tina Decker



Councilor Jennifer Tan
jtan@westlinnoregon.gov
West Linn City Councilor
22500 Salamo Rd
West Linn, OR 97068
P: (503) 657-0331
F: (503) 650-9041
Web: westlinnoregon.gov

100 Years
1913 - 2013



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Pelz, Zach

From: Kerr, Chris
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2013 4:18 PM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: FW: Happy Thanksgiving from the City of West Linn!

Fyi

Chris Kerr, Economic Development Director/Interim Planning Director
Economic Development, #1538

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Public Records Law Disclosure This e-mail is subject to the State Retention Schedule and may be made available to the public.

From: Gail Holmes [mailto:gholmes927@aol.com]
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2013 11:06 AM
To: Webmaster
Cc: Carson, Jody; Kovash, John; Frank, Thomas; Tan, Jennifer; Jones, Michael; Kerr, Chris
Subject: Re: Happy Thanksgiving from the City of West Linn!

I wish I could, my heart is still breaking over the lack of concern the City of West Linn has in the safety and welfare of my friends in Robinwood.

Sent from my iPad,

Gail Holmes
Willamette

On Nov 27, 2013, at 10:57 AM, City of West Linn <webmaster@westlinnoregon.gov> wrote:

Hi ! Thank you for reading this week's email newsletter from the City of West Linn - stay in touch at WestLinnOregon.gov.

Is this email not displaying correctly?
[View it in your browser.](#)



WEST LINN
WEDNESDAYS




Happy Thanksgiving!

The City of West Linn wishes you a safe, happy, and relaxing holiday weekend.



Register Now for the Ugly Sweater Dash

Join the City on December 14th at 9 am for a 5k run to benefit the West Linn Food Pantry. Entry fee is \$25 plus 2 cans of food.



Community Tree Lighting December 6

This year's Tree Lighting is next Friday, at 6:00 pm outside City Hall. Santa will be making an appearance on an antique fire truck!



Holiday Parade on December 14th

The City's Holiday Parade starts at 10 am on the 14th and there is still time to register to participate. See you there!



Neighbors Helping Neighbors

Saturday December 14th is also Neighbors Helping Neighbors where volunteers will be helping neighbors in need! Be on the lookout for another volunteer day in 2014.

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Pelz, Zach

From: LOTWP
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 7:43 AM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: FW: November Update from Councilor Mike Jones

Ex parte

From: Mike Jones [<mailto:michaelkjones@comcast.net>]
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2013 10:19 AM
To: Jones, Michael
Subject: FW: November Update from Councilor Mike Jones


From: Bonoffs [<mailto:bonoffs@comcast.net>]
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2013 10:02 AM
To: Mike Jones
Subject: Re: November Update from Councilor Mike Jones

Hi Mike, I hope all's well, appreciate you sending this along. I continue to believe the process was flawed and ultimately not in the best interests of the City of West Linn. The need for an emergency source was not debatable. But the lack of a meaningful alternatives analysis process on the part of Lake Oswego - and the lack of demand for that by West Linn, particularly in light of technical issues raised by the planning commission, was shocking for a project of this magnitude. We may have gotten to the same place, but we all would have been able to take some comfort in knowing that the range of impacts was fully considered, and that it was truly the best available option for both cities. I do appreciate your efforts and sincerity throughout a very trying period. Thank you for that.

Mike

----- Original Message -----

From: Mike Jones
To: Mike Jones
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2013 9:06 AM
Subject: November Update from Councilor Mike Jones



From the Desk of Councilor Mike Jones
November 2013
City of West Linn

A TIME TO GIVE THANKS

We have so much for which to be thankful. I hope all of us take a few minutes over the next days and remember all the blessings that we have. We live in a great Community with great neighbors and I try to appreciate that every day.

Pelz, Zach

From: Thornton, Megan
Sent: Monday, January 06, 2014 1:23 PM
To: Tan, Jennifer
Cc: Pelz, Zach
Subject: RE: Ex-parte disclosure related LOT

Councilor Tan,

Thank you. I will forward this to Zach to include in the record.

~Megan

Megan Thornton, Assistant City Attorney
Administration, #1663

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From: Tan, Jennifer
Sent: Monday, January 06, 2014 1:20 PM
To: Tan, Jennifer; Thornton, Megan
Subject: RE: Ex-parte disclosure related LOT

Hi Megan,

I have additional people to add to the list below. Again, LOT discussion was limited. I did not learn anything new about LOT that I did not already know before talking to the following people. I was not biased by anything that was mentioned.
Randall Fastabend
Sara Frazier
Rod Clark

Thank you.
Jenni



100 Years
1913 - 2013



Councilor Jennifer Tan
jt看@westlinnoregon.gov
West Linn City Councilor
22500 Salamo Rd
West Linn, OR 97068
P: (503) 657-0331
F: (503) 650-9041
Web: westlinnoregon.gov

West Linn Sustainability Please consider the impact on the environment before printing a paper copy of this email.

From: Tan, Jennifer
Sent: Saturday, December 14, 2013 9:04 AM
To: Thornton, Megan
Subject: Ex-parte disclosure related LOT

Hi Megan,

Over the past week LOT topic has come up when I was with the following people. LOT discussion was limited. I did not learn anything new about LOT that I did not already know before talking to the following people. I was not biased by anything that was mentioned.

Kerry Sovde
Kelly Larsen
Becky Brody
Todd Jones
Don Kingsborough
Lorie Griffith
Vicki Handy
Bob Martin
Ray Kindley
Kris Olson
Sumi Kim
Beth Rice
Eila Chapel
Lisa Chang
Pam Nicolson
Julie Garcia
Glen Friedman
Tina Decker

Pelz, Zach

From: LOTWP
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 7:43 AM
To: Pelz, Zach
Subject: FW: Moving forward

Ex parte

-----Original Message-----

From: Scott Gerber [mailto:jumpin@cmn.net]
Sent: Sunday, December 01, 2013 7:58 PM
To: Tan, Jennifer
Subject: Moving forward

Councilor Tan

Well, the story continues. First, I would like to say that I admired the stance that you and Councilor Frank took in voting against the recent Intertie IGA. I appreciate that the two of you recognized that the wording of that agreement was not consistent with the conditions of approval. It is unfortunate that the rest of the council was so easily convinced that this IGA as written was adequate. West Linn's loss.

Although my position with you and the rest of the council has been an adversarial one, I do recognize that you are under significant pressure to do what is right for all the citizens of West Linn. While you may have been convinced that the LOT project is the best course of action, I strongly disagree, and as such have had to do what I could to stop it. I am not by nature a contentious person, but I am firm in my convictions. Most of all, I believe in the public process. I believe you have been given poor advice and guidance since the beginning of this process when the whole ex parte thing was misinterpreted and the people's voice was shut down.

As you know, LUBA has remanded to the council on certain issues. Councilor Tan, I do believe that you strive to do what is right and it is because of this that I am writing you now. The original appeal was greatly flawed. The mayor knowingly disregarded the public process and the council as a whole failed to hold him responsible. It wasn't like he made a mistake. He was asked to comply with legitimate requests to follow the public process and he refused. Following this, the council refused to follow protocol when they did not examine issues of bias and requests for his recusal.

Regardless of how you may have been advised at the time, I believe you are aware now of how the project opponents were disdained in the process as it occurred back in February. I urge you to take a good unbiased look at what transpired. I do not see how you can ignore the abuse of the public process and just rubber stamp this through. I strongly feel that the council decision has to be negated and either remanded back to the Planning Commission decision or started anew.

I have no doubt that you will be advised differently. In fact, I would think that any course of action that would impede this project would be frowned upon. It is too far along. Will that make it acceptable for you to approve the abuse of the public process that took place during the hearing?

LOT is on the fast track. They are completely committed and assume that the West Linn Council is in their pocket.

Lawyers rule the day and they have the fire power to fight anything they don't like. I am sure you read the recent article which proclaimed that they would defend OPRD against any claims made by the heirs of Mary S. Young. Did you wonder about that? Did you know that Mary's grandson had heard about what was going on and is not happy about it? Did you know of this stipulation in the original deed:

"Without limitation, neither this property nor any previously granted property by the undersigned to the state shall be used for water conditioning, pumping, or any other similar purposes."

Small wonder that they might be concerned as they are in direct violation of this. Mary's grandson shared this with me, but he does not have the funds to fight it.

I bring this to your attention as just one more example of what is inherently wrong with all of this. LOT bullies their way through anything that causes them problems, and I am sure they will do the same with this remand. Is The West Linn City Council totally under their thumb?

Please give all of this your consideration as this process moves forward. I don't envy your position, but it is one you have sought out. There is no way out that will satisfy everyone. Why am I appealing to you? Certainly you owe me nothing. However, I believe you do owe the people of this city and I believe you are perhaps the only one involved in this who might place integrity and respect for the public process above achieving the desired results. Ultimately your decision should be one that you believe wholeheartedly is the right one.

I would be happy to sit down and discuss this or other thoughts you may have on how to deal with this.

Respectfully,

Scott Gerber

Sent from my iPad

Sent from my iPad